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ABSTRACT 
ORGANIZATIONAL SCIENCE/FICTION: 
THE POSTMODERN IN THE MANAGEMENT DISCIPLINES 
MAY 1987 
MARTA B. CALAS, B.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO 
M.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY 
Ph. D. , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Linda Smircich 
Traditionally, the organizational disciplines have been 
understood as the scientific study of organizational practices. This 
dissertation proposes, instead, that the discipline is constituted 
through specific textual and discoursive representations and by the 
limits imposed on such representations. It explores the constitution of 
the management disciplines as particular formations of the modern 
historical period, and as determined Kritings Kithin the institutional 
domain of the modern American university. 
Informed by recent Horks in the human sciences, heralding a 
transition from modernity to postmodernity, it is argued here that: 
1. The organizational disciplines are articulated in the 
development of the modern American university and its conditions of 
possibility at specific points in time. 
2. These disciplines are discoursive formations defined by the 
university-society relationship. 
3. The representations fihich purports to "advance knowledge” in 
the’organizational disciplines are discourses particular to their time 
and place, constantly reinterpreted to re-mark the modern concern for 
vi 
"scientific disciplinary progress. 
Analyses of three foundational organizational texts illustrate 
the plausibility of these arguments: Barnard's (1938) Ibg.FyoQtiQQg q£ 
the Eiecytive; McGregor's ( 1960) Ib§ iyQ§Q Sic3§_Q£-Ehte£:pi:i§e; and 
Mintzberg's ( 1973) I&e_l!atyce_QC_haQiSSrlel_MQCiS. The texts are read 
against specific contexts and intertexts, following 
poststructuralist/deconstructivist strategies. These readings sustain 
the concluding proposition: The possibility for the "organizational 
sciences" to perform as postmodern cultural critique. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: AN-OTHER FICTION 
Part I 
The organizational sciences are currently characterized by major 
debates. There are serious discussions centered on the nature of the 
organizational phenomena (the subjective/objective debate), on the 
claims to knoRledge in theorizing and researching (the question of 
degree of participation of the knower in the known), and on the 
appropriate techniques for capturing this knowledge ( the 
quantitative/qualitative methodology debate). 
These ontological/epistemological/methodological debates have 
been, in most cases, attempts to resolve the issue of truth/knowledge in 
the organizational disciplines. They point to an on-going contest 
between the dominant paradigm of research and theory and other less 
dominant approaches that intend to confront the dominant views. Rithin 
the debates there seems to be an intention to substitute one approach 
for the uncovering of true knowledge with another. 
Other disciplines in the human sciences have been experiencing 
similar unrest, e. g. anthropology, architecture, art, legal studies, 
literature, music and dance, philosophy, social theory, theology (Marcus 
and Fischer, 1986; Taylor, 1987). But some theorists have attempted to 
stand back from the debates to take a meta perspective, and to 
understand the confrontations within their disciplines differently. 
1 
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From one perspective, the debates appear to be grounded in confronting 
"false** with "true" because at some point in history "truth or falsity" 
became a style of thinking and saying equated with knowledge. Rith this 
kind of understanding, the grounds of debate shift from a question of 
true or false to a question of representation. The questions that 
become important are not Hhat is the truth? Hhat is knowledge? but How 
is "truth" made?, and How is "knowledge" fashioned?. 
Scholars questioning "truth and knowledge" in this fashion have 
conceived of the need to do "discipline" differently. They question 
their discipline* s construction from socio/historical and discoursive 
perspectives. These perspectives foreground the institutional 
arrangements and specialized discourses of "the disciplines" as 
inclusion/exclusion mechanisms which determine what counts as knowledge. 
They also foreground the power/knowledge aspects of the disciplines, and 
the non-neutral status of knowledge and of the knowledge-producing 
institutions. In summary, these perspectives propose that the quest for 
truth and knowledge in the disciplines is itself a representation of 
knowledge bounded to the modern cultural period. 
This manner of questioning the disciplines pays attention to the 
multiple social situations, particular discourses, and discontinuous 
occurrences which, as a very entangled web, provided conditions of 
possibility for the emergence and development of academic disciplines. 
They are commentaries which pay attention to the disciplinary 
productions —how they are fashioned and how they are sustained as 
claims to knowledge- by overlapping them with other productions which 
have been excluded from their limits. In any case, these commentaries 
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do not claim to be moce.tcutUCyl or betteC—ISQQHledge than that upon 
Rhich they are commenting. They are interested productions Rhich, on 
calling attention to Rhat they are doing, point at the traditional 
"disciplinary knoRledge" and "disciplinary boundaries" as equally 
interested productions. They are Rays to question the limits of 
knoRledge by pushing them into the realms of their "outside, " of their 
"margins. " 
The activities described above are mostly conducted through the 
adoption of poststructuralist theory, Rhich addresses these issues of 
knoRledge and representation in a form of criticism called 
deconstruction. This form of criticism questions the claims to truth of 
any human production by addressing its taken for granted textual 
constructions. It points to the instability of human signification and 
to the difficulties of grounding truth/knoRledge on such activities. 
Poststructuralist theory has become a common ground for theorists and 
researchers from diverse fields to engage in reflexive activities over 
their disciplinary constructions, and to re-define the notions of 
theorizing/researching in their fields. Also, these activities are noR 
considered a signal of a changing cultural condition: The transition in 
Hestern society from the Modern to the Postmodern period. 
From this discussion, I propose this dissertation project as an 
attempt to create aRareness in the organizational sciences of the 
possibilities offered by taking a poststructuralist stance over ours 
current debates. It is also an attempt to question the limits to "truth 
and knoRledge" imposed by traditional disciplinary understanding in this 
"modern field of knoRledge." And beyond, it is an attempt to join the 
k 
other "human sciences" in the present production of the Postmodern 
condition in Hestern society. 
0rgani2ational Sciences: A Moment of Dlsjuncture 
In recent years the disciplinary "outputs" of nhat we call 
9r9§0izatignal_sciences_literature have increasingly displayed signals 
of confusion over the generated/generation of knoKledge in the field. 
In some cases there seems to be despair over the inability of the 
discipline to fulfill and transcend, from research to practice, its 
promises of general theories of organization, with the power for 
predicting and explaining macro and micro organizational phenomena ( i. e 
from adequate "fit" between organizational structure and environment to 
the "fit" of individual attributes to specific organizational activities 
and expectations). 
For example, Rallace (1983) is explicit in saying that confusion 
in level of analysis and parochialism in conceptual definitions are 
impediments to a general theory of personnel and industrial relations; 
Brousseau (1983) proposes a model of informed choice to develop a more 
comprehensive and precise model of job-person dynamics; Jick and Mitz 
(1985) emphasize the importance of overcoming inconsistencies in 
previous research findings pertaining to sex differences in work stress 
in order to build a valid theory of their relationship; Ronen and 
Shenkar (1985) propose some new methodological developments in an 
attempt to uncover underlying cultural and social traits in different 
countries that, they think, produce differences in employee work goals; 
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and Van Fleet and Yukl (1986) still hope for a GUT (Grand Onified 
Theory) of leadership to emerge in the next century. Many have been 
working toward the goals of "general theories" for a long time, and few 
are as optimistic as Locke (1986) who asserts that there has been a 
progressive development in the understanding of the phenomenon of job 
attitudes since the times of Scientific Management, especially in recent 
decades. 
The difficulties in the type of work mentioned above are 
commonly explained as due to insufficient methodological rigor 
-inadequate sample size; low power in statistical tests; low 
reliability in instrumentation; confounding effects due to deviances in 
research subjects- (e. g. Marino and Lange, 1983; Mayes and Ganster, 
1983; McElroy and Downey, 1983; Phillips and Lord, 1986) and/or 
theoretical limitations -inadequate or incomplete models-(e. g. 
Jakofsky and Peters, 1983; Lord and Smith, 1983; Pfeffer and 
Davis-Blake, 1986; Ralston, 1985; Ramaprasad and Mitroff, 1984; Salancik 
1984; Szilagyi and Schweiger, 1984). 
The difficulties in developing definite knowledge in the field 
have not prevented researchers and theoreticians from proposing the 
practical applications of their findings (as may be easily ascertained 
by perusing the "applied/practical implications" paragraphs in the 
majority of these writings). More recently, however, very serious 
considerations have been given to the lack of utilization of traditional 
academic research in the field of organizational practice (e. g. Beyer, 
1982; 1983). Beyer (1982) mentions that as organizational studies 
became a distinct field by the mid-1950 researchers were oriented toward 
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the production of basic research, as expected. From her perspective 
research utilization is a new issue for the organizational researchers' 
agenda. Thus, Beyer and Trice (1982) offer various recommendations so 
that researchers can ensure their research will be utilized in 
organizational practice. But they do not admit that the traditional 
research approach needs reconsideration. 
HoKever, others do. For example, Thomas and Tymon (1982) point 
at some difficulties in traditional organizational research ( e. g. 
research variables lacked operational validity because they Here often 
not subject to managerial control) that limit their relevance for 
organizational practice. As an ansner to these difficulties, bitterer 
and Jelinek (1983) propose organization design. They define this 
approach as the practical application of general knoHledge to a specific 
client's organization problem, Hhich shares the properties of action 
(context specific) research and knonledge (traditional generalizable) 
research. But McGuire (1986) conceptualizes the problem as residing 
somenhere else. She emphasizes the different realities academic and 
practitioners may be approaching nhen it appears that they are 
approaching the same situation ( i. e. the organizational context). In 
her vien it is important to learn about differences in cognitive 
processes betneen researchers and managers before any of the more 
immediate recommendations to foster utilization could be implemented. 
In summary, the traditional understandings about discovery and 
application of knonledge in the organization sciences posit the 
possibility of eliciting measurable, comparable, and generalizable 
phenomena relevant for managerial practice. These understandings keep 
T 
organizational researchers and theorists from abandoning the path of 
normal science (Kuhn, 1970) in spite of lack of consistent and 
cumulative results. The latter assertion is perhaps difficult to grasp 
in view of the numerous discussions about the either preparadigmatic or 
multiparadigmatic state of the field (e. g. see Astley ( 1985) for a 
recent summary of this issue). Rhat is not often observed is that these 
discussions and understandings are conducted within a philosophical 
framework to which the organizational sciences have already made a firm 
\ 
commitment: empiricism and positivism (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan, 
1980). 
A more recent stream of organizational theory and research. 
frequently associated with phenomenological and/or critical 
philosophical positions , and often embedded in approaches known as 
"organizational culture/symbolism," is contesting the aforementioned 
(and by now traditional) difficulties in the field (1). This literature 
points to the nature of organizational phenomena as constituted in the 
realm of organizational participants' interactions and meaning-making 
activities. The positions taken here usually pay greater attention to 
the particular contexts in which these activities occur, and would 
rarely propose generalizability for their findings (e. g. Martin, 
Feldman, Hatch, and Sitkin (1983) is one of few exceptions in this 
regard). Rhat is often implicit in this type of research is the 
stability of the human processes in which the findings are based. That 
is, there is an apparent consensus among these researchers about the 
existence of stable "hidden structures" where the meanings and 
understandings are formed and maintained. In general, they represent. 
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Kithin the organizational literature, the structuralist philosophical 
orientation discussed in the second part of this chapter. 
For example, within the more phenomenological/interpretive 
perspective Smircich and Morgan (1982) offer a view of leadership based 
on the management of organizational symbols by those in positions of 
authority. They indicate the importance for the leader to deal with the 
equivocality of interactive situations by attending to the interpretive 
schemes of those involved. Once this is attained, the meanings and 
values conducive to desirable organized action can be embodied through 
appropriate symbolic discourse; Barley (1983) offers a semiotic approach 
to elucidate rules by which members of a work culture consistently and 
coherently generate meaning; Frost and Morgan (1983) suggest that 
focusing upon sensemaking leads to a search for key themes that 
structure a situation; Gregory (1983) explores the possibility of 
approaching the organizational members native views through an 
ethnoscience approach; Schall (1983) proposes understanding the culture 
of particular organizational groups through elicitation of their 
communication-rules; Smith and Simmons (1983) argue that by paying 
attention to the symbols, tales, legends, and myths that organizational 
members use to describe their experience it is possible for researchers 
to tune into organizational groups' operative dynamics that otherwise 
remain inaccesible. 
There are also some attempts to capture the "stable structures 
of meaning" in more overt and public organizational manifestations. For 
example. Trice and Beyer (1984) caution that studying organizational 
cultures requires the search for elusive meanings. These can be better 
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found in the latent expressive implications of particular organizational 
rites and ceremonies; and Pondy and Huff (1985) propose the possibility 
of symbolic exploitation of "routineness" to reduce the exceptional 
conditions surrounding organizational change. 
For the interpretive/organizational culture researchers the main 
limitations in attaining knoKledge are the problematics encountered in 
eliciting the meanings and meaning-making structures from the researched 
organizational members. Beyond the more obvious preoccupations Kith 
method, these commentaries often focus on the difficulties experienced 
by the researchers in ascertaining the validity of their findings from 
the organizational participants, and sometimes they focus on the 
disturbing activities in the organizational setting produced by the 
research enterprise itself (e.g. Louis, 1985; Mirvis, 1985; Adams and 
Ingersoll, 1985). 
These latter considerations have also provoked other more 
critical perspectives about the relationship between the producers of 
knowledge (researchers) and the producers of organizational phenomena 
(researched). The question: "Hhat kind of knowledge is possible?" which 
has informed the interpretive research agenda, has been overturned in 
other recent works to question: "Knowledge for what, is possible?" For 
example, Jones (1985), Deetz (1985a), and Butcher (1985) emphasize the 
importance of "organizational culture research" in instilling ethical 
values in organizations. And others (e. g. Jermier, 1 985; Rosen, 1985; 
Deetz, 1985b; Stablein and Nord, 1985; Steffy and Grimes, 1986) follow 
critical theory perspectives (represented here by neo-Marxist, Frankfurt 
School, and Habermas' positions) and concede the researchers an 
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important position in the emancipation of organizational participants 
from the ideologies in which they may be entangled. These are positions 
which join the participatory (e.g. Freire, 1971; Smith, 1982) and action 
research views (e.g. Morgan, 1983a; Morgan and Ramirez, 1984) to 
redefine a more active and responsible researchers' role in the 
consequences of knowledge generation and consumption. 
One may say, in general, that interpretive and critical 
organizational research differ from their more traditional counterpart 
not only in their position about the nature of the organizational 
phenomena - usually proposed as context-specific, and residing in the 
realm of human processes for the construction of meaning but also in 
their view of the possible relationship between organizational research 
and organizational practice. The less traditional research is more 
likely to consider important the multiple views of organizational 
constituencies, not just the managerial view. It is more committed to 
promoting an ethical view of organizations, and in its critical stance 
is even likely to adopt an anti-managerial view. 
In any event, be it content or process oriented, generalizable 
or context-specific, grasped by quantitative or qualitative methodology, 
etc., the traditional and the less traditional research in the 
organizational sciences have rested on the assumption that what they 
envision as true knowledge is possible. That is, they rest on the 
assumption that there are forms of organizational phenomena, external to 
the research process, that can be theorized and then captured by 
empirical research activity. This knowledge is to be maintained (e. g. 
in books, journal articles, conference papers) and utilized in some 
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other forms (e.g. for extending knowledge in further research; for 
teaching students; for helping organizational practitioners first and 
foremost, perhaps, for helping the researchers in their tenure 
processes). 
Few are as perceptive as Gray, Bougon, and Donnellon (1985) in 
recognizing that meaning-making in organizations is an unstable and 
precarious condition. For them the organizational meanings are 
constantly destroyed and constructed in some other ways. Unfortunately, 
on taking a critical theory, "organizational-members-empowerment" 
position, they fail to recognize that their proposition "lifts the mat" 
from a stable ground for empirical knowledge about organizations. One 
may question the possibility of following their recommendations to 
elicit those structures which account for the constructions/destruction 
of meanings; after all, aren’t those "structures" also precarious 
meanings? And beyond, why would the researchers be excluded from 
suffering this condition? 
Perhaps, Smircich (1985) understood this situation very well 
when she said: 
"... Drawing conclusions about experience is always 
arbitrary, depending upon what one chooses to bracket and 
pay attention to. In the same way, although these symbols 
are fixed upon these pages in an apparent stable way, the 
reader’s interpretation of them and my interpretation of 
them are in no way fixed and stable. . . Hhen I read these 
pages a year from now, they will no doubt mean different 
things to me...There are no authoritative conclusions, just 
the confrontations of our multiple interpretations (.72). 
These latter comments reflect the position which I adopt in this 
project. It is a position 
knowledge in the organizational 
which denies the possibility of true 
sciences as commonly envisioned within 
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the field. It denies that organizational research can be predicated as 
"knonledge about organizations" because the knoRledge it produces is as 
unstable in its meaning as the meaning of the organizational phenomena 
itself. Mine is a position Rhich proposes that the disciplinary 
difficulties stem precisely from the understandings about Rhat the 
organizational sciences are and Rhat they are supposed to do. 
In this dissertation I discuss hoR the field's predicaments are 
nested in the ambiguous and sometimes paradoxical position it occupies 
Rithin its oRn cultural space. The paradoxes and ambiguities appear, 
for example, in the gap betReen management theory and research and 
management practice, in the uneasy relationship betReen the concept of 
"scholasticism" and the concept of "application" in the field, and in 
the questionable status of the organizational sciences Rithin the 
intellectual and scientific community in the university. On observing 
the organizational sciences’ difficulties Rith theory and research one 
must not fail to consider the lack of influence and acceptance that the 
scholarly management Rork has had in the larger social Rorld of Rhich it 
is a part. Unfortunately the latter has been explained more often than 
not as a result of the former - the lack of definitive theory and 
research, and the lack of conclusive results, prevent the advancement of 
good applications. It is my position that the current difficulties of 
the organizational sciences Rill not be resolved through the circularity 
of this kind of thinking. 
Rather than staying Rithin the discipline and asking: Rhat are 
the difficulties Rith theory and research in organizations Rhich prevent 
the organizational sciences from advancing more conclusive results and 
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more useful applications?, in this project I move to a different kind of 
discussion that pertains to the organizational sciences as they belong 
to the larger social milieux of the modern knowledge-producing 
institutions and the modern scholarly disciplines. This discussion 
stands back from the immediate understandings in the field and asks: How 
did the organizational sciences become "sciences"? How is it that in a 
culture centered around business organizations and economic issues, 
these organizational sciences are separated from organizational 
practice? 
The discussion is embedded in the assumption that the wider 
cultural space to which the organizational sciences belong is undergoing 
a marked change from that on which they were founded, and that it is 
this change that permits me to contextualize the arguments on social and 
historical grounds. I will further propose that in their present form 
the field’s understandings and discourses will not withstand the change. 
Thus, it is time now to ask: Hhat is this dissertation about? 
Problematizing "The Discipline" 
Usually there is the idea that to write a dissertation in the 
organizational sciences one should start by identifying a problem within 
the discipline and propose a resolution for that problem in a way that 
could be assesed as "an_original_contribution_tQ_knowledge_within_the 
discipline. " My dissertation is not about investigating a problem, as 
defined by the discipline, in order to advance knowledge within it. One 
may say that it is, instead, a work set out to problematize: 
"investigating problems, as defined by the discipline, in order to 
advance knowledge within it. " 
This position immediately questions the notions "investigation 
of problems," "disciplinary definitions," "advancing knowledge,'* and 
"within," and proposes that they should be taken as disQoursiyg 
formations determined by/determining the_mQdern_historical_perigd_in 
Hestern_society. On taking this position, one is observing the notion 
of discipline as a cultural/historical artifact given in language, 
instead of accepting a conception of discipline as "the site where 
knowledge about a subject is accumulated. " 
In order to take a position which problematizes "the discipline" 
in this manner one must, however, proclaim that one is standing outside 
the period in which modern disciplines were defined (i. e. one cannot 
"observe the modern" if one is part of it). To that effect the 
dissertation promotes its own postmodern stance and declares the 
postmodernity of its effort by constantly calling attention to what it 
is doing. It works in a space that contrasts discipline as "knowledge 
about something" (the "normal" modern notion) with "discipline" as 
"knowledge as." The latter notion focuses on the concept "discipline" 
as a human pro“duction which pro“Claims that it is kQQwlgcJge. 
More specifically, the manner in which "the problematic status 
of the discipline" is established by the dissertation is not by 
questioning whether the knowledge claimed by the discipline is truthful 
and close_to_a_particular_rgality, within/beyond the accepted paradigms. 
Rather, it questions how the ideas that disciplinary knowledge "has to 
be about truth and being close to reality" was put in place. In this 
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sense the dissertation takes a postparadigmatic stance emphasizing that 
any disciplinary construction of knowledge is a—fQC?D—Qf—HCiting, 
implicated all along in the network of social, discoursive, and 
institutional conditions of its time and place. 
As mentioned before, the activity through which the dissertation 
unravels the disciplinary production is known as deconstruction. This 
activity is concerned with the manner by which particular philosophies 
throughout Hestern history have defined what is possible "to talk 
about," and what can be considered legitimate knowledge. 
Poststructuralist activities such as deconstruction also question how 
the contributions made by these philosophies to modern Hestern thought 
have accumulated around us in discoursive and institutional formations 
to the point where we stand today. It notices how these philosophies 
have left traces of ideas which had particular relevance for specific 
moments in history. However, these traces have lived on, to our 
present, in taken for granted discourses and institutions as they became 
embedded in the modern rhetoric of "the progress of knowledge." 
The deconstructive activites to be performed here, inspired by 
works of Foucault ( e. g. 1 972; 1973; 1979; 1983b) and Derrida (e.g. 1976; 
1978; 1986), focus on the organizational sciences' "disciplinary 
discourses of knowledge" and their construction through institutional 
arrangements and textual formations. These deconstructive activities 
are themselves a form of writing which pay attention to "the unsaid of 
texts and institutions. They work as a scanner on the surface of "the 
evident" to open spaces for "the-not-so-evident." At the same time, 
"the-not-so-evident" is presented only as another writing which could 
open up indeterminate spaces for many more writings. There is no claim 
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for "the-not-so-evident" as if it were "true knowledge" which was made 
opaque/covered by "the evident" ( which is the type of claims usually 
made by critical theories). On the contrary, "the-not-so-evident" 
becomes a strategy to point at the fictions which produce both "the 
evident" and itself. It works by producing disquieting effects over the 
claims to knowledge of the modern disciplines in general, represented 
in this case by the organizational sciences. 
This deconstructive work cannot follow the argumentative logic 
typical of modern analytical writings and modern critique because the 
modern analytic and argumentative logic is itself a form of writing 
-attempting to get at "truthful knowledge"- which is non-reflexive 
about its own constructions. Rather, because deconstruction is situated 
at the edge of the modern as it moves toward the postmodern, it often 
works as an il-logic which points to the fabrication of "logical 
arguments. " These conditions create a particular dilemma for both the 
writer and the readers of this text. That is, any expectation of 
linear argumentation and inductive/deductive models of knowledge, within 
which the traditional organizational disciplines perform, must be 
suspended at this point. 
On the other hand, I recognize the importance of providing some 
form of guidance to the reader of this work. By disclaiming that it is 
"knowledge about something" I am denying it the form of "solid ground" 
common in the organizational sciences discourses, and moving it into 
very unknown terrain. It does not bother me ( the exile, the foreigner) 
to engage in such activity, but others may not feel that ready to work 
their way through it. 
The very strange disclaimer that I have just made, as much as 
IT 
Rhat I am doing now, —and Rhat I Rill be doing over and over again 
throughout this Rork— is to shift the grounds of knoRledge from 
representation of some kind of reality, external to that representation, 
to the discoursive formation (e.g. this dissertation) that Rorks as a 
representation. This shift has been increasingly announced in the 
discourses of philosophy since the last century. It is this "linguistic 
turn" Rhich more recently has been making incursions into other 
disciplines. 
In the folloRing paragraphs I hope to provide some guidance for 
the reader based on a short genealogy of changes in philosophical 
discourses. I can say that this is a logical Ray to approach the task 
since philosophy claims to be the foundational discipline for other 
types of knoRledge (e. g. Rorty, 1979; Culler, 1982) —and since many 
of the recent difficulties of the organixational sciences have been 
attributed to their being unaRare of commitment to a particular 
philosophical position (e. g. Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980; Morgan, 1980; Morgan, 1983a). 
I should immediately emphasize, hoRever, that announcing it "as 
logical" is just an arbitrary and interested choice to make this 
dissertation text possible. Philosophy is only a discourse, a form of 
Rriting, that claims to be about knoRledge, (e. g. Rorty, 1 979; 
Derrida,1982) and that is subjected to its oRn cultural and historical 
conditions. But it is also an excellent pre-text to present the 
poststructuralist issues as the more recent positions in the discoursive 
"lineage" of "true knoRledge. " 
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Part II 
Modern Foundations of Knowledge: 
From Decartes to Kant to Late Rittgenstein 
In this section I will sketch some philosophical ideas which 
have been defined as "important in determining modern Hestern thought" 
by multiple commentators. I will take an historical approach, starting 
in the sixteenth century. As can be gathered from Figure 1-1, the 
"historical line" is not a direct one. Along the times ideas have come 
and go, and moved around, in the stream of thought of different 
philosophical positions. Some influences are more direct than others. 
Often, discontinuous notions enter these "patterns of thought" in ways 
that disfigure their all'eged influencers beyond recognition. Perhaps, 
as Nietzsche would have said, the "philosophical field" could be 
understood better not as foundational discipline for knowledge but as 
the philosophers’ private grounds in their battle over the possession of 
Truth. 
I am drawing my commentaries from Jones (1969; 1975), Feenberg 
(1981), Hartnack (1981), Hartshorne (1983), and Osborne (1985). My 
readings here, including the choice of sources, have two aims: First, 
they serve to chart, very briefly, the territory where the 
poststructuralist ideas inspiring this dissertation eventually 
flourished. They point at the increased preoccupation with language in 
the philosophical enterprise of the twentieth century. Second, they 
serve to guide the readers in a territory usually kept outside the 
boundaries of the organizational disciplines. The discussions provided 
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are basic informational material, and not narrowly specialized 
philosophical digressions. They are very broad commentaries that do no 
justice to any individual philosopher. They just try to convey a sense 
of what appeared to be the main philosophical issues in those periods. 
Readers knowledgeable in these matters are invited to continue on to the 
following sections. I hope to be of service to the rest of us. 
From Descartes to Hume 
The period I am charting here covers around two hundreds years, 
roughly from the end of the Renaissence to the Enlightenment era. These 
years are known as The Age of Reason (e.g. Durant and Durant, 1967). 
Philosophy separated from religion during the Renaissence, taking more 
secular overtones. These were the years of emergence of the modern 
national states, and the definition of civil society. Religious ideas 
multiplied, including the Protestant Reformation. And these were also 
the years of Copernicus and Galileo, and the amazement provoked by 
scientific advances. One may say that two things stand out for 
philosophy during this period: it has to be redefined as a discipline on 
its own right separated from religion; and it has to be defined in its 
relationship with the scientific enterprise. 
Descartes is the representative philosopher of this era, often 
mentioned as originator of modern thought. But perhaps the influence of 
these years in modern and current thought is better understood by 
including Descartes' contemporary, Hobbes, as an oppositional voice. 
To the epistemological question on which most modern philosophy 
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rests: Hoh do we knoK? Descartes gave an answer centered on the 
individual, by stating that there is nothing easier to know than one's 
own mind. The other problem was the ontological question: Hhat do we 
know? Or, what can be known through Descartes proposition? The answer 
is that basically we can know everything: first the self -that famous 
phrase "I think, therefore I am"- and then everything else through 
God, who reigns over the knowing self. In this view the gap between 
mind and matter, subject and object, is kept open in reality (the 
dualist position) but closed in knowledge through the help of God, who 
cannot lie to us. Descartes, the geometer, includes knowledge through 
science -knowing the ordered, calculable universe- among those 
things that we can know out of the goodness of God. 
The solution redefined philosophy in relationship to both 
religion and science. The task of philosophy was not to prove the 
existence of God anymore. It was clear that God existed. Its 
relationship to philosophy was as ultimate presence to validate 
knowledge; and science was just one of the objects of knowledge for 
man* s mind. 
Hobbes had much to say about this matter, including that 
Descartes should have kept to geometry and stayed outside of philosophy, 
for which he did not have a mind. Following from the ideas of Bacon, 
Hobbes was a materialist who relegated mind to appearance, and reality 
to the empirical world of sense perception. For him all that existed 
must be explained in mechanistic terms through laws of the evolution of 
substance. But aside from ontological and epistemological issues, he 
contributed a theory of the origin of civil society. In his view man 
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surrenders his individual freedom to the state out of egotistical 
reasons. In exchange for security he enters into a pact or contract, 
and into moral obligation to comply Kith such pact. His theory 
justifies the existence of the civil state and balances the dichotomy 
betHeen individual freedom and allegiance to power and authority, 
maintaining man in the center of it. Thus, his contribution provided a 
modern orientation to political discourses in philosophy. 
Following after Descartes and Hobbes other representative 
figures of this era are Spinoza, who proposed monism (everything is God) 
against Cartesian dualism; Leibniz, a logician whose monism is proposed 
as a relational structure, as an identity-in-difference; and Locke, who 
denied any a priori content of the mind (as proposed by Decartes) and 
predicated all knowledge out of empirical experience. Spinoza and 
Leibniz would agree with the Cartesian conception of idea (following 
from the Platonic tradition) which is subjective and dependent on the 
human mind. For Locke, ideas are sensible objects and the task of mind 
is to work over the received ideas. It follows that the relationship 
between philosophy and science requires that science formulates the 
problems that should be undertaken by philosophy. 
Like Hobbes, Locke had an interest in political philosophy. Like 
Hobbes he stipulated a justification for civil society. He proposed the 
existence of individual identity based on self-consciousness, and a 
subordinate identity to the state to protect individual rights to 
property. Thus, Locke’s natural state is less violent than Hobbes' . 
The subordination to civil society is required to guarantee equal 
enjoyment of individual rights, rather than to protect individual life. 
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Berkeley overturned Locke* s conception of reality. If reality 
for Locke was independent of our perception of it -and could only be 
inferred- for Berkeley Rhat Has perceived is reality. HoRever 
Berkeley’s idealism is based on empirical knoRledge. Hhat exist can be 
perceived, either actually or potentially, otherRise it does not exist. 
He conceived his proposition as an ansRer to the ontological question. 
Later, other philosophers received these ideas as an epistemological 
ansRer. 
After Berkeley, Hume proposed a radical scepticism. Hume 
empha sized that the accepted necessary condition betReen cause and 
effect, until then conceived as an ontological property of the cause, is 
illogical. Unlike his predecessors, Rho Rere Rilling to rest the 
ultimate cause of all knoRledge in the goodness or perfection of God, 
Hume indicated that all Re can knoR is our mind’s states. He cannot 
prove through the empirical method the existence of other minds and of 
the external Rorld. HoRever, for Hume experience becomes a fairly 
reliable guide even if not a necessary condition for any occurrence or 
existent. Rhat Re experience are either simple or complex impressions. 
And the simple impressions can be separated into their simple 
components, Rhich are independent from each other. His proposition is 
for a pluralistic Rorld of absolute disconnectedness and absolute order 
at the same time. 
Hume, Rhose ideas also explained the idea of utilitarism as a 
moral philosophy, closed "The Age of Reason. ’’ Rationalism and 
empiricism did not provide final ansRers to the philosophical questions 
of their time but opened a diversity of ideas Rhich are still 
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influential in our time. 
From Kant to Nietzche 
The rationality, objectivity, and self-consciousness which 
pervaded the seventeenth and eighteenth century gave way to a less 
optimistic conception of the world. It became clear in the nineteenth 
century that the expectations of a wonderful world promoted by the 
French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution were far from 
realizable. These events brought, instead, additional difficulties. 
Hume* s work is representative of the end of the Age of Reason. He 
undermined the concept of reason. science, and nature in which the 
period rested. Kant can be understood as a response to Hume. He wanted 
to show that an a priori knowledge of nature was possible. And he also 
wanted to limit scientific knowledge in order to make space for other 
forms of knowledge based on feeling and faith. 
Kant abandoned the rationalist view, where minds are passive 
contemplators of independently existing objects, to propose a 
constructivist position. That is, objects are constructs in which the 
activities of the mind play an essential part. Derived from this idea 
are the following: 
-experience is a spatiotemporal manifold in which distinctions are 
made, including the distinction between self and not-self. 
-the natural sciences are limited to describing and generalizing about 
this spatiotemporal manifold and the various "objects" distinguished 
within it, including self and not-self. 
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-transcendental conditions are the types of questions that the mind 
asks of nature. They validate the sciences in their oan separate 
fields, and at the same time limit them to those fields. 
-transcendental conditions are not in experience. They exist a priori 
and are the May by Mhich our minds organize experience. They are 
relational categories. 
-Other questions like God, freedom, and immortality fall outside the 
field of experience. They belong to a different field Hhere their 
reality is guaranteed by the facts of morality and faith. 
Kant's fundamental thesis is that ne are dealing Kith tHo kinds 
of reality Mhich require different criteria of meaning and truth. 
These ideas have proven Midely influential to our days. Almost 
all Hestern philosophy since the nineteenth century can be considered a 
response to Kantianism. 
The immediate reactions to Kantianism can be discussed along tMO 
different lines of thought: One rejected that metaphysical knoMledge Mas 
impossible, and the other rejected the realm of methaphysics altogether. 
The first one Morked on solutions to incorporate the metaphysical and 
phenomenal Morld in a single explanation (a rejection to dualism of any 
kind). The other promoted scientific knoMledge through phenomena as the 
only kind of knoMledge Mhich is important for human life. 
Representatives of the first ideas are Hegel and Schopenhauer, 
Mho Kent in different directions to attain the possibility of absolute 
certainty. For Hegel, Kant's idea of pure reason is constitutive of 
things as they are, not as they appear. That is, mind can fiYfiOtyfllly 
have access to metaphysical knoMledge. His ideas are embedded in a 
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processual and developmental concept which is an important contribution 
to contemporary thought. 
He conceived the evolution of human mind in history, and from 
there the possibility that as we develop we will be able to attain 
higher levels of truth and knowledge. This happens through a process of 
negation, where things that appear as opposite become the same -in 
synthesis- at a higher level of consciousness. These ideas are 
proposed as a new system of logic, different from the Aristotelian model 
that was not opposed before. 
For Schopenhauer, on the other hand, the mind is limited to 
things as they appear, to the phenomenal world, but the world of things 
as they really are is accessible to us in intuition. His reaction was a 
clear heir to Romanticism. He considered the meaning of art and ethics 
as stages of higher development in human life. In his radical 
nominalism, philosophy was relegated to the task of articulating 
experience into a system of abstract concepts for working at the 
phenomenal level. In his view, philosophy would work on clarifying 
linguistic conventions that often disguise experiential similarities. 
As we will soon see, this insight worked in different ways to promote a 
linguistic interest in twentieth century philosophy. 
Both Hegel and Schopenhauer formulated political views which 
denied the possibility of laissez faire philosophies -stemming from 
Lockian and Humian views, and promoted by Adam Smith who was also Hume's 
disciple. If anything, laissez faire was at the low level of moral and 
political development. For Schopenhauer the differences between 
individuals exist only at the phenomenal level. Thus, at a higher level 
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we are ready to sacrifice individuality for the needs of others, as we 
are all one. For Hegel, man follows a compulsion which he thinks is his 
individual will, but this notion is eventually transcended when he 
reaches the State* s will. At this level, individuals recognize that 
they are not separate or autonomous entities but organs of the one true 
individual, the State. 
The other reactions to Kantianism, those that limited knowledge 
to the phenomenal realm, shared some interest on history and philosophy 
of history with the above views. They also shared the view that 
unlimited progress is possible; but from there on they parted company. 
In opposition to Hegel and Schopenhauer, they were indifferent and even 
hostile to the idea of a system of knowledge which included metaphysical 
questionings; they did not see a need to transcend reality beyond this 
world, and promoted scientific methods for all study of human phenomena. 
Their scientism was predicated on the view that social phenomena was as 
amenable to scientific method as physical phenomena. 
As social philosophers their interests went beyond knowledge of 
man as individual to knowledge of social organization, a contribution 
which shaped the new disciplines of sociology and psychology. In their 
views the ideas entertained by any group of people are elements of their 
world view that can be predicted. Their practical orientation derogated 
theory per se as a form of knowledge, including the derogation of 
philosophical speculation. In general, they attributed most of men* s 
mistakes in this life to ignorance which is remediable through 
scientific knowledge. They accepted Bacon* s dictum that **knowledge is 
power** and should be used for the improvement of man. But the old 
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geometrical model of knoKledge about the physical world was transformed 
now into a genetic model of knowledge. 
These are superficial similarities, however the representatives 
of these views also differred in fundamental ways. The utilitarians, 
represented by Bentham, John Mill and his son, John Stuart Mill, did not 
pay too much attention to the historical point. Pragmatic and 
empirically oriented, their views of "the greater happiness for the 
greater number" was predicated upon a strong rationalist orientation 
toward general utility. Their quest was to demonstrate that the 
universe is basically simple, and that the mind can discern its 
simplicity and use the knowledge of it as a model for conduct. From 
here it followed that everything, including values, could be quantified 
and measured according to its utility. Theirs was an approach to 
decision-making that stressed extreme individualism and laissez-faire. 
Comte, shared with the utilitarians a rationalist view of the 
universe, but he denied that most human beings are rational and capable 
of acting on the basis of long-range, intelligent analysis. Only a few 
men -an elite- are able to control their emotions and use scientific 
methods to ascertain the right answers. His question is: How to induce 
citizens to adopt his program, given the inferior intellect of the 
majority? 
His science of society -positivism- with a branch of social 
statics to describe the laws of order, and a branch of social dynamics 
to describe the laws of progress, would provide the answer. This 
science would make possible the highest stage of development in human 
history. At this level society could organize in a tightly controlled 
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regime. Conformity to the ruling elite -the experts- would be 
assured by appeals to the emotions and sentiments of the majority. The 
intention of his program -a secular religion-like dogma- was to 
arouse men's feelings for "humanity." To make them aware of their unity 
and counteract selfish motives. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Marx is the third representative in the 
phenomenal responses to Kantianism. He shares a phenomenalist view with 
the utilitarians and the positivist. Like them he believes in the 
inevitability of progress, and that human nature and the physical 
universe conform to simple laws that can be discovered by science. 
Unlike them, the key to his system lies in notions of development and 
dialectics which followed from a strong Hegelian view. But for him the 
developments would occur at a material level. 
Historical materialism would work to overturn economic and 
political theories of capitalism. It offered an epistemological and 
pragmatic device where the pragmatic test would provide the definitive 
answer. That is, the empirical correspondence between theories and 
facts was not enough to ascertain what was true. The truth was what 
worked. And if it served to overthrow capitalism, it was true. Thus, 
his belief in violence, conflict and class stuggle -revolution- as 
fundamental realities in historical changes move him away from Hegel and 
closer to Schopenhauer. 
Hegel was thirty nine years old when Darwin was born. Marx was 
Darwin* s contemporary. The "family resemblances" here are more a 
product of their times than of intellectual influences. They shared a 
cultural space that was ripe for evolutionist and progressive thoughts. 
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The Industrial Revolution was not creating the promised better society. 
Rather, it Ras creating neR sets of problems. Eventually "Social 
DarRinism" became an influential current of thought in the late 
nineteenth and early tRentieth century. 
Tro other philosophers Rithin this period, Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche, offered a radical departure from the above vieRS. They Rere 
hostile to science as a cognitive enterprise, and doubted the 
applicability of the scientific method in the solution of economic and 
political problems. Their vieRS Rere either ignored or discounted as 
aberrations during their times. Today they are very influential and, in 
the case of Nietzsche, his vieRS often considered prophetic. 
Kierkegaard is regarded as founder of "existentialism." For him 
philosophy* s task is to improve us by changing us. To exist, to be a 
"self," is to struggle and to become. Everything else are 'things for 
selves and do not have independent status. His philosophy of radical 
subjectivity and existential anguish can be read as a personal struggle. 
The truth, centered in improvement for humankind and the unified 
individual, Rhich previous philosophies has promised, seemed even more 
remote in the "century of progress. " His voice anticipated some current 
themes in Restern culture. 
Nietzsche Ras relativistic, antisystematic, and very difficult 
to classify. He partook of the existential problems proposed by 
Kierkegaard but did not try to solve them. His question addressed Rhat 
position one should adopt toRard the irrational, purposeless, and 
meaningless Rorld that one faces. He formulated a version of 
understanding the Rorld based on the impossibility of recovering the 
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original text. That is, we try to know the world by interpreting what we 
expect to be its real, original meaning. But this is a myth, since 
there is no such original meaning. The world that we know is already 
interpreted many different ways over by the different social groups that 
preceded us. Thus, any absolute answer to "truth" is impossible. 
His attack of philosophy as pretended foundation for Truth is 
quite strong. Philosophy is just a language that traps us and make us 
fit to it our experience of the world. It is also an attempt by the 
philosophers to justify their instinctive beliefs. The philosophers are 
like lawyers making a case for their views. He extends this critique to 
science on similar grounds. 
Another central concept in Nietzche was "the will to power. " In 
this view the shape of the world is produced out of the exercise of 
power over the less powerful. At the conscious level the "will to 
power" is a double standard where the virtues of the strong and those of 
the weak are different. For example, the Greek and Christian virtues of 
equality, consideration for others, and moderation, are virtues of the 
weak which were taught to instill them with a "herd morality. 
Nietzsche* s model for power was the creativity of the artist. The 
artist can attain "self-overcoming" -to cope with the absurdity of the 
world- by the creation of a work of art. This work of art is the 
creation of a miniature cosmos from the chaos within the artist. And 
out of all this, he recommends that one have to learn to laugh at 
oneself, otherwise one must weep. 
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Process Philosophy to Late Hittgenstein 
Philosophical thought in the late nineteenth and the twentieth 
centuries takes more diverse paths than in previous periods. These 
philosophies address four issues that are still of current interest. 
First, there is a feeling of ambiguity about the appropriate human mode 
of being in the world. Second, there are debates about the role of 
science in modern society. Third, the position of the individual in the 
world is questioned. Self-consciousness and acknowledgement of a divided 
self are difficult ideas to master together. Fourth, there is a concern 
for the role of language as representation or articulation of reality. 
As we will see, these issues become intertwined in the different 
philosophical positions. 
Three philosophers who bridge the path between the two 
centuries, Bergson, Rhitehead, and Dewey, follow the process 
philosophy" inaugurated by Hegel, but each took other distinctive 
characteristics. Bergson attempted to use scientific findings to 
construct an antiscientific conception of reality. His metaphysics was 
close to Schopenhauer's intuitionism but incorporated to it the theory 
of evolution as a doctrine of progress. Rhitehead reaffirmed Hegel s 
view about the capacity of reason to know reality, but based his 
categoreal scheme toward absolute knowledge on modern physics. Still 
Dewey took another path. 
Though influenced by Hegel in his early years, the philosopher 
of instrumentalism became skeptical of the possibility or desirability 
of building philosophical systems. He believed that philosophy must be 
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useful in the solution of social problems. For those purposes 
philosophy must be modeled on the natural sciences, and must be content 
Hith probability rather than absolute knowledge. For him the truth must 
be useful. He believed, with Nietzsche, that the quest for certainty 
was the philosophers* response for dealing with an uncertain world. 
The three believed in the possibility of progress promoted by 
intelligent action on the part of individuals. They conceived thought 
and its objects within the evolutionary process. Ideas have a history 
which is relevant to their present, and the philosophical thought is an 
outgrowth of its own culture and period rather than eternal truths. 
They shared a notion of reality as changing and dynamic, and recognized 
the prestige that the natural sciences had in their times. 
Others followed a different orientation. Reviving the 
rationalist-realist tradition of the Hobbes-Locke-Hume line, these 
philosophers proposed that: 
-philosophy was primarily a cognitive enterprise. 
-existential problems should be kept out of the philosophical 
writings. 
-the universe of knowledge is only the phenomenal realm. 
-things in the universe are only externally related. They are simple 
entities which appear complex only in their combinations. 
-knowledge is attained through analysis, by decomposing complex 
entities into their atomic simples. 
-clarity is achieved when mind is brought into the presence of each 
these simples. This is knowledge of their essential nature. 
-everyday language is inadequate for presenting to thought the clarity 
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of knowledge. 
-the central problem of philosophy thus become the problems of finding 
a language simple enough and clear enough to either represent or be 
isomorphic with the simples. 
-simples endure through time. They do not change or evolve, they just 
recombine in different forms. 
This tradition of analytic philosophy had variations. For 
example, Moore's philosophy of sense data engaged in issues of common 
sense knowledge. Frege, a founder of philosophy of language, believed 
-like Moore- that our mind can be in contact with the objective 
world, and  unlike Moore  that the logic of the signs in which we 
express our knowledge reflect the structure of the objects we know. He 
thought, like Plato, that in mathematics we attain knowledge, not mere 
belief. He then proposed that all models of knowledge follow 
mathematical thinking, since this was the best type of thinking. 
On the other side of Moore was Russell. He used analysis to 
purify science and purge it of the errors of common sense thinking. 
Among his most important propositions was the distinction between hard 
and soft data, and his attempts to show that inferences from hard to 
soft data are warranted. But his main interest here was to define the 
extra-logical principles we use in making these inferences. 
A different position in this tradition is represented by 
Hittgenstein's (1922) earlier writings. He said that what can be said 
should be said clearly, and what cannot be said one must pass over in 
silence. Still, in his view there was the difficulty of articulating 
what can be known but about which we cannot talk His view is a 
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linguistic reformulation of Kant's metaphysical realm, which exist but 
is unknowable. His fundamental question was how to talk about what is 
unsayable, if only to say that it is such. His preoccupation was to 
understand the boundaries between what can and cannot be said. 
The Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle -e. g. Schlick, 
Neurath, Carnap, Ayer- found wide support for their concerns in the 
writings of the analytic philosophers and in positivism. They placed 
all their confidence in knowledge through the model of the physical 
sciences and in attaining verifiable knowledge. They strived to reduce 
all the sciences to unity in physics, where the ultimate simples of 
knowledge could be found. Following the Fregian view, the fundamental 
assumption was that isomorphism existed between the structure of 
scientific language and the structure of the world. Following 
Wittgenstein on the sayable (and disregarding the unsayable) they 
strived to attain the pictorial-logical form where ultimate facts would 
rest. 
This program did not attain its end. Eventually Carnap wrote 
the Principle of Tolerance. He proposed that rather than an ideal 
language, whose structure is revealed by logical analysis and that 
mirrors the world in its identity, it appeared that there were a variety 
of languages. None of them were isomorphic with the world, and all 
could be appropriate for knowledge. Still, this view was based on 
formal scientific languages, like Euclidian and non-Euclidian geometry, 
and not on everyday languages. 
The source I am consulting here (Jones, 1975) considers that the 
positivist/logical positivist views vanished after the early 1950s. 
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They Here discussed as anachronistic survivors of eighteenth and 
nineteenth century culture during the early part of the tnentieth 
century. 
If the search for objective knonledge is usually associated Kith 
the rationalist/analytical tradition, a different vien tonard this kind 
of knoHledge Has initiated by Husserl’s phenomenological tradition. 
Like the analytical philosophers, they rejected Kantian constructivism 
-i.e. that mind participated in the construction of its object. 
Analytic philosophy thought that consciousness Has transparent/inert and 
mind Hould pass through it to knoH its objects. In this sense inner 
states and bodily states Here equivalent. For phenomenology the 
intentional!ty of consciousness apprehended the objects. In both 
schools major importance Has given to the immediacy in mind of the 
objects-for-mind. And from here they diverged nidely. 
Phenomenology Has inspired by Hegelian viens, and attempted to 
overcome the Hegelian oversight about the intentional!ty of 
consciousness. In its vien the Horld Has made by the interconnectedness 
of things, by a river of experience. There Has a refusal to nrite off 
as subjective the Horld of emotions and transitory things, since they 
also rested on the experiential realm. To attain phenomenological 
knoHledge, certainty about all the richness of the Horld, it Has 
necessary to cultivate phenomenological bracketing and reduction. In 
this sense phenomenology attempted to eliminate the distinctions betneen 
mind and body, idealism and realism. 
Their vien of language reflected their confidence that reduction 
of preconceptions about the Horld Hould give the Horld to mind. Rather 
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than reducing the world to the limited sterile language of positivism, 
they encouraged language to flourish. A rich language would be the only 
way to represent the richness of the phenomenological world that was 
known. 
In a sense, Husserl’s phenomenology was an epistemological 
answer to Kierkegaard's anguish about uncertainty. His successors, 
Heidegger and Sartre, would delve into ontology and existential 
interpretation. 
Rather than accepting phenomenology as a theory of knowing the 
world, Heidegger transformed it into a method for knowing our Being, as 
a creature concerned with its fate in an alien world. In order to 
attain such knowledge one must become involved with the world, with its 
everydayness, and accept, live, one* s own anxieties. These activities 
would lead to a moody understanding that would uncover the real 
structure of Being. This ontological structure is a priori, primordial, 
acultural, and ahistorical. 
In this very complex philosophy two themes are of primary 
importance: the relationship between Being and time, and between Being 
and language. Heidegger believes that if we found the articulation of 
these two structures with Being, the latter can be uncovered. His 
concern with language is particularly interesting. He thought of 
humankind as a conversation about Being, to deal with anxiety about 
death and finitude. Eventually he realized the impossibility of finding 
Being in the articulation of language because one cannot "say" that 
articulation -i.e. how does one present the relationship between 
language and reality without including any of them? His answer to this 
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dileMma was that authentic saying must be a dialog of silence. 
If Heidegger's basic question was: Hok do we face the knoHledge 
that Re are going to die? Sartre* s Kas: Rhat is our human situation in 
a world without God? His questionning was close to Kierkegaard's, his 
answer closer to Nietzsche's: One must make -rather than try to 
find- a center for life. Another way to understand this position, 
knowing that Sartre was Heidegger's disciple, is to question what to do 
after experiencing Heideggerian anxiety. For Sartre the first thing to 
do is purge oneself of illusions of knowledge as a prelude to action. 
For Sartre, the limitations proposed by philosophy which impede 
us from knowing about our true consciousness and ego are not so. For 
example, we make the world we want to see in language, there is no 
"original text." He are only passing moments, and the self we 
experience is a social self constantly reinterpreted. If we could 
describe the real world through any word it would be "absurd. " Our true 
consciousness is transparent, an impersonal spontaneity, like wind 
blowing toward objects. Thus, out of this nothingness we are free to 
become the self of our choice. Our problem is how to adopt a project 
where we can make the world and the self of our choice, keep our 
individuation, and respect the projects chosen by others. 
Sartre's existential phenomenology emphasized, like Nietzsche, 
that the authentic individual is one who accepted living with 
uncertainty. His major problematic was reconciling his philosophical 
emphasis on individual freedom and his own Marxist project. He 
recognized that the world he was living in imposed undue limitations on 
human beings out of social and economic problems. In his late position. 
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Joining revolutionary forces Kas viewed as an individual step toward 
creating the appropriate conditions for individual freedom. 
Since the early twentieth century, and often parallel to the 
phenomenological movements, other schools of thought appeared. These 
derived directly out of the Marxist tradition, and kept alive a 
political orientation in social philosophy. This current of thought, 
generali2ed as Critical Theory, includes Lukacs revisionist 
interpretation of Marxist reification, and the Frankfurt School 
tradition represented by Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Habermas. 
The latter thinkers wrote to explore and oppose the manner by 
which "instrumental rationality” becomes embedded in society. This kind 
of thought makes human beings dominate other human beings, and 
ultimately makes them to engage in self-domination. Hhen thinking and 
social organization are dominated by instrumental rationality, the 
dominance becomes "totalizing" in the sense that no other way of 
thinking seems possible. In this sense ideology is a "partial truth" 
that claims to be "the whole truth. " Needless to say, this is a 
critique of modern capitalist industrial society, and of the role of 
knowledge in such a society. 
To end our tour of modern philosophy, I will re-present 
Hittgenstin in this text. His latter writings would criticize the kind 
of linguistic approach he had taken earlier. That is, while still 
preoccupied with language and knowledge, his late language-games were a 
far cry from his picture theory. The early theory explored the 
possibility of achieving isomorphism betweeen ideal language and 
things-in-themselves, later he thought that the notion of an ideal 
language Has an illusion and the quest for isomorphism doomed to 
failure. This vien agreed nith Carnap's Principle of Tolerance, and 
with Nietzsche’s position that philosophy is a form of therapy rather 
than a form of analysis. 
He exposed the fictions concealed nithin standard philosophical 
Kritings. For example, he indicated that preciseness is not the 
substance of logic. Rather, logic is a non-vague language because that 
is a rule imposed by the philosophers. Accordingly, he considered 
traditional theory of language reductive of the domain of language and 
meaning. His concern non Has to understand hoH language functions in 
the social context of the Horld. He proposed that: 
-language arises in a particular social context. 
-any system of signs is a language. 
-a language is a language if it is effective in promoting its 
purpose. 
-the identical correspondence betneen Hord and object is the 
exception. 
-hoH language means depends on hoH it functions in particular 
circumstances. 
In his vien language functions as language-games, nith rules 
that are not identical among different games, can change often, and have 
a context-dependent meaning. At this point, Wittgenstein (1953) Has 
accentuating the multiple language games that are possible in the modern 
Horld. 
There are many nays to interpret this fast tour of modern 
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Hestern philosophical thinking. For my purposes at this time it 
suffices to say the following: It has been a tour that shows the 
progressive erosion of the domain of metaphysics, or ultimate Truth, 
since the time of Descartes - the only truth found is that there is no 
Truth. In this "crisis of knowledge" philosophy moves from its 
traditional definition as a cognitive enterprise to a definition as 
social, political, and therapeutical discourse. The traditional 
epistemological question -How do I know?- has been transformed into 
the question. How does "know" mean? The theories of knowledge have been 
transformed into representation as theory. The "foundational discipline 
of knowledge" is remains. Hhat is erected in these ruins? 
Poststructuralist Theory 
A game. Evidently, there is no structure, no foundation - 
after contemplating the ruins poststructuralist theory plays on 
articulating some answers. The answers have an interesting genealogy 
where structural linguistics, Nietzsche, Marxism, phenomenology and 
existential phenomenology, among others, dance about the unbounded space 
of this game. 
As we may infer from the previous discussion, in the early years 
of this century everything was a science, or had a structure to be 
proposed or discovered by science. In the United States the 
pragmatist/pragmaticist Peirce was busy devising semeiotic, a science of 
signs. He attempted to classify all cultural signs in a universalistic 
scheme -e. g. icons, indexes and symbols. On the other side of the 
Atlantic, Saussure was contemplating linguistics as part of a larger 
science of signs, semiology. He attempted to demonstrate that language 
was a system of differences and relations between signs. 
There are wide differences in their views, but both agreed that 
the task of their sciences -from the Greek semeion ("sign”), and today 
generalized as semiotics by Eco (e. g. 1976; 1979; 1984) and others- 
was to describe those conventions that underlie even the most "natural" 
social behaviors and representations. They attempted to discover the 
structure that underlies human signification. 
Culler argues that the development of semiotics at the beginning 
of the twentieth century was an important influence in philosophical 
works thereafter (e.g. Cassirer, 1945) but he also observes that: 
". . . the crucial insights which semiotics develops 
lie further back, in the work of Marx, Durkheim, and Freud, 
who insisted on the primacy of social facts... in focusing 
on social facts which are always a symbolic order, Marx, 
Freud, and Durkheim dramatically showed that individual 
experience is made possible by the symbolic systems of 
collectivities, whether these systems be social ideologies, 
languages, or structures of the unconscious" (1981: 25-26). 
The pragmatism in Hittgenstein's later work can be traced to the 
pragmatic interest in Peirce* s semeiotic, which questions what are the 
species of signs and the important distinctions between them. 
Wittgenstein questionned the species of contexts, and the rules for 
language-games in these contexts. He must remember here that 
Wittgenstein had defined language in relationship to its functionality 
-i. e. a language is a language if it is effective in promoting its 
purpose. 
The Saussurean influence took a different path. The French 
Structuralism of Levi-Strauss in anthropology, Lacan in psychoanalysis, 
and Barthes in literary criticism are direct heirs to his ideas. If the 
structure of language was a system of differences and relations, the key 
to the structure, its code, should be in the articulation of those 
differences and relations -e.g. the binary oppositions, and the 
relationship betneen that which signifies and that which is signified by 
it. It followed that finding the structure of a language would lead to 
the core of human signification, the rules by which people make meaning. 
Thus, the Saussurean differences at the level of words (e. g. 
cat/hat) influenced Levi-Strauss (1955) to look for the structure of 
cultures at the level of myths; influenced Lacan (1966) to critique 
Freudian theory, and to propose that the unconscious was structured like 
language; and influenced Barthes (1972) into searching and showing the 
structures of popular culture in France. 
I should stress here what is implied in the structuralist 
proposition. First, the existence of an a priori structure in the 
system (be the system language, myth, or mind) which defines how humans 
think. The question then is, how is this system patterned? Second, 
that the structure is acultural and ahistorical. Thus, the system, in 
its origin, is not defined by its culture and history but defines its 
culture and history. Now, suppose that the system's pattern really 
looks like a text. And further, suppose that we impose over this text 
the Nietzschean idea that there is no original text, or at least no way 
by which we can recover the original: Rhat would happen? 
Poststructuralist theory. 
Once we get to this point it is difficult to find a unifying 
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theme folloved by proponents ( ?) of poststructuralism-i,e. one cannot 
look for a definitive pattern anymore. Still, there is an interest in 
language for understanding the manner in Rhich humans produce their 
life. And beyond, there is an interest in re-reading the "general 
text," the human productions Rhich form the history and practice of our 
present, of our Hestern culture, and that claim to be the right 
interpretations, "the Ray things are, or should be. " The aim from here 
is to shoR hoR the "right interpretations, " can be undermined. The main 
purpose is to produce undecidability about having a "right 
interpretation, " rather than to propose a better interpretation. Once 
the limits are subverted, the possibility of extending the horizon of 
our history and the boundaries of our practices is there, but first Re 
must ask: Rhat are Re noR? 
The ansRers are searched in the discourses/Rritings of 
knoRledge. Remember that Bacon said "knoRledge is poRer"? And that 
Nietzsche said that humans create the Rorld in their "Rill-to-poRer"? 
Rhat Re are noR may be our struggle for poRer defined as knoRledge; or 
plainly, a definition through the lie that poses as Truth, Let's noR 
get acquainted Rith the tRO poststructuralist Rriters that inspired this 
dissertation. 
The Foucault Connection: Technologies of the Subject 
Foucault explores the theme Rill-to-truth/knoRledge to 
re-interpret the history of the modern episteme. He reads chance Rhere 
planning Ras implied; discontinuity in explanations of continuity; 
exclusions and silences in the "natural" isolation of the pathological 
and criminal; and progress of knowledge nowhere. 
His best known work looks into the institutional arrangements 
(e. g. prisons, hospital, schools) and disciplinary discourses (e. g. 
medicine, law) and practices (e.g. sexual practices) in modern history. 
He thinks that there are the readable traces of the discourses of the 
present. He follows how things and theories take shape, subsist, change 
and disappear. His interest is understanding the way by which 
discourses and institutions influence and work on each other. He is not 
searching for immutable rules and systems to predict what we would be. 
He is re-opening the past to understand what we are. 
For him discoursive practices are: 
"...characterized by the delimitation of a field of 
objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the 
agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the 
elaboration of concepts and theories. Thus, each 
discoursive practice implies a play of prescriptions that 
designate its exclusions and choices. 
Furthermore, these sets of 'regularities’ do not 
coincide with individual works; even if these 'regularities' 
are manifested through individual works or announce their 
presence for the first time through one of them, they are 
more extensive and often serve to regroup a large number of 
individual works. But neither do they coincide with what we 
ordinarily call a science or a discipline even if their 
boundaries provisionally coincide on certain occasions; it 
is usually-the case that a discoursive practice assembles a 
number of diverse disciplines or sciences or that it crosses 
a certain number among them and regroups many of their 
individual characteristics into a new and often unexpected 
unity. 
Discoursive practices are not purely and simply ways 
of producing discourses. They are embodied in technical 
processes, in institutions, in patterns for general 
- behavior, in forms of transmission and difussion, and in 
pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain 
them..." (1977c: 199-200) 
His readings bring other discourses alongside the "author-ized 
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versions. " The others constantly creep in (e.g. the mad, the 
criminal). They are the voices that Here not heard, the ones that could 
crack the continuous surface of the mirror, that can shoH the un-natural 
of the natural. The continuous, the heard, the natural exclude the 
others. But there are technologies for controlling them: through 
individuation, separation - and then massification. They can be 
counted, measured, classified, promoted, demoted. . . , and all for their 
onn/common good. Once they create a subject they can subjectify it. 
The Derrida Connection: Iterability of Signification 
Rather than Horking on historical documents Derrida primarily 
reads modern philosophical texts. He shoHS hoH the claimed "foundation 
of knoHledge" cannot be so Hhen knoHledge is written in the instability 
of language. Horking in the text proper, he shows how every text can 
subvert its own meaning. There are always overdeterminations in the 
text. The words can be made to mean very different from its apparent, 
intended meaning. 
His deconstructive enterprise proceeds from the binary 
oppositions of structural linguistics. First, the opposition is 
overturned by showing that the second term, often thought as inferior 
and dependent on the first, can be read as superior. Second, the total 
structure of the opposition is made unstable to prevent its return to 
the original condition. Space is created between the terms. 
For example, he deconstructs the opposition presence/absence and 
its relationship with speech and writing. The claims to knowledge in 
Restern civilization have given primacy to the voice who can say the 
truth, and ultimately to the voice of God. The voice is represented as 
truth because it is immediate to the speaking subject's mind. The 
subject is self-present, identical to itself, capable of saying what it 
means, and clarify if necessary. Writing is secondary to speech. It is 
a transcription, absent from its author, and incapable of meaning as 
clearly as voice/presence. 
He shoMS, instead, that writing, the sign -the capability to 
signify with something else than speech- must happen first. Re cannot 
have made any original sound unless we have thought of a way to 
differentiate it from another sound. In this sense speech comes after 
our capability to create/inscribe a sign with certain durability and 
transferability - ecriture. 
Rhat follows unstabilizes the situation further. Now, what is 
presence and what is absence? Is the voice really self-present or does 
it depends on others to inscribe its meaning. Rhat is writing and what 
is speech? Or, is not all a play of differences? It is undecidable. 
Thus, it is "differ/a/nce," a word created by Derrida to mark the space 
between the previous pair of opposites. In French "difference" and 
"differ/a/nce" sound the same but, what is differ/a/nce? And, of 
course, various philosophical texts get further unstabilized here: the 
concept of "difference" has been central in the writings of Nietzsche, 
Saussure, Freud, Husserl, and Heidegger. 
Derrida's writings are a constant showing of the iterability of 
signification. He produces new texts, new meanings, by working over a 
previous text. He shows how the same words can mean differently in 
different contexts but, unlike Hittgenstein, he does not collect those 
con-texts. They are Hritings, as multiple and undecidable as the text 
themselves. 
A final comment for now on this discussion about Foucault and 
Derrida. They are critics of our modern society, and their writings can 
be read as leaning toward the left (what is right/left?). However, 
Critical Theory proponents attack them (Nagele (1986) calls this 
situation "a war between frankfurters and french fries") on the basis of 
their refusal to acknowledge and fight directly in their writings the 
dominance of capitalist ideology. Derrida is particularly vulnerable. 
The texts he has chosen to critique, and the lack of "everydayness" in 
his writings, is considered by some (e.g. Habermas, 1983) a conservative 
if not a reactionary sign. Foucault, who has publicly refused to be 
labelled Marxist -or anything else- refrains from formulating any 
global systematic theory, he rather analyzes the specificity of power 
mechanisms, wherever they may appear, including in "critical positions. " 
They are perhaps closer to Adorno's (1973) late writings, but it is 
clear that there cannot be a grand theory position in poststructuralism. 
Modern! sib/Post structural ism/Postmodernism 
I proposed at the beginning of this chapter that we are in the 
transition between modernism and postmodernism. Hhere is 
poststructuralism located? I concur with Huyssen (1984) on saying that 
it belongs to the modern at its end, and perhaps at the beginning of the 
postmodern. He sees the poststructuralist projects as important steps 
in understanding the end of "the modern. " And it is in that sense that 
poststructuralisra is postmodern, as a reading of the failures and 
limitations of the modern. 
Thus, how are the works of Foucault and Derrida important in the 
postmodern stance of this dissertation? Knowing their work, and the 
issues they have been addressing provide a starting point for my work. 
The dissertation is not about explaining how to use or apply Foucault 
and Derrida in organizational sciences. To do that would be to write 
the defeat of the dissertation -its inability to stay away from modern 
approaches to theory. Rather, it is the issues they question how is 
it that we have constructed theories on a foundation of "Truth" without 
paying attention to the textual/discoursive/institutional construction 
of those claims to knowledge?- that I will be working on. 
The "summaries" of their positions which I presented above 
(drawing from Culler (1982); Leitch (1983); and Hoy (1986)1 underscore 
that we, in the organizational sciences, should understand how 
implicated are our institutions and discourses of knowledge in the 
philosophies and epistemes that Foucault and Derrida have discussed. I 
argue that doing organizational_disciplines in a postmodern mode 
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requires a broader understanding of our position in the episteme of the 
modern. 
For that purpose, I re-present a history of the organizational 
sciences' constitution as a modern discipline in the next chapter, 
bringing into it some other (hi)stories usually not heard. Chapter 
three formulates a transition betHeen the "modern disciplines" and 
postmodernity. I first discuss some postmodern commentaries about the 
role of the knoRledge producing institutions in a postmodern Horld; 
later I describe major postmodern topics. 
Chapters four to six are poststructuralist readings of main 
organizational sciences texts: Barnard (1938), McGregor (1960), and 
Mintzberg (1973). The deconstructions effected in each chapter 
illustrate three movements in the construction of the discipline: 
Barnard's discuss the grafting of past discourses as claims of authority 
for current discourses; McGregor's is the exemplar discourse in the 
construction of "the disciplinary subject;" and Mintzberg's shows the 
working of discourses as mecanisms of inclusion and exclusion. In each 
case, the deconstructive work is presented as postmodern practice of 
organizational theory. 
In chapter seven I re-view the issues previously discussed and 
suggest the practice of organizational_sciences as postmodern cultural 
critique. 
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And noH, for a pre-^^^^-view of Khat is to come, let me 
deconstruct the title of this dissertation: 
Organizational 
Science Fiction 
Hhat is it? 
Truth Lie 
Hoh does it happen? 
Discovery / 
Hhat does it become? 
Found 
Hhat do I do next? 
End 
Hhat does it mean? 
Death 
Invention 
Produced 
Create 
Birth 
Thus, the desirable term in the opposition, "science," has been 
transformed toward the undesirable "dead end," and it is fiction which 
can now claim a desirable meaning. Let's explore further what kind of 
fictions we have produced to maintain our "science" out of the dead 
end. " Is it time now to play over the ruins? 
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Notes 
[ 1 ] 
Not all "organizational culture" literature would question or 
oppose the traditional approaches. See Smircich (1983) and Smircich and 
Galas (1987) for more detailed analyses of these issues. 
CHAPTER II 
ME MUST BE PERFECTLY CLEAR 
In a recent book Stanley Melville attempts to define current 
criticism. Settling for a Derridean perspective he said: "Criticism 
finds itself not in its defeat as knonledge but in the [indefinite] 
complexity that marks its attachment to literature as neither Kholly 
internal to that literature nor simply an external addition to it -- a 
primary supplement, a fact." (1986; 152). 
For Derrida, the supplement is more complete than that to which 
it is attached. By definition, a supplement would be whole by itself 
- as a supplement - while, at the same time, it would be an addition 
to something else. On the other hand, the "something else" announces 
its incompleteness, its lack, by requiring "the supplement." Derrida* s 
notion of supplement is his way to subvert the meaning, so taken for 
granted, of supplement as something of secondary importance. But he did 
still more with this concept. 
In On_Grammatology, Derrida (1976) indicates that Rousseau's 
obsession with "supplementary" as secondary to an "original notion" not 
only marks the incompletness of the "origin" but it also shows that once 
one starts to supplement for more completion one gets engaged in a 
neverending supplementation. Thus, the myth of the possibility of 
completness, wholeness, origin, final meaning, becomes "deconstructed. " 
His interest in these issues was, of course, beyond anything specific 
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that Rousseau aay have said. His aim Has to shoH that any text means 
•ore than it says; that if one conceives of writing as a supplement to 
speech, one is warking the possibility of intellegibility without the 
presence of a speaking subject. And additionally, one is standing in a 
position, neither inside nor outside that presence, which makes it 
possible to understand but also to extend any meaning. 
Paraphrasing Melville, above, I argue in this dissertation that 
the organizational sciences are in a moment of history which often 
announces their defeat as knowledge. My contribution here is to help 
the organizational disciplines find themselves as participants in an 
indeterainate complexity which could mark their attachment to our 
current cultural moment. That is, this work aims to move the 
organizational disciplines out of their possible defeat as a modern form 
of knowledge, and into a different self-understanding: one that will 
position them as neither wholly internal to the current culture, nor 
simply an external addition to it - rather as a primary supplement. 
In light of these comments I propose that the organizational 
sciences as scholarly disciplines have been engaged for too long in 
overcoming their "supplementarity" (in the sense of "secondary") to 
other disciplines in the modern cultural space, as well as their 
"supplementarity" to the organizational world. For these purposes they 
have pursued the creation of a subject: management, whose presence 
validates and authorizes a meaning for "organizational sciences" and 
define their boundaries. I further suggest that the future importance 
of these disciplines in/for the society in which they were created would 
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stem from a different self-understanding: one Hhich Hould enhance their 
supplementarity in the Derridean sense. and which depends on the 
possibility that they become critics of their own society. The 
"organizational sciences" would then be understood as 
criticism/supplement of Hestern society’ s main cultural production: 
organizations. 
My Kork in this chapter starts the explorations for such 
possibility. In it I revieH some socio/historical conditions Rhich gave 
Kay to the organizational disciplines as a university subject, and 
analyze their attempts to define themselves as disciplines in the 
context of modern American society [11. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, the review is initially guided by the following questions: flow 
did the organizational sciences become "sciences"? flow is it that in a 
culture centered around business organizations and economic issues the 
organizational sciences seem to be separated from organizational 
practices? At the end of the chapter I re-submit my contention that we 
are now in a different cultural moment, postmodernism, where even 
talking about unresolved disciplinary definitions is meaningless. Hhat 
is increasingly questioned instead is the role of the 
knowledge-producing institutions in their relationship with the rest of 
society. flhat is the role of "scholarly disciplines" in a postmodern 
society? 
This latter questioning guides the rest of my project. It 
emphasizes the importance, and the difficulties, for traditional 
scholarly disciplines -in particular for the organizational 
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disciplines- of attaining a different self-understanding and 
participating in the postmodern condition. A different 
self-understanding for the organizational disciplines would require the 
deconstruction of that illusion of presence and privileged knowledge 
which currently authorizes and validates the field: the role of the 
manager. As indicated in chapter one, I effect later some of that 
deconstruction through readings of major management literature which 
hinges on the space between "management theory" and "management 
practice. " Neither outside nor inside, my readings re-produce them as 
core exemplars of primary supplements. After this is done, could the 
"organizational sciences" be adequate for participating in the 
postmodern moment? Hould they be able to become cultural critique? 
These questions are in line with my overall aim of problematizing the 
limits of "truth and knowledge" imposed by the traditional disciplinary 
understandings, pushing these limits into the realms of their "outside, 
and of their "margins." 
A Short Excursion into the "Origins" of 
Modern Management Education 
In the following paragraphs I discuss the development of the 
organizational disciplines, and the professionalization of their 
academic activities, as the struggle for validation of a new field of 
knowledge within its own historical period: the modern. My discussion 
focuses on socio/historical explanations. It is a narrative of 
continuities and developments in society and historyj a descriptive tour 
of the discipline within the context of modern America’s higher 
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education institutions. This history (story?) is important for this 
project because it points at hoK the construction of modern disciplinary 
boundaries is an activity quite distinct from the traditional (Kantian) 
disciplinary claims: that knowledge has to be specialized in each 
discipline out of the logic of the discipline itself -to attain "the 
truth" in each realm of knowledge. Many other reasons seem to be at 
work here. 
This section highlights how the organizational disciplines' 
development, and the development of their "discourses of knowledge, " 
have shared some common paths with the development of other disciplines 
in American universities. The sharing, however, has been more running 
behind than leading in those paths. The discussion serves as basic 
background for analyzing the current crisis in the field against the 
larger cultural scene. 
Modern America: The Specialization and 
Professionalization of Knowledge 
The marking event in the emergence of the modern disciplines of 
organization and management has been attributed to Henry Towne in 1886 
( e. g. Rren, 1 986; Chandler, 1 977). In his statements for that year's 
American Society of Mechanical Engineering meeting in Chicago, Towne 
indicated that: 
"Engineering has long been conceded a place as one 
of the modern arts, and has become a well-defined science, 
with a large and growing literature of its own, and of late 
years has subdivided itself into numerous and distinct 
divisions, one of which is that of mechanical engineering. 
It will probably not be disputed that the matter of shop 
management is of equal importance with that of engineering. 
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as affecting the successful conduct of most, if not all, of 
our great industrial establishments, and that the management 
of Korks has become a matter of such great and far-reaching 
importance as perhaps to justify its classification also as 
one of the modern arts. The one is a well-defined 
science...; the other is unorganized... A vast amount of 
accumulated experience in the art of workshop management 
already exists, but there is no record of it available to 
the world in general, and each old enterprise is managed 
more or less in its own way, receiving little benefit from 
the parallel experience of other similar enterprises, and 
imparting as little of its own to them; while each new 
enterprise, starting ' de novo' and with much labor, and 
usually at much cost for experience, gradually develops a 
more or less perfect system of its own, according to the 
ability of its managers, receiving little benefit or aid 
from all that may have been done previously by others in 
precisely the same field of work" (1886: 428). 
Towne’s statements indicate the acceptable interpretations for 
the industrial activities at the end of the nineteenth century in the 
United States. The question now is: Here Towne* s expectations ever 
fulfilled? 
The answer is yes — and no. Eventually, attempts at the 
professionalization of management. and the institutionalization of 
management education happened as a matter of course and today. the 
management-educated managers are doing their specialized work within the 
organizational world -and the management academicians are doing their 
specialized work within the academic world. On the one hand, there is 
no doubt that management is now a well defined science, with a distinct 
literature, with numerous journals, and with many associations for the 
interchange of experience. On the other hand, it is questionable whether 
"the accumulated experience" has benefitted old and new enterprises; 
especially the "accumulated experience" in the form of scholarly 
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management research. 
Hor to comprehend this ambivalent answer? this ambiguous 
situation? Let's now do some "archeology of knowledge," which starts by 
locating the nature of Towne's statements within the broader social 
scene of his times. 
The post-civil Har years in the United States brought a general 
sense of economic well being into a nation still in its forming stages. 
Hhile Europe had a tradition of being periodically shaken by 
intellectual currents, which influenced its economic and political 
systems, the United States was developing in those years an economic and 
political system fairly devoid of any explicit intellectual roots. If 
after the Civil Rar there was a clear followership of the ideas of 
Herbert Spencer which were of little interest in Europe, was probably 
more due to their congruence with the ideals and aspirations of American 
society at that time than to any revelatory message about the way 
America should go. Spencer was a firm supporter of science and 
industry, and a believer of individualism and survival of the fittest. 
He was also an advocate of representative government which he thought 
necessary for a progressive industrial society (Bottomore, 1969; Rhite, 
1976; Blackford and Kerr, 1986). 
The society which developed along these ideas was not without 
criticism. Important figures like Dewey, Veblen, Beard, Robinson, and 
Holmes spoke against truculent capitalism and conspicuous consumption, 
for progressive education, for the understanding of the law as judicial 
contractions rather than immutable truths, and for the understanding of 
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history as a pragmatic Heapon in the explanation of the present and 
control of the future ( Hhite, 1 976). They provided a balance of liberal 
thinking against the more conservative groups who owned or controlled 
capital. But their views, if not identical to Spencer’s, were important 
in fostering the institutionalism, pragmatism, and instrumentalism which 
also helped shape as hegemonic ideal a form of economic development 
based on "the survival of the fittest" - and economic_deyelopment, 
per se, as the core value of society ( e. g. Heilbroner 1963, 1968). 
Not until the late 1800s did the United States develop into a 
society where economic issues stood at the forefront. The discourses of 
specialization, production, and marketability were then established as 
those of everyday life, and the society's institutions reproduced this 
order of things. 
The universities were constructed around very similar notions. 
In a nation which in its post-Civil Har era was seldom to be known for 
the influence of its intellectuals in public policy or public life 
( Hofstadter, 1964), it was easy, for example, to confine "the arts and 
literature" to "the departments"; and to declare liberal arts education 
as something to be had as adornment or precursor of something else that 
was "useful. " These conditions still prevail in current American 
society, except that with the passage of time the local and particular 
motivations from which they arose have acquired the status of 
ontological and universal reasons. In today's universities the 
separation of academic "fields" has acquired the intellectual authority 
of a natural objective fact, and this "natural fact" becomes a forceful 
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depoliticizing strain when you can only participate in the very narrow 
space of "what you know about" (Said, 1983). 
Towne's 1886 statements were enacted in institutional 
arrangements for which the American society had recently acquired a 
blueprint. Before the Civil Rar the most common design for higher 
education in the United States was the English Cambridge-Oxford college 
model in the ideal of providing general liberal arts education to the 
elite members of society, and to those who were to govern the new 
nation. The English model conceived of liberal arts and pure sciences 
as university subjects while keeping professional preparation outside of 
it (e.g. medicine in the hospitals, engineering in the construction 
site). After the 1860s the nation approached higher education with a 
different model: the modern German university (Bean, 1953; Jarausch, 
1983). 
The Pseudogermanization of American Higher Education 
After the Civil Rar there were arguments about the need to 
stimulate national economic development through educational policy. It 
was clear that the American universities lacked the requirements to 
provide the perceived necessary advanced training and research. The new 
demand for graduate and professional education became a blending ground 
for fostering the interests of an individual career, the advance of 
scholarship, and the national welfare (Herbst, 1983). 
The German universities of the nineteenth century pioneered the 
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model of scholarly specialization and higher technical education, as 
Hell as professional education after the undergraduate sequence, and 
appeared as an ansner to the nen American requirements. This model Has 
brought to the United States in different forms. In some cases the 
German approach Has added to the existing program of studies ( e. g. 
Cornell), and in other cases nhole institutions Here developed under the 
nen conception (e.g. Wisconsin). But different from its German 
counterpart and other European universities, Hhich responded to a 
national definition and approval for their offerings, the American 
system of higher education (similar to the American business 
enterprises) folloned a laissez faire philosophy rather than a "national 
higher education policy. " 
Herbst comments that before the Civil War the nation had already 
prepared "a Hide platform of institutional types on Hhich nith the onset 
of largescale industrial development a nen configuration of academically 
and technically more advanced institutions could be placed and developed 
Hithout making superfluous or destroying the older institutions" (1983: 
200-201). Thus, the public large institutions flourished side by side 
the smaller private colleges and academies Hhich, in many instances 
could not dran the line betneen secondary, vocational, and higher 
learning. In the United States institutional differentiation and 
diversification became the norm for nhat Has called higher education, 
and little attention Has paid to crossinstitutional standardization of 
offerings. 
From this discussion one can gather that creating a nen 
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university or university program did not present a major difficulty in 
the United States. At the same time, however, the multiplicity of 
stakeholders (donors, parents, teachers, and college administrators) 
were apt to influence the configuration and offerings of any institution 
in more definitive ways than in the centrally planned European 
institutions, which responded to national policies and the labor market. 
Hhat eventually restored some uniformity to the American universities' 
curricula, in spite of the institutional diversity, was the German 
emphasis on development of new knowledge through scientific 
investigation and specialization. This emphasis became the basic 
requirement of higher learning and the main tool for development of the 
academic professions in the United States; but its workings here, as we 
will soon see, had more to do with societal and institutional politics 
than with science as such. 
Structural Ambiguity: Academization of the Professions 
versus the Professionalization of Academia 
A large number of the new American colleges only survived for a 
few years. For a large proportion of the population, now engaged in 
developing new business and new fortunes, college education in its more 
traditional form had little to do with the life they were leading. 
Colleges developed sometimes as another form of business, and 
industrialization became in many ways the cause rather than the effect 
of higher education. As such, college and university education often 
evolved as another consumer good which could be bought because its price 
was accesible (Burke, 1983). 
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In some cases, the value of traditional higher education Has 
explicitly considered a negative asset. For example, in 1889 Andrew 
Carnegie, representing his industrial and business peers indicated that 
..as far as business affairs are concerned, the future captain of 
industry is hotly engaged in a school of experience, obtaining the very 
knowledga required for his future triumphs. . . College education as it 
exists is fatal to success in that domain" (Veysey, 1965: 4). 
How, then, did higher education in America make peace with 
economic development to the point that today it is considered a sine qua 
non, as if always had been the case? The dilemma was "solved" through 
the professionalization of higher education, which reproduced in the 
academic structures the notions of specialization, production, and 
marketability which were already valued as sustainers of economic 
development (Furner, 1975; Haskell, 1978), In an increasing 
commercialized and specialized society academia became one more producer 
which should respond to the market with an appropriate product. The 
German model of higher education was in this sense more a means than an 
end. 
Light (1983) indicates that the history of professional schools 
in the United States is one of structural ambiguity. Hhen the 
universities took professional training and education upon themselves, 
following the German model, they created this kind of tension in more 
than one form. On the one hand, the academic professionals had to 
define themselves as the carriers of knowledge whose expertise was to be 
transmitted to the future practitioners. As "men of science" their 
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location Has the university and their primary concern Has the 
development of knonledge. On the other hand, this separation put them 
at odds Hith the practitioners of their onn professions and the more 
pragmatic members of society. It also forced many of the 
non-professional disciplines, including the liberal arts, to model 
themselves after the professional fields in order to survive the quest 
for relevance in nhat appeared to be an increasingly pragmatic higher 
education system. 
Observe, honever, that structural ambiguity of this nature could 
only appear in the absence of a national policy of higher education. In 
most European countries the authority and legitimation of certain units 
of higher education as the site of professional training and education 
Has established by the state as national priority. In the United 
States, honever, this authority and legitimation for the universities 
had to be negotiated nith the rest of society. 
According to Light, the negotiation Has attained principally 
through three strategies. First, the universities declared that their 
research, the hiring and training of specialists, and the publishing of 
journal articles should be taken to represent professional reality. 
Through this strategy they created a compromise situation betneen 
training the practitioners and educating them in the profession's core 
knonledge. The outcome of this tension Has to create a hybrid "nho too 
often tended to be neither nell prepared in the skills for being 
effective practitioners, nor able to bring a critically honed intellect 
to bear on [their professional] questions” (1983: 346). 
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Second, the creation of "communities of professional scientists" 
served as the means to establish a community of the competent, which 
could determine standards of professional excellence independent of 
institutional affiliation, and judge each others* work. The National 
Academy of Science was founded around this notion in 1863, and the 
American Social Sciences Association in 1865. The latter developed a 
concept of "the social sciences" which became the acceptable label for 
these disciplines' professionalixation inside and outside the 
universities. In this manner their members contributed to the public 
civil service reform movement and, at the same time, to the 
establishment of many other professional associations for academic 
disciplines. 
The third strategy, closely tied to the other two, involved the 
process of status transfer. By the late 1800s, the research 
university/professional school designed after the German model comprised 
only a handful of institutions in the United States. But it was a model 
aggressively promoted by old and new elite as a way to serve their 
purposes. Through this strategy. Light indicates; 
"... an elite faction used the universalistic 
rhetoric of science and the modern university to legitimate 
its own particularistic approach to professional work by 
institutionalizing it in such a way as to preserve its 
privileged class position. . . the interest of university 
entrepreneurs of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
who acted as agents for the new industrial barons, coincided 
with the interest of the professional elites" (1983: 346). 
The universities which followed the route of professionalization 
and a strong scientific research orientation found themselves richly 
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endowed by the interests they were serving, and Here more likely to 
attract students inclined toward a "useful" education. And the elite 
factions which promoted rigorous professional schools, and their 
emphases on science and research, did so mainly to give universalistic 
legitimation and respectability to their own private interests. From 
this perspective, academics and elites were to benefit as long as each 
"kept to their side of the fence" without attempting to interfere with 
the other. 
The question remained, however, of what would be considered "a 
professional school" under the expectations of those who supported and 
legitimated them. One of the stronger and clearer answers was from 
Abraham Flexner, head of various investigations sponsored by the 
Carnegie Foundation, and whose recommendations were taken as guide for 
other endowments by industrial tycoons. He questioned the 
appropriateness of vocational and popular education within the 
university. Regarding the professions he indicated that: 
"A clear case can, I think, be made out for law and 
medicine, not for denominational religion, which involves a 
bias, hardly perhaps for education, certainly not at all for 
business, journalism, domestic ‘science' or library 
'science'.,." ( 1 930: 4). 
Thus, at the time of Towne's 1886 statements American higher 
education was still defining its modern shape. Those disciplines which 
could easily enact discourses of science and technology were likely to 
establish their disciplinary core without major difficulties. If they 
were ' constituted within the elite institutions, which as research 
universities provided the standards for all others, they were likely to 
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be imitated and perpetuated as "the only coherent account of academic 
reality” (Light, 1983: 355). In the case of engineering, moreover, not 
only the discipline could be naturally tied to another Hide range of 
older scientific disciplines (e,g. physics, mathematics) but the public 
recognition of its importance for the development of the nation provided 
it Hith a home at the uniquely American land-grant colleges. In this 
sense, the engineering profession could folloH its onn path nithout 
necessarily depending on private endonments. On the other hand, 
management training Has fairly distant from any claims of either 
professional or scientific status. 
It is important non to summarize the relationships that Here 
evolving betneen the universities as institutions of higher education, 
academic disciplines, academicians, professional practitioners, and 
society at large by the turn of the century in the United States. At 
this point, the universities, private or public, had become the centers 
of higher education for the nation, and they had their onn interests at 
heart nhen claiming priority for a scientific, research-based graduate 
and professional training after a liberal arts undergraduate education. 
They Here privately-endoned or state-supported models after nhich other 
higher learning institutions Hould folloH. At the same time, 
undergraduate disciplines, including the liberal arts, and especially 
those in the four-year colleges. Here folloning a path of specialization 
and utilitarianism in the quest for relevance and survival. The 
academic faculty, if members of a particular profession. Here likely to 
establish a close relationship nith other non-academic groups in their 
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profession, or outside of it as independent scientist/experts. In the 
liberal arts the relationship Kith non-academic groups Has less likely 
to arise, but in this case the university Has the provider of the 
appropriate climate to cultivate/separate "the intellectual", an 
important if not immediately useful educational elite for the 
to-be-educated elite. 
The critiques of American education by Deney and Veblen at the 
time probably did more to entrench than to erradicate the already 
established order of things. For example, there Has a clear interest on 
the part of Deney (1899) to eliminate the separation betneen society's 
everyday life and the educational system, but an enactment of his 
propositions Has more likely to bring into education an occupational 
ethic than the values of intellectualism to society at large. His 
apparent effort to eliminate the separation betneen theory and practice 
Horked to engulf theory nith practice; and ironically, all of it 
supported the permanence of an elitist status quo. 
In Deney’s viens instrumentalism nas a humane philosophy nhich 
did not Horship the commercial values of American society -nhat it 
obviously norshipped nas a technocratic society: 
", . . The Horld in nhich most of us live is a norld in 
nhich everyone has a calling and an occupation, something to 
do. Some are managers and others are subordinates. But the 
great thing for one as for the other is that each shall have 
had the education nhich enables him to see nithin his daily 
nork all there is in it of large and human significance, 
... At present, the impulses nhich lie at the basis of the 
industrial system are either practically neglected or 
-positively distorted during the school period..." (1899: 
38-39). 
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These views were reiterated even by the harshest local critic, 
Veblen (1899; 1918) who otherwise went often ignored. If he had any 
influence as a critic of this society it was not over the elimination or 
reduction of conspicuous consumption or waste in general. His 
influence was on the ways he could be interpreted to sustain the 
"wasteful nature" of the liberal arts and the importance of the 
sciences, and engineering, in the community's industrial life 
(Bottomore, 1968; Rhite, 1976). 
From this socio/historical vantage point we should observe that 
the American approaches for the development of "a good (goods?) society" 
were then tied to the discourses of social engineering rather than to 
the discourses of social criticism. These discourses preserve and 
extend the status quo of "order and rationality, " and avert 
understandings based on discontinuities or catastrophic changes. The 
former establish their power bases in technology and specialization, the 
latter in intellectual movements. This distinction is very important 
for the discussion that follows. It serves to locate the "roots" of the 
current organizational disciplines and "disciplinary discourses" as a 
rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983) weaved throughout the surface of 
social and cultural developments which are in most cases as American as 
the organizational disciplines themselves. 
In the Margins: The American Business Schools 
Higher business education by the turn of the century had a 
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marginal position in American society. This situation could be 
partially explained by the undefined nature of these disciplines as 
either "science" or "liberal arts". Moreover, any attempt to define 
higher education in business was likely to elicit thoughts of the 
relationship betneen this neH form of "professional education" and the 
clearly vocational private commercial school which proliferated in the 
nation since 1835 (Miller and Hamilton, 1964; Burke, 1983). The German 
model could not legitimate any attempt at professionalization in this 
respect; Germany did not provide status of higher education to business 
training until 1898 (Lundgreen, 1983). 
Nonetheless, by the 1870*s there was already some awareness in 
the United States of the need for business education for those who would 
inherit the business empires that were being constituted, and recognize 
the status differences between this elite group and the clerical 
personnel receiving vocational training in the commercial schools. The 
Hharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, founded through an 
initial "gift" of Joseph Hharton in 1881 was the native American 
response to this predicament, followed in 1898 by similar schools at the 
universities of California and Chicago. Not surprisingly, however, 
Hharton stayed under the umbrella of the College of Arts and Sciences 
until 1912; it was the understanding until quite past the turn of the 
century that higher education for business was part of the gentlemen's 
education, that it should provide more character development than 
vocational training, and that it would build intellectual and moral 
orientations without necessarily leading to a career ( Hugstad, 1 983). 
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This approach to higher business education Has soon to change. 
The empire building that occurred on those later years of the nineteenth 
century became a powerful force in reducing the liberal arts orientation 
in the business schools. The growth of Chandler's (1977) "invisible 
hands" (the larger organizations becoming more complex and more 
dependent on hired "professional managers" than on the capitalist 
owners) created pressure for more specialized management education. 
Moreover, management education soon became a vehicle for social mobility 
when it was evident that a college degree in this field could provide 
lower income groups with entrance to the emergent managerial class. 
Rhat were the views of society for this kind of education? 
Veblen, who clearly saw social advantages in professional education 
commented: 
"The professional knowledge and skill of physicians, 
surgeons, dentists, pharmacists, agriculturists, engineers 
of all kinds, perhaps even journalist, is of some use to the 
community at large, at the same time that it may be 
profitable to the bearers of it... But such is not the case 
with the training designed to give proefficiency in 
business. No gain comes to the community at large from 
increasing the business proefficiency of any numbers of its 
young men. There is already much too many of these 
businessmen, much too astute and proefficient in their 
calling, for the common good... The work of the College of 
Commerce, accordingly, is a peculiarly futile line of 
endeavor for any public insitution, in that it serves 
neither the intellectual advancement nor the material 
welfare of the community" (1918: 205). 
Implicit in Veblen's comments is his negative answer to a more 
unspoken dilemma about management education. That is, can there really 
be a management education? And if so, what is it? 
Early disciplinary efforts were spent on building the 
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"management subject. " Evidently, the fate of the discipline depended on 
this definition, and on its ability to separate its "professional 
product" from the non-management educated. But also, its discourses had 
to demonstrate its primary value to society. Thus, at that point in 
time they started to be scientific. 
A prime example of these efforts appears in Hotchkiss' 1918 
lecture at the University of California. The then Director of Business 
Education at the University of Minnesota stressed: 
"Business may not yet be a science, but it is 
rapidly becoming scientific. Scientific inquiry is all the 
Khile carrying new factors from the category of the unknoKn 
to that of the knonn, and by so doing it is setting a 
standard of business efficiency. The more brilliant 
qualities, like courage and imagination, must be coupled 
with capacity for investigation and analysis. . . The person 
Kho uses scientific method takes account of all his knoKn 
forces; . . . His trained imagination and judgement working on 
known facts set the limit on what he does find, all along 
the way... scientific method is the only sure approach to 
all problems; it is a thing of universal application, and 
far from being confined to the technical departement of 
business, ... it may have its widest application in working 
out the problems of management" (1918: 47-49). 
Hotchkiss was not referring his comments to Taylors' "scientific 
management", for the latter's contribution was more to industrial 
engineering than to management; more to methods and procedures than to 
decision making. Hotchkiss is explicit in his critique of scientific 
management as "a cult..." whose followers ". . . seem to assume that their 
science is absolute and inexorable, that it eliminates disturbing 
factors and hence needs no adjustment to adapt it to the difficulties 
met in its application" (: 64). However, he recognizes that scientific 
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management has made a contribution because it has "stirred up" 
businessmen who "...have become accostumed to using the words 'science* 
and 'business' in the same sentence" (: 65). 
His insightful words, which point at the power that a particular 
discourse could have, were promoting the professionalization of business 
education in the universities similar to the professional training given 
to prospective lawyers, physicians, or engineers. And what he was 
promoting with more immediacy was the development of a body of knowledge 
which could be uniquely identified with the management of organizations. 
Discussing the primacy of "the scientific method" for businessmen was 
his strategy for gaining their respect for business research in the 
universities. His expectation was that a disciplinary body of 
knowledge, with tried and tested universal principles of management, 
would be adopted and respected by "executives" who could understand the 
value of knowledge derived from empirical investigations. 
Hotchkiss' expectations, the definition and growth of the 
businesss management disciplines as an empirical field, and their more 
recent entitlement as organizational sciences, occurred in spite of the 
absence of vigorous management research in the universities until much 
later. The demand for management education as a means to entry in an 
emerging elite group, and by those who eventually entered into a state 
of "status panic" (Mills, 1948; 1951) drove the hordes toward business 
education in the universities. Meanwhile, for the universities, 
producing business school graduates was a low-cost proposition if 
compared to such schools as engineering and medicine. The "product" 
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Hith high demand and supply was for many years the highly specialized 
undergraduate degree, which provided entry-level job "knowledge" to an 
increasingly business "educated" population (Hugstad, 1983), 
Structural Ambiguity in the Multiple Margins 
Business higher education epitomizes the notion of structural 
ambiguity discussed before. Rith the exception of the field of 
accounting, the traditional definition of "profession" does not apply to 
the other business school "specialties" (e,g. Gordon and Howell, 1959), 
a situation which creates strain between the manager* s status as a 
professional and the notion of professional in other fields. Moreover, 
in spite of its graduate status the MBA has seldom been recognized as a 
truly professional degree. 
The professional relationship between educators and 
practitioners in the business field is also a strained one. Those who 
educate physicians are physicians, those who educate engineers are 
engineers, scientist educate in the sciences (including the social 
sciences - behavioral, social, and political scientists, 
anthropologists, linguists, etc.) and the liberal art educators are 
usually referred to as intellectuals or even artists. Hhat are those 
who educate business persons and managers? 
In this case, the alienation of the academicians from its 
alleged "field of practice" is particularly evident in the 
management/organizational "specialty". Academicians in this specialty. 
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probably the most undefined Kithin the field, are usually absent from 
the professional associations (e.g. American Management Association) 
Khile the opposite is true in the absence of practitioners from the 
academic meetings (e.g. Academy of Management). 
Hithin the universities, the status of the business school is 
also an ambiguous one. They are usually latecomers in the more 
traditional and established campus, and have a history of groKing out of 
financial considerations: the university administrators promoting the 
program in view of student demand, and loK cost if compared to other 
high demand fields like technology and science; the other faculties 
opposing the program because of its imposition on already limited 
budgets. The charges, honever, have been more clear on accusations of 
vocationalism, and the lack of intellectual orientation in the field, as 
Hell as to the quality of the students and of the education provided 
( Hugstad, 1 983). As late as 1959 the influential Gordon and Honell 
report Has emphasizing the importance of a doctoral degree for an 
appropriate higher business education in vien of the absence of full 
time academicians in the field. They pointed out, honever, that the 
degree did not have to be in business. This assertion further indicates 
the confusing identity of the discipline, especially in the area of 
management and organization. 
Gordon and Honell also commented on business executives’ 
unanareness about research conducted in business schools nhich could be 
relevant to business organizations. These same executives Here, on the 
other hand, anare of research conducted in other fields like psychology 
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or industrial relations. From Gordon and Howell's point of view, the 
problem was that: 
, . more significant knowledge of ultimate value to 
business has come out of the nonbusiness departments of the 
university than out of the business schools. This is true, 
we think, even if we exclude the physical sciences and 
engineering. Major contributions to our understanding of 
business behavior and to the ability of business to deal 
with some type of problems have come from psychology, 
mathematics and statistics, economics, and sociology" (1959: 
381). 
And in the footnote to that paragraph they state that perhaps 
cultural anthropology and political sciences should also be included as 
contributors to business knowledge, but that political science: 
"...has not, on the whole, developed analytical 
tools as obviously useful in the study of business problems 
and business behavior as have the other social sciences. 
This is beginning to change as political science takes on a 
more empirical, positivist, and behavioristic coloration 
(1959: 381 (My emphasis]). 
They did not explain cultural anthropology one way or another. 
Their general critique, stemming from the interviewed 
executives' responses, was that the business schools have not made 
sophisticated use of the underlying disciplines mentioned above to 
provide better, and more useful, empirical research for business 
organizations -the possibility of a different explanation was not 
offered. One alternative explanation could have been that the 
executives understood business as a practical and not a research field. 
Moreover, it must have been difficult for these executives to think of a 
unique contribution made by research in business which the other fields 
were not capable of making. 
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On the other hand, the increasingly "academized" business 
faculties had to establish their oHn definition on this situation. 
Hhile the origins of the discipline Here in the liberal arts, and the 
early moves out of it were toward skills development, the 
recommendations for an academic-oriented ( more research than practice 
oriented) discipline were creating another dilemma for the 
organizational scholars. 
Remembering the introductory lines for this chapter we may say 
that at the crux of this dilemma lies the supplementary nature of the 
organizational disciplines. Because its constituting elements, 
organizations, are the central objects and subjects, as well as the main 
artifacts, of modern western society, any attempt at defining "the 
organizational field" becomes an attempt at the difficult task of 
cultural self-reflexivity. In the absence of this awareness, attempts 
at defining it through other disciplinary models led it to be defined by 
its lack: Neither art nor science, and if the latter neither "pure" nor 
"applied", nor quite a professional field, it did not have any original 
claim to mastery other than its service to the "masters" of society. 
Eventually, it was anthropology without field, economics without 
economy, engineering without shop, mathematics without theory, 
psychology without lab, sociology without society. If defined as an 
undergraduate degree, it suffered criticism for its early specialization 
which detracted from the liberal education. As a graduate degree, it 
had to balance its position as a profession while fending accusations of 
vocationalism. It was clear that business education was badly in need 
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of defining its subject. 
And that Kas the task nhich by the tnid-1950s the organizational 
studies scholars imposed upon themselves (Beyer, 1982). As an answer to 
business practices, which did not understand what academic business 
research had to offer, they further removed the research into the 
deepness of academia - perhaps hoping that eventually a Grand Unified 
Theory of Management would emerge?. .. and provide answers to business 
problems that no other field of knowledge could provide? Otherwise, how 
to explain the Academy of Management* s explicit disapproval since the 
early 1960s about incorporating practitioners in the membership? Or the 
great emphasis placed on staying away from practitioner orientation in 
academic research and publications since the mid-1950s? (e. g. Beyer, 
1982; Hrege, 1986; Adams and Davis, 1986). 
These strategies could be easily interpreted as the 
academicians* responses to the structural ambiguities discussed before. 
The prestige within the academic community of this newer and equivocal 
field would be established through its highly scientific nature and 
exclusive scholarly community. Keeping away the practitioners, or at 
least in a clearly separated dimension (for them you do consulting - 
professional work) was a way to avoid the vocational label while 
awaiting the discovery that will **clearly speak** of the contribution of 
scientific business research to the field of practice. Conveniently 
along the route of this evolution was the increasing momentum that the 
**scientific orientation** was gaining in all fields of knowledge, and the 
higher status of the sciences in society at large. In the kingdom of 
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pragmatism, positivism Has to reign over idealism; and any discipline 
Hhich could be re-presented as scientific Hould reassert a privileged 
status. More than three decades later, Hotchkiss' expectations Here to 
be partially realized. 
A Belated Entrance to Modernity 
My commentaries in previous sections highlighted the development 
of the organizational disciplines nithin the larger context of 
development of modern higher education institutions in the United 
States. But, in any event, it Has and still is the "American culture of 
modernity" Hhich defined nhat Hould be accepted as "true knonledge" in 
these institutional arrangements as folloHs: 
1. The status of "knonledge" is conferred only to activities 
that can be empirically validated. Behind such importance lie at least 
three related notions: first, that truth is attainable; second, that the 
more generalizable a statement the higher the likelihood of its 
explanatory poner, and the closer it Hill be to truth; and third, that 
the generalizability of a statement depends on hoH nell it Hould get to 
represent the reality that is outside of it. Thus, a strong claim to 
knonledge must be based on the possibility of constructing good 
representations. 
2. The idea that "knonledge", as defined above, is attainable 
through the accumulation of additional evidence tonards truth. To 
accumulate evidence is tantamount to become more specialized in less and 
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less; to be able to discover, one by one, the "pieces in the puzzle" of 
truth. 
Closely related to this idea is the separation between "common, 
everyday-life" knoKledge, and "intellectual" knoKledge, with clear 
privileges conferred to the latter. The intellectuals, separated from 
the rest of society, are invested with the important responsibility of 
discovering truth, and of preserving their fields as one Khere 
"knoKledge" is spoken. 
3. The importance of authorship, and of intentional actions and 
results that can be attributed to a person, including the notions of 
"freedom" and "reponsibility". This is to say that the nay to 
"knoHledge" is dependent upon "that one Kho is able to discover it". It 
is dependent on "his (very unlikely "hers") personhood", and on his 
actions as an individual. 
These ideas, derived from empiricist, utilitarian, logical 
positivist, pragmatist, and instrumentalist philosophies discussed in 
chapter one, formed the core of classical modernity in America, and 
eventually encountered opposition from Kithin its OKn period. "Late 
/High Modernism" identifies these oppositional movements Khich, since 
the 1920s, attempt to oppose the rational, realist, technocratic, and 
capitalist orientation of most cultural forms. Ironically, they often 
ended up coexisting Kith Khat they opposed. 
For example, even Khen the philosophical discourses for the 
validation of knoKledge, Khich separated "subject" and "object" in the 
positivist tradition, Kere contested by the phenomenological/existential 
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tradition, Hhich united subject and object -and Khich provided strong 
support to knowledge through the knower* s experience-the bases of 
knowledge were still tied to a thematic of presence by the knowing 
subject in an apprehendable and stable field of experience. 
In art, literature and other cultural avantgarde manifestations 
"Late/High" modernism stood against the formalism and the burgeois modes 
of thinking of classical modernity, but eventually the "movements" 
became institutionalized as formally and intellectually elistist as what 
they opposed. And so, the knowledge bases in the structures of society 
became even more marked in their separation from society’s "everyday 
life". 
In understanding the organizational disciplines from this modern 
"periodizing" perspective one may say that they arrived into classical 
modernity when the culture was already moving into "high modernism". 
The original disciplinary core was formed between the 1920s and 1950s, 
placing major emphasis first on descriptive realism and latter on the 
role of individual knowledge through "scientific validation". In the 
meantime other "human sciences" were involved in cultural developments 
toward more abstract, and more existential expressions. 
In the 1960s and 1970s the business schools and the 
organizational disciplines consolidated their position within the 
universities as prime producers of "useful knowledge" -e. g. , 
establishing the supremacy of the MBA - but the 60s were also years of 
neo-h'umanism [ e. g. Miles ( 1 966) "human relations" vs. "human resources"] 
and the 70s and 80s saw the advent of skirmishes within "scientific 
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rigor" [the rationalism of organizational sciences -e.g. Armstrong 
(1979; 1980; 1983); Mitroff (1974; 1980; 1983); Boal and Rillis (1983)); 
and betKeen "cultural naturalism" and logical positivism (the 
neo-romanticism of organizational metaphors-e. g. Finder and Bourgeois 
(1982); Bourgeois and Finder (1983); Morgan (1983b); Eber (1985)]. 
Hhether these are instances of "high modernism" in the organizational 
disciplines is difficult to say but there is no doubt that they have 
been years of increasing elitism in this academic realm. 
Thus, Khen I asked at the beginning of this chapter: Hoh did 
the organizational sciences became "sciences"? Hok is it that in a 
culture centered around business organizations and economic issues, the 
organizational sciences are separated from organizational practices? I 
Has not posing these questions at random. I was standing outside their 
OHn periodization (as a modern field of knoHledge) and observing hoH the 
disciplinary activities and their onn questioning (i.e. Rhat are the 
difficulties nith theory and research in organizations nhich prevents 
the organizational sciences from advancing more useful applications?) 
Hould not make sense outside the culture of modernity. 
My questions have been already partially ansnered. From my 
discussions in previous sections it is possible to provide fairly 
descriptive answers, grounded on a socio/historical perspective of 
modern higher education in America. For example, one may say that the 
"organizational sciences" as latecomers into an established educational 
system had to follow the rules of that system to legitimize its 
disciplinary status in higher education - And these rules prescribed 
that disciplines Kith professional/scientific orientation would earn a 
privileged scholarly position. 
At the same time, how to claim professional and scientific 
expertise for a field of knowledge which touched upon the most prevalent 
and common of all activities in American society: business organizing 
and management? The ambiguity of its "origin" and the multiple 
disciplinary discourses in its constitution permitted the organizational 
disciplines to choose the more desirable self-understanding; one that 
would stress its prestigious "scientific orientation. " Accordingly, it 
retrenched into the academic research structure and headed into 
"discovering the perfect manager/management form, " while protecting its 
"scientific creation" from the highly populated worlds of undergraduate 
management education and organizational commonsense. And the quest 
still goes on. 
My questions, however, are still to be answered within the 
context of the postmodern cultural period. They address issues of 
current concern to most disciplinary fields which call themselves "the 
human sciences," including the organizational sciences. They are the 
minor questions behind a major one: Hhat is the role of the knowledge 
producing institutions in the present state of society? In the next 
chapter we will discuss how the "logic" that informed the development of 
the modern institutions and discourses of "knowledge" may not make any 
sense'in postmodernity. 
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Notes 
11J 
For the sake of convenience I sill use throughout the project 
the highly ethnocentric tere "American” to refer to persons and things 
from the United States. I recognize, irith regret, that such usage for 
the term has become so pervasive that it is often difficult to remember 
that Americans are all the naturals of North, Central, and South 
America, and assorted islands belonging to these continents. 
CHAPTER III 
POSTHODBRHISH* ORaAlfIZATIOIf> SCIENCE: 
IN THE TEXTUAL FIELD HE FIND EACH OTHER 
In the tMO previous chapters I have argued that defining 
appropriate realns for knowledge -disciplines, institutions, 
practices  was an ongoing interest in the discourses of modernity. As 
Foucault has often observed (e. g. 1972) the institutionalization and 
regimentation of the production knowledge in the nineteenth century 
-which have been represented as stemming from pedagogical interest and 
cultural progress- served to define, as well, the relationship 
power/knowledge that sustained modern society. Is there a discourse on 
"knowledge" in the discourses of the postmodern? 
It seems that the questioning has changed. The recurrent voices 
are more interested in redefining the relationship between the 
production of knowledge and the rest of society. Now that "the solid 
structures of knowledge" have been lifted, what will count as knowledge? 
Is it now oust a matter of naked power, of violence? Some recent 
discourses on these issues are discussed below. Their different 
positions may address the same problematics, but they only touch in the 
margins. The fragmentation in their views indicates where they are 
coming from. 
Habermas on the Hegemony of Scientific Knowledge: 
According to Habermas (1983) the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment era formulated a project of modernity whereby objective 
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science, universal morality and lair, and the arts would each develop 
according to their inner logic, and into separate spheres of knowledge. 
This project aimed to foster the accumulation of specialized knowledge 
for the enrichment of everyday life. Habermas contends that the 
Enlightenment project went wrong because the specialists in each 
professipn became more preoccupied with their immediate professional 
problems than with the betterment of society. Still, he proposes that 
an awareness of these limitations will bring modernity to its 
emancipatory, critical end without giving up the advantages of knowledge 
through specialization. Greatly simplified, his argument is that the 
developments in each sphere of knowledge would come together in the form 
of a "good society” 1£ each separate sphere works toward that end. 
But Habermas recognizes the privilege conferred to the 
empirical-analytic sciences in the technical interest of modern society 
and writes to correct this imbalance. More specifically, he made the 
point that the technical interest was incorporated into the sciences 
Qoly as one type of knowledge and not to be taken as the canonical 
standard for all forms of knowledge. Moreover, he challenged positivist 
philosophers of science who presupposed that empirical-analytic sciences 
provided the model for legitimate knowledge, while any other claim to 
knowledge was pseudo-knowledge (e. g. Habermas, 1971; Bernstein, 1985). 
Habermas' sociological theory is an approach to bring all 
members of society to a position of mutual understanding. He conceives 
of communication acts as situations performed against a background of 
consensus. If communication breaks down, however, the participants must 
engage in argumentation in a discoursive arena where it is necessary to 
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warrant a claim to validity. The good society would only occur if 
scientific, moral, and aesthetic knowledge could present their "cases" 
as of equal value in the discoursive arena. 
Bell on the Central Role of Science and Technology: 
Bell (1976) presents another position. He sees the university 
as the place where theoretical knowledge is codified and tested. During 
the "industrial society" era technology was capital-intensive and less 
dependent on theoretical knowledge. Now, in a "postindustrial society," 
theoretical knowledge gains centrality as the source of innovation and 
policy analysis when technology becomes knowledge-intensive. Under this 
new set of conditions the university has to maintain both its 
disinterested autonomous role regarding knowledge, while being the 
principal service agent of the society. Thus, from this point of view, 
the production of knowledge has had a separate place in society ( the 
universities) but society* s new requirements should bring the production 
of knowledge now closer to everyday life. 
Bell works through these issues in a fashion almost opposite 
from Habermas' . He acknowledges an a priori disjuncture between the 
three realms of society: techno-economic, polity, and culture (these 
correspond roughly to Habermas' spheres). He asserts that these realms 
are not congruent with one another and have different rhythms of change; 
he also indicates that they follow different norms which legitimate 
different and contrasting form of behaviors. For example, the 
bureaucratic and hierarchical techno-economic realm (elitism) contrasts 
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with the political ideology of equality and participation 
(egalitarianism), and a culture concerned with self-fulfillment of the 
"whole person" (individualism). He proposes that these discordances and 
contradictions define the shape of contemporary society. 
In Bell* s view, "the public household" is a solution for a 
society that may otherwise annihilate itself out of its contradictions. 
This is an argument for a society where "all interests are to be 
included and all issues should be negotiated" (1976: 280), which almost 
sounds like Habermas' argument for communicative action. The 
similarities end with that phrase. Bell's is a proposition that unites 
the techno-economic and polity realms through a more intent governmental 
intervention (and some form of religious revival) while he very much 
dismisses the realm of culture as exhausted and depleted. His is a 
world-view where science and technology maintain a central role, while 
basically negating a role in society for modern art. 
To understand the significance of this proposition in relation 
to the production of knowledge it is necessary to understand the manner 
in which Bell defines the role of the "public household. " In his view, 
the "public household" always exists for meeting the common needs of 
American society. For example, during the 1950s the "public household" 
started to underwrite science and technology, given its linkage to 
defense through revolutions in military technology. More fundamental 
still was the centrality of science and the systematic use and 
application of research, from basic science to systems analysis, to 
economic innovation ( i. e. , the development of science-based industries 
like computers, electronics, optics, and polymers) and to managerial and 
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economic policy. The linked relation of science to technology is non 
inextricable. Thus^ says Bell -"Rho shall be educated and hoa far; 
hoR much should be spent for graduate training, and in ahat fields  
this is no longer, in its magnitudes, a matter of individual choice but 
of government policy" (1976: 225). 
In this order of things, ahat counts as knoaledge and hoa can it 
be expressed? Bell stresses that the dominant mode of intellectual 
experience today is mathematical in a nea language of variables, 
parameters, models, stochastic processes, algorithms, heuristics 
minimax, and other terms adopted by the social sciences. "Life is a 
'game'," he says , "a game against nature, a game of man against man - 
and one folloas rational strategies that can provide maximum payoffs at 
minimum risks, minimax payoffs at minimax risks, and that most lovely 
terms in utility preference theory, a payoff that is provided by a 
'criterion of regret’" (1976: 98). 
These changes in language, according to Bell, incorporate 
uncertainty, and break temporal and spatial sequences as ae have knoan 
them in our everyday aorld of facts and experience. They disjoint the 
aorld of facts and experience from the aorld of concepts and matter. 
Or, to say it differently, his is a commentary to further disalloa the 
realm of culture to participate in defining modern society. It is a 
commentary about the impossibility of a coherent notion of art and 
expressiveness as ae have come to knoa them traditionally. 
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Said on the Ethlo of Objectivity and Realiae: 
In a different vein, Said (1983) sees academic autonomy, and the 
specialization within fields of knowledge, as one way to depoliticize 
the intellectuals and to keep their critical stance outside of public 
political life. His arguments are very different from both Habermas' 
and Bell* s. The latter authors describe and discuss the separation of 
spheres of knowledge and realms in society at large (Germany as the 
context for Habermas, and the United States as the context for Bell, in 
spite of their generalized comments about "Hestern society") rather than 
only within a particular institution in society. Said, on the other 
hand, goes more in depth into the significance of "the separation of 
fields" within the specific institutional arrangement of the American 
university. His view is that under the logic of separation and 
specialization of fields within the university there is "an unquestioned 
ethic of objectivity and realism, based essentially on an epistemology 
of separation and difference" (1983: 155). 
The ethic permits words such as "objectivity", "realism" and 
"moderation" to be used equally well in different fields (e. g. sociology 
or literary criticism), while the epistemology works to maintain for 
each field an appearance of "separate realms" for the sake of 
"knowledge". He concludes that these conceptions of ethic and 
epistemology work to keep the universities from interfering in the 
affairs of everyday world. 
Thus, out of its apparent innocence in regard to politics, and 
logic in regard to knowledge, the notion of separation in and within 
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acadeiiic fields can be interpreted as the desirable strategy under 
Bell's notion of "public household". In Said's words: 
"It does not stretch things greatly to note that 
noninterference and rigid specialization in the academy are 
directly related to what has been called a counterattack by 
'highly mobilized business elites' in reaction to the 
immediately preceeding period during which national needs 
were thought of as fulfilled by resources allocated 
collectively and democratically" (1983: 156). 
It is also important to observe how the structural arrangements 
of the university as criticized by Said reproduce the societal 
structures analyzed by Bell. The university, from this point of view, 
is a microcosm of the society where it is embedded, where not all "the 
realms" are equally "vital" or "legitimate"; and where only certain 
discourses will be heard in spite of Habermas' hopes to the contrary. 
For a society that places extreme emphasis on the production of 
knowledge and information -Said uses the examples of IBM and AT&T as 
two of the world largest corporations which claim that what they do is 
to put "knowledge" to work "for the people"- he claims that it is time 
for the intellectuals to break out of the disciplinary ghettos and 
actively participate in a politics of interference and active social 
practice. He ventures some specific suggestions like "crossing from 
literature, which is supposed to be subjective and powerless, into those 
exact parallel realms, now covered by journalism and the production of 
information, that employ representation but are supposed to be objective 
and powerful" (1983: 157). He is concerned with how a consumer item we 
call "the news" is represented by a rhetoric of objectivity, balance, 
realism, and freeedom, and is mostly a euphemism for ideological Images 
of the world that determine political reality for a vast majority of the 
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irorld's population. 
It is clear in Said* s discussion that he is directing his 
coementaries specifically to the hunanities, which in this order of 
things become accomplices of their marginalisation and exploitation by 
remaining "decorously silent on the large questions of social, economic, 
and foreign policy" (1983: 157). His discussion is, however, relevant 
to any other field within the university in the sense that any field, in 
its separation, is equally liable to suffer the fate of abiding to the 
dictates of outside societal powers; to be "defined as" rather than to 
participate in being definers of a better society. 
Bove on Aronowitx and Counterhegemonio Critical Science: 
In his discussion about recent works by Stanley Aronowitz, 
Paul Bove (1986) comments that the importance given to specialization 
within the universities is tied to a historical practice of division of 
labor, which is part of a larger societal order. This practice 
reproduces a social order which works to separate those who can be the 
critics of society from the course of society's everyday life. From his 
perspective, if critical intellectuals want to be relevant they must 
first understand the historical specificity of their own current 
practices -i.e. specialized knowledge in the universities as a 
historical development which responded to some specific interests of a 
particular society. He sees a need for the intellectuals to reposition 
themselves outside the disciplinary division of intellectual labor in 
order to be influential and help bring about a different, more 
desirable, societal order. 
Kith this discussion of Aronoaitz*s (1981) aork the arguments 
made by the other authors better stand out by themselves and contrast 
aith one another. Bove, like Said, sets his discussion on Aronoaitz 
against a background ahere the practice of disciplinary division of 
labor is strongly criticized. The basic tenet of this critique is that 
those aho choose to criticize the current historical moment and the 
current state of society are per force criticizing and opposing the 
discourses that have gained hegemony aithin society, and that have 
marginalized other discourses. Hegemonic discourses can only occur out 
of separation and specialization. They occur ahen any discipline claims 
to be able to explain and subsume under its explanations ahole bodies of 
social or natural occurrences. Thus, the ruling order of our Hestern 
society has become that of those aho can offer more totalizing 
discourses. Needless to say that the model totalizing discourse is that 
of science. 
Bove discusses Aronoaitz as an exemplar of those current critics 
of society aho are capable of crossing disciplinary and institutional 
boundaries in order to offer a theoretically sound counterhegemonic 
practice. Aronoaitz (1981) outlines hoa the modern critique of society 
offered by historical materialism and Marxism is no longer an 
appropriate critique for the current state of the Restern aorld. More 
importantly, he calls into question any theory of society that offers to 
resolve its diverse problems and factions by accomodating them into some 
form of coherent pattern and explanation -i.e. he negates the 
possibility of having a_Q§§te£_discou£S§ of liberation and social 
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change. 
From this point of view an adequate theory of society is one 
with a critical purpose rather than an explanatory purpose; one that 
pursues an alliance with practice rather than the separation of the 
theoretical intellectual from the world of practice; and one that is 
always aware of its social and historical specificity; that is, aware 
that its "solutions” are both local and temporal. There is no possible 
"theory of emancipation" in this view. 
Aronowitz is especially critical of the cultural dominance of 
modern science, and follows Kuhn (1970) and Feyerabend (1975) in saying 
that modern science must be explained in sociohistorical, not 
epistemological terms. He laments that under the rules of science any 
field-theory of society must be a unified theory of explanation with an 
implicit commitment to models of causality and progress. Such a theory 
would fail to comprehend historically specific conditions, which call 
for multiple alternative discourses to describe multiple and partial 
causations, and incommensurable differences. Hith their ideology of 
causality, progress, and prediction, scientistic field theories are 
reductive because they either ignore the elements of cultural life they 
cannot subsume, or they dismiss them as "anomalies" which would 
eventually be incorporated into the theory. 
This discussion leads to a different conceptualization of the 
intellectual who wants to contribute to and participate in a society 
which does not reproduce the current struggles for dominance and 
hegemony. Aronowitz's notion of "critical science” proposes that 
intellectuals become close to those groups representing the oppositions 
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in society. The role of the intellectual becomes, first, providing 
careful investigations into the concrete and specific constitution of 
the historical moment in which the opposition is placed; and second, 
"leading" the opposition into the ideology of the autonomous group. 
This "ideology" preserves the differences of the multiple groups in 
society through a politics of bloc which demands a self-managed society 
and, at the same time, maintains the autonomy of all the constituting 
positions. According to fiove: 
"Criticism becomes the ideology of bloc politics. . . 
Scientific criticism would theorize a bloc that is, by 
definition, antihegemonio in its politics and culture, in 
its ideology and the forms of everyday life. Theory must 
refuse doctrine if it is to assume the perspective of 
self-management. It must describe and defend the 
"permanence of difference" against the common sense of 
identity in both socialism and liberalism" (1986: 20). 
On first impression one can say that the four authors align 
themselves within two opposite views about the role of the production of 
knowledge in contemporary society: Habermas and Bell on a pole that 
fosters disciplinary and institutional separation and specialization as 
the means_tg_serye, that is, better knowledge for society; Said, Bove, 
and, Aronowitz on the other pole, fostering the crossing over 
disciplinary and institutional boundaries so that knowledge could become 
C§r£-Q£ the ac^igns of society. But these commentaries could be 
regrouped in still other fashions. 
For example, Habermas, Bove, Aronowitz, as well as Said, are 
clear in questioning the model of positivist science as the privileged 
model of knowledge. Each is also explicit about the political 
consequences of fostering this model. Bell, on the other hand, offers 
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strong support to scientific models, but his support is more for 
probabilistc mathematical models than for the more traditional 
universalistic prediction/control models of the physical sciences. 
Habermas, Bove, and Arononitz place special emphasis on 
respecting differences that cannot be subsumed under a particular model 
of knonledge. For Habermas the problem is one of bringing 
non-scientific and scientific realms to equal status as knowledge. For 
Bove and for Arononitz it is a matter of including as knozledge issues 
and approaches that currently are either ignored or disregarded as 
abnormalities by the hegemonic scientistic approaches, for example, 
those pertaining to women and minorities. 
Some may say that their commentaries are "leftist" discourses 
but that claim is difficult to sustain. Bell is pure controversy 
floating between extremes; Habermas is accused of naivete by the 
Critical schools; Said and Bove are more interested in the work of 
literature in relation to the world; and Aronowitz goes at length on 
criticizing Marxist and Neo-Marxist positions, and explicitly adopts a 
stance near poststructuralism. 
However, on examining their differences it becomes clear that 
there are two common focuses in their commentaries. One common focus is 
that they indicate, explicitly or implicitly, what are and what should 
be the relationships between the knowledge-producing institutions and 
society at large. Rithin the same focus the authors discuss discoursive 
practices that could account for the structural arrangements of society 
and of the knowledge-producing institutions. The second common focus is 
that each of these works is currently considered, in scholarly circles. 
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to be CQ§tiQdsrS social crlticisn. 
These authors do not leave any doubt about the importance that 
the knoRledge-producing institutions should gain in everyday society: 
they should stand side by side other institutions and practices, 
participating in the making of everyday society, rather than responding 
to other societal "forces. " 
The crossing of boundaries is the dominant tone. The form of 
participation may vary: concurrent development (equal discoursive 
value) of all spheres of knowledge for Habermas, with emphasis in 
creating a better balance of knoRledge a good and balanced society; 
more knowledge production in science and technology for Bell, with the 
technocrats now crossing the boundaries of universities, government, and 
business; and active intellectual intervention to politicize the other 
apparent neutral structures of society for Said, Bove, and Aronowitz. 
These ideas are quite a departure from those followed in the modern 
development of the universities and the disciplines in America -where 
even within the context of professionalism their role was to respond 
rather than initiate, to serve rather than to participate- and to a 
lesser extent in Germany and other Restern countries. These are the 
newer postmodern discourses, where kitsch and intellectualism may be 
rubbing elbows. 
Hy question now is: As in modernity, are the "organizational 
sciences" to be latecomers again in postmodernity? Or are they now 
ready' to abandon their impossible (because of its dominant scientific 
posture) and anachronistic quest into "High Modernism" (because of its 
lateness in reaching this stage of modern culture) and finally become 
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involved Rith their ORn current culture? Even from a purely modern 
perspective I find "High Modernism" in the organizational sciences - 
the elitist separation of "high" cultural forms (as in high-life) from 
"everyday" society, Rhich peaked by the late 1950s in most other fields 
- particularly ironic. As suggested in the previous chapter, for the 
field Rhich could have broken the representational separation betReen 
theory and practice, that is, for the continuity and involvement betReen 
the academic activities and the managerial activities, the irony is in 
the difficulties it has gotten into trying to maintain those 
representations. 
In the rest of this chapter I explore postmodernism further. 
From there, in the folloRing three chapters, I make another, more 
detailed journey into the modern constitution of the "organizational 
subject. " It is my contention that not until then Re Rill be ready to 
understand the postmodern possibilities of our discipline. 
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Enter Poetnodernity 
I concluded the preceding section arguing, as I did in chapter 
tHo, about the organi2ational disciplines' late advent into the 
culture of modernity. I observed that the discipline has been working 
to attain a respected place within the university as producer of a 
scientific body of knowledge. Rith its strategies of separation from 
the "everyday" practices of organizing the discipline can be easily 
located within the typical elitist activities of "High Modernism". My 
comments pointed at the irony of such strategies, but it was an irony 
pregnant with double meaning. Beyond laughing at the separation between 
the theory and practice of organization -which would be just a benign 
modern commentary based on pragmatist philosophies- my laughter had 
postmodern resonance. I was laughing at the elitist attempts of the 
most popular/populous of theories in the Restern world. 
That is, it is my position that one can understand the culture 
of modernity in Restern society, and in the United States in particular, 
as one which has attained its main cultural production in the form of 
"organizations. " Modern life evolves within, and revolves around, the 
notion of organizing -society as "institutional order" (Denhart, 1981; 
Smircich, 1983), Under such circumstances, a discipline constituted 
from and for such productions could have been a main social critic, the 
site for cultural self-reflexivity, and a bridge between knowledge 
production and everyday life. But as we may understand now, that was 
not within the range of possibilities for "authorizing" a new discipline 
in modern America. 
101 
At this point one can go back to Tonne's statements in the 
previous chapter and observe his emphasis on justifying the 
classification of iQdeCQ_^or "the management of norks", nhile 
keeping the classification of SQlSQce for engineering. On first 
thought, one may say that had the organinational disciplines kept its 
label as "art," they nould have folloned the path of social criticism 
outlined above, joining other "arts" as a site of intellectual pursuits 
(such as criticism). But that would be too naive a view. The point we 
must remember is that for the organizational disciplines to join the 
university implied demonstrating command of a specialized discourse, to 
shed the stigma of "vocationalism" and "commercial schools" (the latter 
having the additional stigmatizing character of being highly populated 
by female students), and coming as close to professionalism as possible. 
The conditions of possibility for such happenings were already 
delineated in society. The discourses of power were the discourses of 
science. Thus, the organizational disciplines became "organizational 
sciences" - and the strategies of High Modernism the manner to protect 
their privileged re-presentation. The "bourgeois science" paralleled 
rather than traversed bourgeois society. But with that movement it 
showed its "true colors" and sealed its fate: that was how art, Qot 
SQi§Q&Si moved in "High Modernity". This has added a very concealed 
ambiguity for the meaning "organizational sciences," and has enhanced 
in recent years the confused state of the field. 
In the following pages I initiate the postmodern program pursued in 
the rest of the project. Here I discuss how the "organizational 
sciences" would not be able to continue its "High Modernist" path in a 
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cultural noment Hhich is no longer modern. Rithin the university it 
will be difficult to continue the quest for a privileged position 
through the stratagems of modernity, which are too transparent and 
easily "read** in postmodernity. But more importantly, in postmodernity 
the boundaries between **fields, ** and between elite and mass culture get 
erased. Thus, how are these '*sciences, ** in their distantiation from 
other disciplines and from society, going to participate in the 
postmodern quest higlighted by Habermas, Said, Aronowitz, Bove, and even 
Bell? Rhat kind of participants are they going to be in the making of 
everyday society? 
To deal with these issues and questions I first indicate some 
basic characteristics of postmodernism. Then I focus on the problems of 
representational strategies in a postmodern mode. These strategies 
acquire special importance as they would reveal the discoursive 
formations of the discipline. Later 1 propose that these discoursive 
formations have maintained their specialized and privileged modernist 
status through the constitution of **the organizational subject**-the 
role of the manager/management. The deconstruction of this subject in 
the following chapters will permit me to propose a postmodern status for 
the **organizational sciences'* by the end of the project. Behind these 
arguments lies the conviction that the greatest postmodern opportunities 
for this "scholarly field" are located in its current confused and 
ambiguous state. 
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Th« Dlacoursea of Postaodernity 
As may be understood noa> the difficulties of the organizational 
sciences are not unique. In many disciplines the hope for unified 
fields and accumulated knoaledge, typical of previous historical 
moments, has given nay to the discomfort provoked by competing views and 
unresolved differences. In general this situation can be described as 
one where the master dleooursee are contested by fragmented voices, and 
one where the hegemony of these master discourses is constantly 
questioned. No discipline, especially those in the human sciences, has 
been able to find its "grand unified theory. " In most cases multiple 
and competing theories are accepted within the disciplinary cores. The 
"real Truth" seems more remote now than ever before. 
For example, in the human sciences theoretical approaches which 
attempted to provide formal general frameworks for understanding and 
explanation ("new criticism" in literary criticism, legal reasoning in 
law, positivism in social theory, the ideal of growth in economics, 
universal principles in philosophy, and even surrealism in art) have 
given way to more relativistic and local understandings. An 
illustration from the social sciences can make this point more clear. 
After Rorld War II the contest between Parsonian sociology and Marxism 
could be understood as the opposition of traditional ideologies by 
critical ones. They illustrate modernism not only in their ideological 
oppositions, but also, as commented on by Bove and Aronowitz, by their 
"totalizing discourses" (grand theory mode) in which each could explain. 
and explain away, the "whole" of capitalist societies; and in 
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anthropology, the Rhole of the ”less developed" societies (e.g. Marcus 
and Fischer, 1986; de Certau, 1986). From a postmodern perspective, 
"middle range" approaches (e. g. Merton, 1968), attempting to explain in 
an integrative fashion Hhat would be, otherwise, incommensurable points 
of view, are extreme "totalizing" positions. 
The Parsonian/Marxist "contest" is uncovered/recognized as a 
"modern moment" from the vantage point of postmodernity by noticing now 
how their theoretical assumptions coexist side by side in university 
courses. The contest won by no one, the "grand truth" nowhere; they are 
but "language games" (Lyotard, 1979). 
No less is the case in the natural sciences, where the concepts 
of chaos and disorder have become as prevalent, if not more, than the 
macro theories of order (e. g. Gleick, 1984). The search for a GUT, 
however, has not been abandoned, it just co-exists with other, less 
hegemonic understandings. This "crisis of knowledge" is defined by many 
as marking the movement from the modern to the postmodern (e.g. Lyotard, 
1979; Hassan, 1982; Foster, 1983; Huyssen, 1984; Arac, 1986). 
Different fields have encountered the postmodern condition 
roughly since the 1920s, however it seems that since the 1960s there is 
a concurrent awareness of postmodernity in various fields of the human 
sciences in a form that crosses the disciplinary boundaries and 
amalgamates their discourses. To a certain extent, one may think that 
such is also the case in the organizational sciences, but this judgement 
must be made against the basic postmodern themes explored later. 
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The Posteodern (Period?) Moaent 
Moh, Mhat ejactly is posteodernity? Rrong question. There is 
no exactly in the postmodern moment. The ’’shape” of postmodernity is 
’’collage/montage” (e. g. Ulmer, 1983). 
For some, postmodernism is a response to modernism. According 
to Jameson (1983), the difficulty in seeing this relationship stems from 
the diversity of postmodern responses to modernism. For example, he 
labels postmodern the mixed architectural styles built as a response to 
the International Style of Le Corbusier, Rright, and Mies van der Rohe; 
pop art and photorealism against abstract expressionism. Similarly in 
music, film and literature one can find postmodern Rorks that go from 
the very sophisticated -the pun is in the ambiguity of this Rord, 
Rhich can either mean refined, adulterated or disillusioned- to kitsch 
-it takes Lily Tomlin’s interpretation of the Quaker Oats’ logo to 
understand the concept of infinity. The variety of postmodernist Rorks 
can be partially attributed to the variety of modernist Rorks to Rhich 
they respond, but there are other understandings of this variety. 
For example, Rorty (1979), Lyotard (1984) and Jameson (1984) 
consider that modernity Ras a challenge to an impossible project. A 
challenge to a "history" Rhich put us in the road of rationality as a 
mode of thinking: from Socrates, as reported by Plato, to Kant via 
Descartes. Here is Rhere Habermas’ position disagrees Rith these more 
prevalent postmodernist notions. He believes that the promises of 
modernity have not been fulfilled due to the separation of the 
discourses of "knoRledge" from the discourses of everyday life and the 
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primacy given to instrumental rationality -and not because there is 
anything arong aith rationality per se as a mode of thinking. 
Nonetheless, the modernity of late nineteenth and early 
taentieth century aas an irreverent laughter (e. g. cubism) in the face 
of rationality. The irony aas that the "laughter" became 
rationalized/institutionalized in "High Modernism" -the subject of 
serious discussions and courses in the universities, and aell attended 
exhibitions Iq the museums. 
The "official" modernism most often addressed is that of art and 
literature because it aas in many aays self-conscious and purposeful 
-i. e. it presented itself as a cultural challenge (e.g. Adorno, 1973). 
In other social manifestations, including the sciences, their modern 
moments aere probably less explicit than in the fine arts and letters*. 
but as indicated before, those moments are noa being 
uncovered/recognized by emerging postmodernity. Thus, the epochal 
uneveness of the postmodern appearance can also be traced back to 
moments of disillusionment aith failed modernist challenges, and their 
further institutionalization in the different disciplines. 
These comments may lead to an understanding of postmodernism as 
reflexivity over the utopianism of the modern oppositional movements; 
and over the impossibility of consciously transcending the present 
toaard any different future orientation. The sentiment is best 
captured in a phrase by Habermas: "Modernism is dominant but dead" 
(1983: -6). Hoaever, there is no simple understanding of postmodernism. 
For example, Foster (1983) considers that there are tao 
different kinds of postmodernism: Postmodernism of ^nd 
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postnodernisiii of resistance. The first one is a replaying of 
neoconservatisn. It blanes the practices of modernism for the ills of 
moderni2ation; and hopes to reaffirm the economic and political status 
quo by reconnecting to premodern cultural practices. A good example is 
Belly Rho ties the possible success of a postindustrial Rorld to a 
religious revival of the Protestant ethic. But as I said before, 
postmodernism is difficult to categorize through any ( pre)knoan form. 
One of its critical emphases is precisely against categorizing (e. g. 
Foucault, 1973). And sure enough, hoa to interpret Bell's message is 
debated in postmodernist circles e. g. Foster, ( 1983) and Habermas 
(1980) versus Arac (1986) aho questions ahether Bell's position is 
neoconservatism. 
The other form of postmodernism, that of c§SlSt§5Q§) is the one 
of interest for this project. Resistance, in this case, is not to 
oppose (opposition being a modern notion) but to defer belief. The 
notion of opposition includes substituting one notion of "truth" aith an 
alternative ahich cannot be compatible (e. g. "paradigms" a la Burrell 
and Horgan; "mainstream" vs. "critical organizational symbolism" 
literature). Resistance in postmodernism is to syspggt and defer 
accepting any notion of "truth". It is to question the possibility of 
attaining truth (as in ideal scientific knoaledge) aith the viea that 
"possibility-of-attaining-truth" is just an idea, among many other 
possible aays of thinking (e. g. Foucault, 1976; Hacking, 1982; Rorty, 
1979). Thus, in more than one aay postmodernism is postparadigm 
thinking. 
Postmodern "disciplinary" activities do not offer a "better or 
108 
greater truth”. Instead, these are activities geared at suspending 
judgeaent while uncovering/exposing the ways in which ”the better or 
greater truths” have been "structured and developed" through discoursive 
formations. Deconstructive readings (e.g. Derrida, 1976) which 
"suspect”, "take apart", and "defer resolution" (but do not dggtcuQt) 
our taken for granted modes of thinking and saying are good examples of 
postmodern resistance. 
In general, then, postmodernism of resistance does not propose a 
"dominant view" but observes, comments and takes action upon the 
multiplicity of fragmentary views. From this position one understand 
these events in/as the context of our present world, where fragmentation 
and multiplicity flourish in the face of any attempt at "grand 
solutions". Postmodernist sctivities move within and among these 
everohanging fragments, to make/understand the world "better" - over 
and over again. Aronowitz's (1981) position is an excellent example of 
this view. In the double role he assigns to the intellectual, "action" 
and "thinking" are both necessary but discontinuous and incommensurable 
activities. 
A Postmodern Thematic for the "Organizational Sciences" 
More specific now, let's explore the postmodern themes of 
Interest in this project. They provide the background against which the 
deconstruction of "organizational sciences productions" will be effected 
in the coming chapters. 
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Th» Bnd of Hotanarratives 
One very well known postmodern theme is its characterization as 
*'the end of metanarratives** (Lyotard, 1979). This idea emphasizes how 
the hegemonic, totalizing discourses of previous times, with promises of 
all-encompassing theories for each disciplinary cluster, have given way 
to fragmentary illuminations and local understandings. The failure of 
**the accumulation of knowledge** promised by the philosophical positions 
which promoted the "truth and falsity" style is questioned by more 
eclectic positions. The questioning, in this case, is done in a mode 
which allows the "regime of grand theory" to rub elbows with "the 
resistance", with modes of thinking which question how come we got into 
a "regime of grand theory" in the first place. As expressed by Marcus 
and Fischer: 
"The authority of "grand theory" styles seems 
suspended for the moment in favor of a close consideration 
of such issues as conteztuality, the meaning of social life 
to those who enact it, and the explanation of exceptions and 
indeterminants rather than regularities in phenomena 
observed -all issues that make problematic what were taken 
for granted as facts or certainties on which the validity of 
paradigms has rested." (1986: 8) 
Talking about "hegemonic discourses" is another way of 
addressing "mainstream views" and the power relationships that support 
their dominance. In postmodernity one may observe that the "hegemonic 
discourses" are not the only ones in around anymore. They may still be 
dominant, but there are other minor voices (the ones that question, the 
ones in _QSrsiQ* the resistance) that are being heard. In 
postmodernity the aim of the minor voices is not to stay around until 
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they become dominant^ but tQ_maiotiiD_aD_QD§aiDg from Khere to question 
the ^Qtall^atiiS attempts (of providing integrative, all encompassing, 
"Horld views" which explain, and explain away, everything) of those who 
want to become or to stay dominant. 
Fragmentation of Disciplinary Boundaries 
This brings us to two closely related themes: the fragmentation 
of disciplinary boundaries and the multiplicity of discourses. The end 
of metanarratives in the disciplines can be better understood if rather 
than thinking in terms of "finding Truth" we think in terms of "saying 
'truth'", or language-games in a Hittgensteinian mode. If the grand 
theories are conceived as a style of thinking and saying during times 
where there was a taste for "hegemonic discourses," the analyses of 
those times and thoughts must be effected through analyses of their 
discoursive practices (e.g. Foucault, 1976; 1978; 1979) - to analyze 
the ways in which "truth" was fashioned. 
Thus, the analyses of theoretical discourses, and learning about 
textual practices in theorizing, have become common grounds for many 
disciplines not only to question previous styles, and their 
institutionalization, but for enacting (more consciously) new ones 
(Culler, 1982). In this manner the textual model permits one to 
deconstruct other discourses, and understand our present cultural 
condition as one where it is possible to exist (like different texts in 
a library) with heterogeneity, contradiction, and the discourses of 
others. But, without entering into details here, it is also a position 
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which deconstructs and opens for questioning the logic of the library 
(and the nuseun, by metonyMy) itself. For exaMple, what is "the 
organizing principle" behind the library? Hhat is the epistenological 
position which informs "collecting knowledge" in the library? (e. g. 
Crimp, 1983; Donato, 1979; Foucault, 1977a). So much for comfortable 
metaphors in postmodernity!. 
The "end of metanarratives" is intertwined with these other two 
themes when it questions the authority invested on our categories, 
fields, and disciplines, to determine our bases for knowledge. From 
this point of view the development of disciplines according to their 
inner logic, and the separation of fields, is viewed as an arbitrary 
presupposition, mostly sustained by philosophies which expected to 
develop "totalizing discourses" for explaining the world, while 
maintaining a power seat. And while here one is tempted to except 
Habermas' views from totalizing attempts, Lyotard attacks Habermas 
directly on this point. For Lyotard, in a fragmented world like ours we 
cannot entertain the possibility of any particular discourse to provide 
any specific adequate knowledge. He are entangled in webs of situations 
and relationships, and we need multiple discourses to participate in the 
many "language games" which we are bound to encounter. 
The Death of the Subject 
■ The last postmodern theme I want to present here, the death of 
the subject, is probably the most difficult for us in the 
"organizational sciences" to approach, especially since it took us many 
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years to institutionalize a "hunanist" vieH of organizations. Hoirever, 
it is also the most important postmodern theme in this dissertation. 
Inside of it is located any possible attempt at deconstructing the 
"organizational sciences." 
Jameson summarizes this theme as follOHs: 
"The great modernisms Here, as ne have said, 
predicated on the invention of a personal, private style, as 
unmistakable as your fingerprint, as incomparable as your 
onn body. But this means that the modernist aesthetic is in 
some Hay organically linked to the conception of a unique 
self and private identity, a unique personality and 
individuality, nhich can be expected to generate its onn 
unique vision of the Horld and to forge its onn unique, 
unmistakable style... Yet today, from any number of distinct 
perspectives, the social theorists, the psychoanalysts, even 
the linguists, not to speak of those of us Hho Hork in the 
area of culture and cultural and formal change, are all 
exploring the notion that that kind of individualism and 
personal identity is a thing of the past; that the old 
individual or individualist subject is 'dead;' and that one 
may even describe the concept of unique individual and the 
theoretical basis of individualism as ideological" (1983: 
114-115). 
According to Jameson there are tno positions Hithin this theme. 
One adopts the vien that there Has such a thing as individualism during 
the classic age of competitive capitalism. Those Here the days of the 
nuclear family and the emergence of the bourgeoisie as the hegemonic 
social class. Honever today, this vies points out, in the age of 
corporate capitalism, of "organizational men and Homen", of 
bureaucracies in business and state, of demographic explosion: the older 
bourgeois individual subject cannot exist any longer. The other 
position adopts a more radical vien. It not only considers the 
bourgeois individual subject a thing of the past but it also points to 
its mythical existence. From this point of vien there has never been 
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autonoMOua subjeota of that type. They only ezlated as a theoretical 
oonatruot of a philoaophloal and cultural style which sought to persuade 
people that they '*had” individual subjects, that they possessed this 
unique personal identity. 
The “death of the subject" points not so much to our inescapable 
situation as cultural and social beings, an argument for cultural and 
social determinism, as to the imperatives of understanding ourselves and 
our possibilities past the immediate appearances of “the self" and its 
“unique place and competence". As Indicated by Lyotard's views on 
language games above, we are traversed by the multiple discourses of our 
times. He are these multiple dieoouraee. 
Recently, an interdisciplinary collection of essays about 
autonomy, individuality and the self in Restern thought (Heller, Sosna, 
and Mellbery, 1986) has shed additional light on this debate. The 
essays work from the following assumptions: first, they understand the 
notion of individualism -where the individual human subject is the 
maker of the world- as a central historical notion of life in the Rest 
for the last five centuries. The modern definitions of self, 
psychology, moral responsibility, identity, artistic representation, and 
economic behavior “. . . all rest on the notion of an individual whose 
experience and history, whose will and values, whose expressions and 
preferences are essential constituents of reality" (1986: 1). 
Their second assumption indicates that from the second half of 
the nineteenth century the notion of a Restern society constructed 
through an individualistic order has become increasingly problematic. 
Developments such as industrlallaation and the emergence of mass society 
have altered the necessary presuppositions for unity and autonomy in the 
human individual. These tiro assumptions attempt to deconstruct, as much 
as Jameson's commentaries above, the "individual subject", who either as 
a mythical or anachronistic figure cannot exist in postmodernism: ". . . 
throughout the norld, the subject increasingly appears as the empty, 
ideological image of mass culture, _Itgll^iiiting_ix£||__e£_SB 
fijlBlBlStrStlYfi_iSiSQSyrafi- ( 1986: 9 [my emphasis]). An argument against 
Comte, but not necessarily for Harx. 
Their third assumption, hoicever, is where the issue regains its 
affirmative value. The explorations conducted in all the essays seek to 
attain an alternative conceptualization of the experience of 
subjectivity, rather than returning to the impossible "individualistic 
state. " From this position, the notion of postmodern in 
quotes and under erasure marks, is to be experienced as dependent on a 
cultural order, but also as an undetermined productive instance. Here 
the individual is: 
..."a self in motion that ii)(e8_u§e_gf.t^e.discgurse 
q£_au^SBOBQys_iBdly^^yility.in.ggodyBQ&lQB-llt^.gn.gQgglBfl 
SSCisS_SC_dliclBcegents_of_itg_pogltlgn in order to 
reinterpret the history of its own behavior from 
continuously shifting vantage points. In an extreme form, 
this transitory self, which experiences a coherent sense of 
individuality and uniqueness as one of several competing but 
mutually vivid accounts of existence, may undergo a kind of 
intellectual vertigo" (1986: 12 (my emphasis)). 
I should point now at the relationships between "the death of 
the subject" and the previously discussed postmodern themes. These 
relationships will provide additional insights into the significance of 
deconstructing "organizational sciences" as we know them now. If, as 
played with when deconstructing the title of this dissertation, the 
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'’organizational sciences” in their current form are moving into the 
modern subject* s fate, then the deconstruction of the "organizational 
subject” may help us to reconstruct it in a possible postmodern mode . . . 
fchere intellectual vertigo can be a tenable position. 
Before I emphasized: first, that everything ire take for granted 
as rea^ categories in the norld ( e. g. , truth/falsity; a dominant vieii; 
disciplines; the individual) can also be conceived as a sty^e.of 
thinking_and_saying; and second, that such style is embedded in 
particular types of specialized discourses (e. g. scientific; 
professional; psychoanalytical) often aiming at establishing a dominant 
view. But, as noticed by Foucault (1972) and Said (1983) these 
specialized discourses may not be as different (among themselves) as Me 
may think. It is likely that they share: the same episteme for 
Foucault; the same ethic and epistemology for Said; or, as the critical 
theorist Mould have it, perhaps the same ideologies. 
If Me overlap both ideas. Me observe that the vieMs Me hold 
about the Morld are made by the discourses tliroyg|i_Hhich_Me_pj:oduce_it. 
It does not matter hoM ”unique an individual" Me think Me are. Me are 
nothing but the discourses through and in Mhich Me live. In a sense Me 
are nothing but traversing points in netMorks, rhizomes, of discourses. 
Thus, Mhen you (or I), "unique individual", think, or speak, or Mrite, 
or read. Mho is doing it? Your (or my) "unique Mords"? or oyc inherited 
discourses and vieMS of the Morld as_they_may_fee_sai^_iD_Qyr_times2. 
. The "death of the subject" provides the background for 
additional complications. It alloMS us to focus on the problematic 
relationship of any product of discourse, and their "authors". In other 
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vordS) if Hhat He think, write, speak, comes from discourses that are 
not exclusively ours, then those others can come up with their own 
"misreadings" of my words which would be as possible as mine. As our 
discourses become more multiple and complex, as we move from "network" 
to "network, " what is possible to say and think becomes more dissimilar 
and localized   words, the symbol, might be the same, but the meanings 
would multiply. At this point any attempt to maintain the "hegemony" of 
any discourse would change from "truth" to violence-i. e how do you 
maintain the status of "truth" for any meaning? How do you "authorize" 
the true version? How do you "prove" it? Those who follow the modern 
views about "true knowledge" outlined in the previous chapter would say 
that "further research is necessary," and with that statement they would 
seal their totalizing views. 
To create disciplinary discourses -"the truth of the matter", 
embedded in the modern tradition (literature, theory, research)- has 
implied the acceptance of the single, approved, interpretation of its 
meaning. The idea of multiple interpretations has always been an uneasy 
one for "scientific fields", which exemplify the "truth or falsity style 
of thinking. " But poststructuralism and postmodernism have challenged 
the "hard disciplines": it doesn’t matter what the matter is, it is 
nothing but discourses. And discourses do not have exact, invariable 
meaning: any word can have multiple meanings, for different persons, at 
different times, in different places. Hithout necessarily implying 
absolute relativism, the concept of one single interpretation of 
anything becomes a very problematic assumption from this perspective. 
The notion of "the subject", -unified, whole, balanced. 
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consistent- resolves the difficulties. The rhetoric of "the 
individual" works against the experience of multiple interpretations. . . 
a fragmented self is diseased, schixophrenic. Thus, against the 
experience of multiplicity lurks the shadow of insanity. This ideology 
has fueled the surviving skills of the modern disciplines. In the 
discourses of uniqueness, separation, wholeness, truth, and 
specialization of the individual, -discourses about its ability to be 
in control and to control- hides a world of experiences of 
fragmentation and ambiguities. . . and of massification through cultural 
control. 
In this context the "management subject" which sustains the 
"organizational sciences" is a prime example of the discourses of 
modernity. IbS_CQl§_Qe_tbe_iiDi9fiC is the necessary condition for the 
existence of the discipline. It is a rhetoric about the unique 
abilities of the manager, and his effective actions as an individual. 
On his actions depends the fate of the organizations, and in them the 
fate of society. The ability to manage effectively can be learned, and 
this knowledge in enhanced by the accumulation of scientific empirical 
knowledge. He is in control. . . He will succeed. There is no space for 
a disjointed self in this situation. It took too many years  from 
Comte to McGregor- to finally institutionalize these views in an 
"organizational science." 
In this project the deconstruction of the management subject 
will allow us to understand its sustaining localized rhetorics at 
different points in time since its emergence as a modern "disciplinary 
subject." It will show how its "metanarratives" and specialized 
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discourses have built on the ideology of autonony and individualise. In 
the current postmodern moment, ahere the efforts to sustain this 
ideology are increasingly changing from "truth" to violence, these 
readings Hill set the stage to propose a possible postmodern 
organizational subject. - But, are there any signs that this aould be 
possible? 
Can there be a postmodern 0. S. ? 
Aside from the concerns of recent mainstream organizational 
literature highlighted in the first chapter - and that ae can 
attribute noa to the unfulfilled promises of "science," and the 
contesting of its hegemonic discourses  the organizational sciences 
are exhibiting further discontent, and some self-critique. In recent 
years scholars in this field have been questioning other issues 
traditionally taken for granted in organizational practices, and 
especially in organizational research activities. 
These aorks go beyond the oppositional ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological debates (e. g. Oaudi, 1983; Astley, 
1985; Galas and Smircich, 1985; Cal^s 1986a, 1986b; Stubbart, 1986; 
Smircich and Galas, 1987 ) and focus on another problematic ahich deals 
aith the transformation of the researched phenomena into the discoursive 
practices through ahich it is theorized and reported. 
' As already observed, the critiques to mainstream organizational 
theory and research outlined in chapter one, can still be connected to 
the discourses of modernity. They are oppositional discourses ahich 
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propose to substitute one notion of truth irith another (e. g. the 
positivist "truth" with the phenomenologist "truth"). The more recent 
critiques are closer to the conditions of postmodernity. They address a 
recognition that aii_tcu£b lies in its representation; and they also 
address the problematics that such recognition represents for the 
organizational disciplines. 
For example, Astley (1985) following Berger and Luckmann (1967) 
commented on the socially constructed nature of "truth" in 
administrative science, Rhich is an important argument made by many 
authors in this and other fields (e.g Latour and Roolgar, 1979; 
Shrivastava and Hitroff, 1962; Morgan, 1983; RatzlaRick, 1984; Stablein 
and Nord, 1985). But more important and fresher in this field is his 
analysis of the linguistic and political nature of "scientific truth" in 
our disciplines. He notes that: 
"Once Re relinquish the vien that theoretical 
constructs are direct representations of external reality, 
language itself becomes the essential subject matter of 
scientific deliberation. Language is not simply a vehicle 
for transmitting information. Rather, it is the very 
embodiment of truth" (1985; 499). 
He also observes hOR "knoRledge" in the field is often 
determined by social/institutional control of intellectual advance. 
given the competitive pursuit of intellectual reputations. His 
arguments, illustrating a self-reflexive axareness of our "occult 
practices" (Tyler, 1986), Join similar recent critiques of other 
scientific fields (Kuhn, 1970; Feyerabend, 1975; Knorr-Cetina and 
Mulkay, 1983; Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Clifford and Marcus, 1986). In 
a similar vein. Galas and Smircich (1985) and Galas (1986a; 1986b) have 
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performed critical readings of ”the leader"; and Stubbart (1986) of 
"strategic management. " 
In these arguments, "truth" and the constitution of "the subject 
of knoKledge" in the disciplines are vieired as political, discoursive, 
and textual activities, Rhich are issues embedded in the discourses of 
postmodernity. Thus, a postmodern analysis of a subject of knoRledge 
requires an analysis of its discoursive representations -but it is an 
analysis of "representation" in a postmodern mode. 
A Postmodern Look at Representation 
Representation is considered a central concern of postmodernism. 
Rith this concern postmodernism questions the dictum of philosophies 
that privilege sensed and experienced presence as reality. An example 
may provide a better opening of this issue. 
Let us think about a vase of roses painted in the realist 
tradition. Hhen rendered by the artist it has to be as close to 
rsility as possible. The value of the painting placed on hoR much it is 
"like r§al^ty". But on looking at the picture "as a painting" rather 
than "as a vase of roses” Re notice that it is not like !lc§allty" at all 
(implying that it is not like the vase of roses Rhich Ras the model for 
the painting). Rather, it is flat, it only shoRs color differences 
Rhich are synthetic, fictions of "light” "shadoR", and there is no smell 
of roses. Besides, reality had another context in time and space ( the 
room Rhere the vase Ras painted, the time Rhen it Ras painted, the 
artist presence). Then, if Re look at it "as a painting” Re may say 
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that this painting is not a re-presentation of but a 
present-ation of itself as allegory/evocation of sonething else. There 
Here aany aore aspects of cealltZ the tra:jectory of this painting 
that are not evoked in it. Looking at the painting in this nay it 
becoaes a text "to be read", full of indeterainacies. There is auch 
aore to the painting than "being like " 
Another example, this tiae froa a later artistic moaent. A 
collage/aontage aade up of C69i objects pasted together inside a frame. 
A cut-up froa Ihe_Neif_X2rlS-IliS9i & piece of string; soae colored cloth, 
pink and blue; tiro soda bottle caps. A nice textural arrangement. Each 
article there is "real 'whatever'". Then, this art piece should be more 
rsal than the previous one if we consider the reality of the objects in 
the composition. Moreover, its title is "Cut up froa Ib§«ifYI, with A 
Piece of String, Soae Colored Cloth, Pink and Blue, and Two Bottle 
Caps. " Re may feel soae uneasiness: is it art or is it trash? But, do 
we have to look at it any differently froa the previous example? From a 
textual point of view it is as indeterminate as the previous one, except 
that it "hides" it differently. 
These examples simplify many important aspects around 
representation (e. g. Foucault, 1983) which will given closer attention 
in the readings of the role of the manager. They capture, however, a 
view that I can now transfer to research activities in the 
organizational sciences. 
- Be it painting or organizational research, any field which rests 
its claims on what exist outside of it is dealing with problematics of 
representation. This is to say that conveying "what is going on in the 
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Horld” implies engaging in a transformation and re-production of that 
irorld into some form of re-presentation. 
In other Kords, it is the assumption of the organizational 
sciences -as Hell as any other empirical discipline- that to form a 
disciplinary core they must rely on their ability to apprehend the 
organizational phenomena and to redefine it into an ordered set of 
categories and abstractions. These categories and abstractions are 
further reconstituted in nhatever form a research description and report 
may take, usually a written form. 
On addressing these assumptions a question appears which goes 
beyond the ontological and epistemological issues more often 
acknowledged. He have to further ask in this case: Hhere is the 
organizational phenomena the disciplinary core refers to ? Is it in the 
organizations themselves, or is it in the re-constituted, re-presented 
form we call organizational research? 
Here we are dealing with an assorted set of problems. First, 
there is the issue of abstracting organizational phenomena. Host 
debates addressing this issue focus on ontological grounds (i. e. 
whether to conceive organizational phenomena as "objective reality” 
-positivist view-, or as a "social construction"-interpretivist 
view-) and epistemological grounds (i.e. the separation or participation 
between the knower and the known). 
The second issue, that of apprehending and categorizing, appears 
mostly in methodological debates. In this case the problems are posed 
around the appropriate notions or categories used to obtain and classify 
the phenomena so that they could be ordered, and explained or 
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understood. Traditionally the debates have opposed 
quantitative/qualitative methodologies in the quest for a meaningful 
ordering and understanding of the researched "reality. " 
The third issue is probably the one most often taken for granted, 
its problematics acknoRledged in very fea instances. It is the dilemma 
of re-presenting the phenomena through the forms in which it is defined, 
described and reported. This issue also participates in the ideological 
debates over the nature of reality. 
For example, from a positivist ontological position it is 
unlikely that the description and reporting of "reality" will be deemed 
problematic given its a priori objectifying and reductionist defining 
operations. In other words. the positivist "world" is what the 
researcher defines it to be. guided by previous "solid" ( not 
disconfirmed) theories and "rational" approaches toward the world "out 
there. " From this position there is no major need for self-reflexivity 
about the defining operations, nor questioning about the researcher* s 
role in interpretation and description. This approach to representation 
is close to the "realist" tradition in art, where the artist* s task is 
to render an image as close to reality as possible (the vase of roses). 
The interpret!vist or social constructionist position is more 
ready to address the problem. The philosophical position which inform 
these views (usually phenomenology/existential phenomenology) is 
explicit in regard to the participation of the "knowing subject" with 
the "known object. ** Here there will be some reflexivity about the 
complexities of conveying the researched situation, and the 
participation of the researcher in its definition. But the problem is 
12h 
often "aolved" through a contextualizing strategy that gives privilege 
to presence and experience (where, for exanple, the social and local 
grounds of organizing are described, as experienced by the researcher). 
How is "contextualizing" possible, or how is that "contextualizing" 
produces "reality" (the politics and poetics of 
(inter)/(con)textuality") is seldoa questioned. In Many ways this 
approach will be siMilar to the collage in my second exaaple. That art 
piece not only brings into its constitution the "real object," Making it 
as present as possible; it also represents the experience of the artist, 
the intentionality of the person over the texture. 
As May be gathered froM the above discussion, froM a postModern 
view the issue of representation further deals with quite a distinct 
coMplication. Traditional theorizing and researching (ontological, 
episteMological and Methodological issues) deal with phenoMena "outside" 
its representation, thus, with a thaMatio of presence (approaching and 
apprehending phenoeena). Theorizing about re-presentation, 
re-constituting, and re-producing deal with a theaetic of absence 
(evoking phenoeena). ‘This latter these plays a very iaportant part in 
the position toward representation taken in this project. 
Here the notion of representation is understood as the 
possibility for effecting deconstructive readings. Representation in 
this case is "Mounting" or "grafting" alternative Meanings over an 
apparent straightforward niaesis or copy of an external reality. Such 
an activity substitutes ■i9§§i§ aiao. Rather than re-producing 
reality, based on an external presence and experience, to aiae i.a_§ 
based on the playfulness of presence sad absence. 
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One can understand this idea through the collage/nontage of my 
second example, this time "read" beyond the interpretivist position. In 
this case the collage/montage produces everchanging effects through the 
multiple Mays in which one can interpret what is cgally there (e. g. the 
bottle caps). For example, one can "read" in the bottle caps the 
evocation of the absent bottles. And then, again, it can be a protest 
against littering the streets with bottle caps (instead produce art with 
them). Or a statement of the artist's preference for a particular brand 
of soda. Or a "hanging" of the company that produces them for their 
insensitivity to apartheid. And all of the above. Deconstruct!ve 
readings are a "making" of what is "really" there - in all its 
ironies, puns, and indeterminacies. 
Thus, from a postmodernist point of view, the issue of 
representation in organizational research (or any other empirical field) 
would not necessarily require a change of style in the research 
approach. Hhat it would require is the questioning of the research 
approach as style. Such questioning must lead us to enter the 
postmodern condition addressing first the pragmatics, poetics, politics 
and ethics of organizational research and theory. Questioning any 
representation from this position, for example a Journal article, one 
should address what it does (e. g. how does it "advance knowledge") how 
it is said (e. g. the conventions of writing science) who can, or should, 
say it (e. g. the established vs. "the novice", when, and where) and what 
ideological message it sustain (e.g. that the manager's views are 
privileged over that of other organizational members, or vice-versa). 
But more important, this exploration must be done through 
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collage/nontage, and mime stratagems, irhich produce disquieting effects 
over any claim to single, straightforaard, meanings; and ahich advance 
the possibility of other meanings. 
This kind of criticism/reading not only opens possibilities for 
neir productions over old texts, but is in itself an exercise on opening 
and proliferating possibilities of interpretation over any kind of human 
activity -almost a practice on the many surprising nays by nhich ^e 
can mean more than irhat ne say-to have a disjointed self, and still 
be an "OK individual”. 
From Hodarn Metaphor to Postmodern Metonymy and Allegory 
Some critiques to the traditional functionalist view of 
organizations have acknonledged the force of metaphors chosen to 
represent the norld, and the metaphorical nature of theorizing (e. g. 
Hanning, 1979; Morgan,1980; 1983). Mostly, they have adopted the notion 
that all science is primarily metaphorical and that, depending on the 
chosen metaphor, theorists commit themselves to an epistemological 
position Khich emphasizes a particular form of knoHledge. These 
critiques, hoaever, have often ignored (as much as those that they are 
criticizing) some other problematics of these claims to knowledge. 
That is, be it the "objective world out there" punctuated by 
mechanistic or organismic metaphors, or the "socially constructed nature 
of the .world" punctuated by metaphors such as culture, theatre, and even 
language games, all organizational research and organizational practice 
is theorized and re-produced by discoursive practices. 
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In few instances the chosen metaphor has been one that questions 
the discoursive problematics of theorizing; one that would question the 
representational force of metaphors themselves -i. e. the ambiguous 
state of any claimed meaning for a metaphor - and that regards all 
language as metaphorical. 
From a postmodern textual theory position^ the problematics of 
metaphor have been acknowledged (e. g. De Man, 1979) as attempts at 
totalizing, stable meanings (e. g. to talk of the metaphor of mechanistic 
organization permits one to draw and interpret everything through that 
imagery-the metaphor providing a structure where to rest a_conceBt). 
In the postmodern deconstructive approach metonymy and allegory are the 
preferred discoursives figures. Metonymy because it allows one to move 
along contiguous figures to proliferate rather than reduce meanings 
-e.g. the second "reading" I did in my "collage" example. And 
allegory because it is an unstable figure, which can be told over and 
over again with new interpretations. Other examples, through metonymy 
one can start exploring how to move from the idea "executive" to the 
idea "women executive" through discontinuous notions, which accentuate 
the non-identity between the concepts. And through allegory one can 
think about the multiple ways in which an "organizational story" can be 
reinterpreted, rather than looking for the "common vision" in the 
organizational members' "minds." 
Thus, this textual theory position, and its accompanying 
rhetorical figures. allows one to conceive "the world" as 
representation, instead of focusing on how tbS-SQCld is represented. It 
calls attention to the construction of "representation" as theory, with 
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as many implications as possible, rather than to the construction of "an 
stable theory" for the purpose of representation. 
From this brief discussion the importance of textual theory for 
the critique of the "organixational sciences" is brought to the fore. 
It informs the possibility that the legitimixing strategies of an 
"organizational science" and the creation of its disciplinary boundaries 
reside in its enabling discourses; those Hhich have worked at a 
convincing best to re-present "organization" and "science." 
Having made this explicit, textual strategies may enable a 
different "line" (loops?) of questioning and critiquing. For example, 
it could permit one to stop searching for the theoretical standpoint 
that may best represent the organizational world, and start proposing 
different representations to constitute that world. Rather than to 
question how well a theory represents to question how does a theory make 
representation. Also, these strategies may open the way to new models 
for "legitimizing" organizational research and practice. These models 
would more likely be grounded on the analysis and critique of the 
representational practice/theory, in its textualization, instead of the 
traditional concept of "degree of correspondence" between "model", 
"data" and "reality." 
Moreover, through textual theory it is possible to open the way 
for the organizational sciences to participate with other disciplines in 
the wider cultural debate known as "the postmodern condition. " This 
participation is of particular importance for the organizational 
desciplines since it is the view of the world they have traditionally 
espoused (capitalist, industrial, technological, rational. 
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consuaer-oriented) irhich is at stake in nany of these debates (e. g. 
Bell, 1976; Janeson, 1983; 1984; Lyotard, 1984; Said, 1983). 
Finally, aith this discussion I an representing in £Qs:n and 
the relevance of this project. All that I have written so far, 
and whatever I would write is clearly tied to a possible "mastery of 
effects" as well as to other issues ( philosophical, political, ethical) 
that crisscross the merely "poetical. " Here I am trying to create a 
situation that can convince others of the importance of addressing these 
issues, of my competence for doing so, of "the world of possibilities" 
to be opened by doing the non-traditional. Is this a reality that I am 
creating in and with what I am writing? Is this also the case with all 
theoreticians and researchers in this field? An affirmative answer to 
these questions prompts closer and more self-conscious examinations of 
our disciplinary practices. 
In the following chapter I will start these examinations through 
deconstructive readings on "the role of the manager. " 
CHAPTER IV 
DIVERSIFICATION, DECENTRALIZATION: 
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 
I think it is time noH to explain in more explicit terms 
-Khich because of their announced "explicitness" are, of course, more 
liable to be reinterpreted and deconstructed- the Kork that this 
dissertation is set to attain. 
I have been trying to establish tKO basic ideas in the previous 
chapters. The first one, articulated by questioning the role of the 
intellectuals in a society Hhose actual "cultural categories" are 
understood as unstable and often meaningless, Horks on shoning that the 
activities we call "organizational sciences" are attached, belong, only 
to that particular institutional order of "the university" and 
"academia. " That is, as is the case with the activities in the other 
"academic disciplines," the "organizational sciences" exist as an 
activity within the university and university-related domains -and not 
at all outside of it. This first idea, which I explore through the 
simulacrum [1] Postmodernism-i. e. "what if we have now different 
cultural categories?"- tries to subvert our traditional oppositional 
categories theory/practice (what we do in the university/what we do 
outside of it), by proposing that there is no theory which corresponds 
to forms of practice. Rhat I mean is_not (as some may think) that to 
every practice there is an irreducible localized theory (i.e. that 
theory/practice are a unit that cannot be regarded as oppositions). 
Rather, the idea is that theory is a form of practice, independent and 
often parallel to other forms of practice to which it refers ( Foucault 
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and Deleuze, 1977). 
The second idea, partially derived from the first one, defines 
the "organizational sciences" as a particular kind of activity: 
discoursive [23. In this sense the practice of theory is a discoursive 
activity, and as such it is determined by the rules of its practice, as 
any other practice Kould be determined by its own rules. 
Particular to the rules of discoursive activities are the 
folloKing: (a) discourses may appropriate as their subjects the objects 
of other practices; and (b) other practices may appropriate discourses 
as their onn objects. Here I am purposefully using the term 
"appropriate" to make explicit that the relationship between the 
practice of "theory" and the practice of "other practices" (e. g. 
management ) is one often determined by power relationships. The power 
relationship can become one sided when either (a) or ( b), above, 
dominates. For example, (b) will dominate the relationship when a 
theory is appropriated to "support and represent" a useful practice, 
without facilitating more theory (e. g. easy access into organizations 
for academic research purposes) to be "built" on those practices. 
From this perspective part of the organizational disciplines' 
current ambiguities can be further understood. On one hand, the 
"organizational sciences" have been involved in activities to bridge 
both sides of what may now be considered a non-existent opposition ( i. e. 
organizational theory/organizational practice). On the other hand, the 
lack of understanding of organizational theory as a discoursive activity 
has prevented the discipline from understanding the possibilities 
embedded in a practice of theory independent of the practice of other 
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practices. That is, the lack of understanding of theory as practice has 
kept "the theoretician / researcher / disciplinarian" involved in a 
never ending quest toward the "progress of the discipline. " The 
ultimate pre-tense of purpose is one of transcending "useful theory" 
into "useful practice. " Because of such definition of the disciplinary 
situation, the relationship between the practice of organizational 
theory and the practices of other practices (e.g. the practice of 
management) has become one of dependency. 
Unfortunately, whenever the practice of other practices stops 
appropriating the discourses of theory as "useful representations for 
practice" (as has been the case more and more in the practice of 
management), "the theoreticians" further retrench into the b(v)owels of 
academic research in their quest to regain their opposition (practice) 
and attain their "lost balance" (theory/practice). 
The more recent "organizational sciences" separation from the 
world of "practice," discussed in Chapter II, can be interpreted as a 
"necessary" step in attempts at re-covering from "the lack of practice. " 
It is interesting to notice that "the world of practice" has stayed 
quite comfortably going about its business without worrying over any 
"missing theory. " 
The activities I am performing in this dissertation aim at 
( re?)establishing the disciplinary "power balance" in a different mode. 
That is, by concentrating on what was defined as (a), above by 
working on defining how the practice of theory can appropriate as its 
subject the object of other practices- the practice of theory will be 
able to go about its business without depending on the practice of other 
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practices. More specifically, by re-presenting the practice of theory 
as a discoursive activity, the dissertation is the practice of a 
discoursive activity which appropriates as its subject "the objects of 
organization" without depending on them. 
The work to be done here, the activities of reading and writing 
over specific "organizational texts," are themselves practices of the 
theoretical variety. These commentaries about the constitution of a 
disciplinary subject are the practices to be evaluated -they are not a 
"theory" for "some other practice". 
In other words, this work is not about deconstructing the 
organizational subject to propose a different theory of organizations. 
On the contrary, the deconstruction of the organizational subject is in 
itself the practice of organizational theory. The task at hand puts 
emphasis on the practice of theory as an activity proper to the 
university. In the practice of theory the diverse university community 
may find itself bound and powerful, a requirement for participating in 
the world with ( nQt_towards) the practice of other practices. 
The activities in which I work, deconstructing representations 
of "the organizational subject" through textual "mounting" and 
"grafting," are at the same time productions of "doing theory." They 
are exemplars of possible activities for the organizational 
theoreticians. They are also activities which connect the theoretical 
work in the "organizational sciences" to its proper institutional domain 
of the university and the "human sciences. " 
13k 
On Reading the 0rgani2ational Texts 
The readings I Hill perform in this one and the folloning 
chapters demonstrate some possibilities for a postmodern practice of 
theory in the "organizational sciences." These readings correspond to 
three moments nithin a forty-year period of textual representations 
about organizations. The chosen texts represent exploited boundaries 
for the tHO main ideas expressed above: (1) that theorizing (about 
organizations or anything else) is a form of practice proper to the 
university; and (2) that the practice of theory is discoursive activity. 
These texts have become well knonn connectors over the years 
betneen the Horld of management practice and scholarly managerial 
theories. But their constitutive textual strategies (e. g. the rhetorics 
of "authorial presence and experience", "realist descriptions", 
"practicality of ideas", and other textual representations) mark them as 
Hritings nhich are extremely self-conscious of their irresolvable 
position inside the Horld of theory (in spite of their constant claims 
to the contrary), and therefore particularly vulnerable to 
deconstruct!ve readings focusing on their "externalities. " 
It is important to recognize that my readings are not a 
genealogical work on hoH "the organizational subject" came to be 
constructed in a progressive fashion, from the 1930s to the 1970s 
-much to the contrary. First, the issue of the construction of the 
organizational subject is a current concern of this dissertation and, 
therefore, its relevance is itself a matter of the dissertation's 
representational strategies, and its onn historicity. Thus, rather than 
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threading the development of the organizational subject through a 
forty-year time span, the readings collapse them in the single space of 
"contemporay theoretical concerns. " 
Second, this dissertation, as a form of post-modern Kork, is 
anare of the ex-post facto construction of "historical continuities" 
(e.g. Hhite, 1973) and of history as another fictional Rork. The 
readings' "historization" is just a strategy to mark discontinuities 
betReen the different periods in Rhich these texts Rere Rritten. Such a 
strategy points at the fictions involved in creating developmental and 
progressive theories of disciplinary knoRledge. In my readings each 
organizational theory is "conserved" as a localized discourse (in 
time/place) Rhich had its meanings bound to those localities. That is, 
Rhile recognizing the impossibility of reconstructing noR hoR these 
texts meant Rhen they Rere Rritten, the readings use 
(inter/con)textualizing strategies to sustain the illusions of their 
separate time and place (e.g. Marcus and Fischer, 1986; Fabian, 1983; 
Clifford, 1986; Price, 1983) [3). 
Thirdly, I do not claim any particular authenticity for the 
product of these readings. They are demonstrations of a conscious 
practice of theorizing as discoursive activity and not claims as to "the 
best" or "real" interpretation for these texts. Beyond this, my 
"interpretations" are themselves Rritings to be interpreted by other 
Rritings -thus, one more time, the impossibility of claiming "the best 
and final" theory for any practice. . . including the practice of theory. 
More specifically, developments in post-structuralist theory 
[e. g. Derrida's deconstruction ( 1 976); Foucault's archeology of 
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knoKledge (1976); even Barthes' writerly texts (1974)1 and some 
philosophy of language ( e. g Hittgenstein, 1 958; Austin, 1 975; Searle, 
1979) let us recognize that; 
(1) "Mords" do not necessarily have a fixed meaning, they can be 
separated from the "things" they are supposed to represent (they are 
more than any specific object He represent Kith them); and 
(2) that even if there Here fixed meanings, "Kords" are a 
different "thing" (they have separate identities) from "any-thing" they 
stand for. 
This applies to any sign (Khich to simplify one might call 
"Kord") Ke use to represent anything, be it printed Kords, sounds, 
paintings, numbers, photographs, gestures. . . etc. 
And once Ke get to this point Ke can reverse all I have said 
before and notice that, explicitly or implicitly, all practices -be it 
of theory or other practices- are Kritings. They are indeterminate 
signifiers, texts to be read. 
In summary, Khat I am doing in/Kith these readings brings to the 
foreground the construction and legitimation of the "organizational 
sciences" through the discoursive constructions of the disciplinary 
subject and the progress of disciplinary knoKledge. The readings aim to 
establish a "lineage" for the subject, Khile noting that "disciplinary 
knoKledge" is nothing but localized discourses Khich address particular 
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concerns, of different times. It is a proposition for understanding the 
discipline as engaged in a constant activity of legitimation for its 
subject. Khich over time gets to invoke "tradition" -e.g. the recent 
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Peters and Raterman's (1982) emphasis on Barnard’s work- as but one 
legitimizing strategy. 
The readings accentuate discontinuities in the American culture 
between different points in time, and "serve" as testimony of an ongoing 
practice of theory which maintains the discipline "alive. " In other 
words, it is proposed here that "progress" and "accumulation of 
knowledge" are textual illusions ( based on conceptions of time) to 
legitimize the existence of the organizational disciplines. The 
readings, emphasizing how the practice of theory is a locally meaningful 
discoursive activity, overturn the possibility of "accumulation of 
knowledge"  discourses ("words" as defined above) cannot accumulate 
anything. The localized discourses just become re-interpreted at 
different points through the textual representation "progress. " 
My readings, as critique of a disciplinary practice of theory 
when (re)creating the organizational subject and legitimizing the 
discipline, are themselves another kind of localized -i.e. in 
postmodernity- practice of theory within the discipline. This 
practice of theory would not have been possible before the current 
cultural period. Moreover, on being accepted now as dissertation work 
in the organizational sciences my readings become an instance of how the 
practice of other practices -the institutional acceptance of a 
dissertation- may appropriate discourses as their own objects of 
legitimation -the possibility of this dissertation because of the 
existence of postmodern discourses now. 
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(Inter/Con)Textualliing Strategies 
The specific strategies I Kill be using in these readings 
highlight the DlyciXQCility of any interpretation, and the fictiQQalized 
QbacaSteC-QC-tcyth. These strategies are purposeful in creating an 
argument to gain verisimilitude for the "textual interpretations, " 
In the readings I perform tKo main operations. The first 
establishes historical perpectives on the period Khen each book nas 
published. These are current commentaries on certain issues non 
interpreted as "accurate descriptions of Khat Has important" at previous 
times. They may be thought of as a chorus of voices which stand behind 
"the main production" (the text to be criticized) to "contextyalize the 
scene." That is, they provide "historical context" through which the 
text gets established "on its own grounds. " 
The second operation provides a dialogue with the criticized 
text. This one is a cultural commentary contemporary to that text, 
which becomes intermixed with the text itself. The intercontextyalizing 
strategy produces specific conditions for reading the criticized text by 
establishing a concurrent relation with its contemporary, the other 
text. I should indicate that intertextyality is an important 
poststructuralist issue. It emphasizes how anything we take as 
"original text" is really composed of traces from previous "texts" 
-not just writings, but also ideas, institutions, discourses and 
various practices which become "inscribed" in any present culture. They 
are remains whose origins we ignore, and which are, anyhow, impossible 
to recover. Ricouer (e, g. 1981) provides a similar argument through his 
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”hermeneutics of suspicion. " 
Hhat I attain by invoking the context/intertext is another site 
for re-interpreting the ideas I am reading. The aim is not to claim 
that I found "the real origin" but to subvert the "authorized version" 
as the only possible "real origin. " Both strategies use the notion 
"time" to create the__2resent_space for the readings. Observe hoH in 
each case the background/foreground is current and locally created, non 
and in this dissertation. At the same time the strategies serve to 
"graft" other meanings over the criticized text, such that the latter 
becomes a current production. 
I am not proposing these strategies as "a method" for reading 
organizational texts. Hy contentions against producing "a method" are 
anti-formalist, but mostly deconstructionist. They folloK Feyerabend's 
(1975: chapter 6) concerns and, even more, Derrida's (1976: 157-164) 
contentions. Evidently, they can be used by others interested in 
approaching textual critique in a similar vein -but the possible value 
of what I am doing here resides somewhere else. For now, the primary 
purposes of these readings are to subvert/deconstruct the illusions of 
"truth" and "progress" that have sustained the organizational 
disciplines, and to further the possibility of other disciplinary 
practices. From that point of view "my method" is meaningful in "this 
locality" and for those purposes. It is consciously subversive and 
deconstructive on working as an-other practice of organizational theory. 
As "a method" it can work better by metonymy, by eliciting ideas for 
"other methods" nhich on deconstructing the discipline construct it 
explicitly anen, over and over again. In the last chapter I Hill 
discuss other purposes for Hhat I am doing here. 
Reading The Functions of the Executive 
The text to be read in this chapter has become a classic in the 
organizational literature. Looking through recent organizational 
behavior textbooks one finds this Hork cited often to support 
definitions of managerial influence and authority (e. g. Kast and 
Rosenzneig, 1985; Baron, 1983; Ritchie and Thompson, 1984; Hellriegel, 
Slocum, and Hoodman, 1986). Moreover, aside from the multiple citations 
in management journals this text is still being cited in non-management 
journals mostly in regard to its "theory of authority" (e.g. Rose, 
1976; Conkling, 1979; Britan, 1979; Hougland, 1980; Reich, 1981; 
McMahon, 1981; Lackman, 1982). 
This limited sample demonstrates, nonetheless, that The 
EyDctigns_of_the_Executiye has been (re)interpreted to support an almost 
ahistorical rhetoric for the existence of "organization theory," as if 
organizational theory Here a "natural fact" that Has eventually 
discovered; and to emphasize the "groHth of knonledge" in the field 
-i.e. the text is often cited as a marker for the "original 
organization theory" Hhich has non been "further developed. 
On this account Barnard has been criticized sometimes for not 
discovering/developing enough of "the organizational theory truth". 
For example, in the introduction to the Function's 30th anniversary 
edition, Andrews comments: 
. , Although he must be credited with readmitting 
man to organization theory, he seems much less interested in 
a living, growing person than in the abstract "Individual". 
He is not much concerned about personal involvement. His 
analysis of motivation suggests responsive behavior rather 
than full participation in the administrative process; it 
makes no room for the development of individuals, for the 
maturing of their needs, and for the dilution or 
strengthening of their commitment" (1968: xiii-xiv [my 
emphasis!). -Oh... Maslow, Argyris, Hulin and Blood, where 
were you in 1938? 
Similarly, Perrow critiques Barnard’s work (including 
critiquing Barnard himself) by saying: 
"Another idea that does not fit with Barnard's 
cooperative view is that of the balance between 'inducements 
and contributions. ; Only in recent years has it become 
fashionable to conceive of organizations as systems with 
inputs and outputs. Barnard was way ahead of his time when 
he did so in 1938." (1986: 69-70). 
Perrow seems to be unaware of the "social systems view" which 
was already around during those years. "The Hawthorne team , with whom 
Barnard was well acquainted held these views; and that was also the case 
with Mary Parker Follet, an author cited by Barnard. Perrow’s greatest 
oversight is that, unlike other Barnard’s commentators (e.g. Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979) he explicitly ignores Pareto’s influence over Barnard 
(clearly cited in the Functions) and which explains even better how 
Barnard’s "systems and equilibrium" views were not really "ahead of his 
time. ’’ Moreover, Perrow explictly assumes that Barnard is unaware of 
Durkheim, Parsons, and Heber, but Barnard cites Parsons, Pareto, 
Durkheim, and Heber with ease (e. g. 1938: 68-69). 
Another recent review of Ihe__EU0ctions (Keon, 1986) emphasizes 
how Barnard was almost in the threshold of "discovering" integration as 
a means of conflict resolution (a la Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), and 
Equity Theory (as in Adams, 1963) but he did not quite make it. The 
reviewer is even more explicit in his disappointment about Barnard’s 
treatment of inducements and contributions. He considers Barnard 
inadequate for not extending his analysis to the 
organixation-environment relationship in the manner of Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978); and he is also disappointed because Barnard did not 
give enough attention to the contractual relationships between the 
executive and the board of directors. According to the reviewer, 
Barnard’s oversight prevented Agency Theory (as in Jensen and Heckling, 
1976) to be developed 38 years ago. 
This last critique illustrates, perhaps better than the others, 
the violence -a rhetoric that forces a view of "knowing the truth"  
in the quest for "disciplinary progress, ’’ "accumulation of knowledge" 
and sustenance of the "organizational subject. ’’ Beyond these points, 
it is difficult to read the last sentence in Keon’s review without using 
it to pun-ctuate the initial paragraphs in this chapter. I emphasized 
there that to regard the relationship theory/practice of management as 
continuous, or even contiguous, activities is among the "organizational 
sciences’ ’’ major fictions. He says: ’’. . . Ihe_Functions_of_the_Executive 
brings theory and practice alive in an integrative fashion" (1986: 459). 
In general, Ihe_Functionsl critiques and citations have 
separated it from its proper context and/or intertext in a quest to 
support interpretations quite beyond its time and place. But more 
important, the commentators have invariably assumed that Barnard’s is a 
"theory of organizations" written to sustain the managerial point of 
view. My readings may eventually subvert these common interpretations. 
The first part in the discussion that folloHs "contextualizes" 
this book through an analysis of the historical moment when it was 
published, the decade of the 30s. The discussion Rill comment on 
general issues in American society during those years, and more 
specificly, on particular business issues at that time. 
The second part of this discussion creates a "dialogue" betneen 
Barnard's Rork and Lynd*s (1939) critique of the American culture at 
that time. The product of these readings is an interpretation of 
Barnard* s text quite different from the traditional interpretations. I 
should re-iterate (a pun, emphasizing Derrida's notion of "iteration of 
meaning" Rhich proliferates and disseminates other meanings from "the 
same Rords") that these interpretations are productions to mark the 
fictive character of any interpretation. They Rork by deferring the 
possibility of "truth" or "real meaning" in the interpretation of any 
text. Thus, my "interpret-a( c)tions" Rork on exposing the discipline's 
uses of discoursive activity in its agenda for legitimation, by 
re-marking hoR traditional interpretations need not be any more 
plausible than my ORn. 
Kith all these said, let's turn our attention to an historical 
context. 
Historical Con/Text: General Issues 
If there is any one short description to characterize American 
society at the beginning of the 1930*s it is probably "hunger and 
inequality among technological marvels," For example, Hhile the New 
York Horld’s Fair Has getting ready to unveil some "incredible" 
technological advances like television, and Birdseye's entered the 
business of mass producing frozen foods, people dug in the Chicago 
garbage dump looking for pieces of food, and the nation experienced a 
sucession of food riots. Right before the 1932 election unemployment 
reached 25%. 
According to Goldman, the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
the presidency Has for many a last hope against all hope for national 
recovery. And hope Has perhaps nhat Roosevelt banked on nith his 
inaugural Hords of ". . . let me assert my firm belief that the only thing 
He have to fear is fear itself, . . " These Hords, honever. Here not those 
of a planner nith Hell defined notions of "Hhat is to be done." They 
Here more those of an experimenter nho Has also saying; "The country 
needs. . . bold persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a 
method and try it. If it fails admit it frankly and try another. But 
above all, try something" (1977: 254). 
Behind the nation's general agreement nith the Nen Deal's 
policies -that the best solution to economic and social ills Has 
action by the federal government under strong executive leadership- 
one Hould find a general unanareness of the experimental nature of these 
measures. Thus, the public had confidence in those initial governmental 
measures like protection for bank depositors and for all investors in 
stock; in federal credit nhich eased farmers' and households' debts; in 
the Hay that phony bankrupcy proceedings Here made more difficult and 
taxes Here imposed over excess profits and dividends; and also, in the 
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Civilian Conservation Corps which provided a source of gainful activity 
for unemployed youth .., while prices were raised by taking the country 
off the gold standard. 
Public expectations were intimately tied to the opportunities 
for the millions to have jobs at a point in time when the depression of 
1929 presented "the free enterprise system" in its most inhuman form. 
This situation had created sympathy for the idea of national planning 
and national economic units. According to Goldman, by 1933 even "free 
enterprise" had abandoned their no-intervention stand and ". . .there was 
hardly any industrial, economic, financial, commercial reform, or 
agricultural leader who did not advance some idea of government 
intervention. "( 1 977: 259). 
The ensuing governmental activities eventually showed the 
experimental and ambivalent position of the nation* s leader about his 
position on these issues. The two most important pieces of legislation 
in the early New Deal years, the National Recovery Act and the creation 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, were drawn in the context 
of the executive* s ambiguities about national economic planning. Should 
it follow an Associational Activities pattern which emphasized 
noncompulsory relations between the government and economic life -with 
trade associations which would give each industry a code of ethics, help 
modernize its practices, and provide industry wide understandings 
against cut-throat competition (and a way to by-pass anti-trust laws)?; 
or should national economic planning follow a pattern of powerful 
federal control? One way or another, the aim was to stimulate the 
economy. 
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By 1935 it was clear that in each case -NRA and Triple A- 
most ccKJes had been Kritten primarily by big business and were to their 
advantage. "Recovery programs controlled by the big corporations 
-said a periodical of the times- involved giving a subsidiary 
attention to the interests of the labor element, and hoping that the 
consumer Rill be satisfied Kith a fen kind Rords and a seat out in the 
alley" (1977: 271-272). 
After NRA and Triple A Rere repealed by the Supreme Court (in 
1935 and 1936, respectively) George Peek, former Triple A administrator 
commented "I learned that the Americans think of their government as 
something above and beyond the people of the United States, as something 
Rhich can control groups at its Rill. The truth is that no democratic 
government can be very different from the country it governs if some 
groups are dominant in any plan the government undertakes" (1977: 272). 
During the early thirties Roosevelt Ras sympathetic Rith big 
business' predicaments. He thought of government controls more as a 
partnership betReen business and government to Rork on the nation s 
recovery than as Ray to crackdoRn undesirable and explotative business 
practices. HoRever, indicates Goldman, "...during the NRA period the 
President discovered that corporate executives could prove highly 
unsatisfactory partners. Many openly flouted or skirted around all 
provisions of the NRA Rhich Rere not entirely favorable to them, 
assailed most of the other NeR Deal measures, and spent millions of 
dollars trying to convince the country that Roosevelt Ras an egomaniacal 
Communist." (1977: 281). By the mid-thirties Roosevelt Ras certain that 
he could not bring big business as a partner in the enactment of any 
future legislation. He Has enraged enough nith businessmen to comment 
"I get more and more convinced that most of them can* t see farther than 
the next dividend. *' 
Out of this situation the common notion that Marxist and 
Socialist activism Has prevalent in the United States during those years 
can be better understood. There is no doubt that social and labor 
legislation of the likes of the Hagner Act, the Social Security Act, the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Farm Security Administration Here not 
endorsed by most business organizations and business executives. These 
constituencies Here used to being the primary beneficiaries of most 
former legislation, and seldom the "economic supporters" of it. On the 
other hand, it appears that more than ever before the general population 
Has developing a populist, nationalist spirit. 
In spite of the loud accusations by the business "class" that 
society Has dominated by Marxist ideologies, at this time Marxism Has 
more a topic for the literary intellectuals than an issue in social and 
cultural theory. According to Bottomore (1969) these Here the years 
that post-Marxian European thinkers Here being discovered in America. 
In particular, Pareto and Heber ( the latter still in its German version) 
Here studied by those interested in pure theories of society; and social 
criticism appeared to be a declining interest in most intellectual 
circles. 
It is important non to further qualify the above. Russia, and 
its government, did gain more nidespread acceptance in the United States 
during the thirties, but for reasons beyond the peculiarities of Marxist 
theory as such. There Has indeed admiration for Russia’s economic 
achievements at a time when most of the world was suffering a 
depression, but the increasing regard for that country was borne in 
different grounds. Russia was interested in building military allies 
against the by now imminent menace embodied by Hitler -who had 
proclaimed himself as the defender of the world against Bolshevism. To 
these ends the Communist International defined in 1935 the idea of 
Popular Front which made clear their interest in working with any 
"antifascist" organization and government, including now the United 
States. At the same time they indicated the ceasing of all 
revolutionary activities. 
These changes in Russian policies generated a large group of 
fellow-travellers among the liberal minded in the United States, and 
also an increase in respectability and "understanding" of Moscow. 
Perhaps this "Americanization of Communism" can be best represented in 
an anecdote told by Goldman to describe how the Russian version of 
Marxism had become fashionable in America: "For a liberal to show 
sympathy for Communism hardly seemed extreme when the Baltimore Sun was 
reporting: Hearing a black ensemble with orchids at the shoulder, Mrs. 
Hilliam A. Becker, national president of the Daughters of the American 
Revolution, attended the reception at the Soviet Embassy last night to 
celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution*" (1977: 
275) . 
Thus, in spite of the general economic difficulties of the 
times, ■ and the lack of opportunies for Blacks and other minorities 
—now becoming aware of the obstacles in their path to success— the 
New Deal "engendered a new optimism, it reawakened for a time the 
populist sentiment of the beginning of the century, and it offered at 
least the hope of a more efficiently managed economy” (Bottomore, 1969: 
47), In general, the view of America as "The land of opportunity" was 
still alive. The opportunities Here just postponed, and in the meantime 
Eleanor Roosevelt was assuring "Non it is accepted that the government 
has an obligation to guard the rights of an individual so carefully that 
he never reaches a point at nhich he needs charity, " 
The covert social unrest brought about by the Nen Deal Has not, 
honever, centered in the more disadvantaged groups. The government 
protection of the rights of "the little people" instead of 
patronizing them, as had been the tradition of previous progressive 
goverments- created rabid anti~Roosevelt feelings in the upper 
classes. These groups Hould have supported the government* s economic 
measures had they been aliened the belief that the nen Ians Here the nay 
to fulfill their responsibilities as "superior people. ” The Men Deal 
government, especially during the second term, became instead a direct 
challenge to anybody’s position as "superior people” (Goldman, 1977). 
Historical Con/Text: Business Issues 
By the onset of the depression in 1929 many large American 
corporations had restructured their operations in a more decentralized 
form, folloHing the diversification of their products and services. 
Thus, by this time the tno major forms of organizational structures used 
in the management of large enterprises had been developed. The 
traditional form, centralized and departamentalized by functional units. 
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Has exemplified by General Motors and Du Pont before Horld Har I. The 
other, developed by General Motors and by Du Pont in the 1920s, Has 
multidivisional and decentralized. According to Chandler (1977), 
centralized forms have been used primarily by companies producing a 
single line of goods for one major product or regional market, Hhile the 
decentralized form has been more common in companies nith several lines 
and products, and diverse markets. 
It is interesting to notice that American Telephone and 
Telegraph -Barnard's company- operated as a centralized, 
functionally departmentalized structure from the beginning of the 
centruy to the 1960's. In general, it maintained long lines of 
responsibility in long distance operations, nhile the regional 
subsidiaries (around tnenty) Here centrally managed. In the structural 
sense this company Has an exception from Hhat became the norm in large, 
diversified operations by the 1930s. 
Another trend in business operations, nhich started nith the 
century and became overtly clear in the thirties. Has the 
professionalization of business brought about by the separation betneen 
management and onnership. Blackford and Kerr comment: 
"The shift raised questions about corporate goals. 
Corporations had traditionally been seen as devices to earn 
profits for their onners, nho also ran them... the managers 
questioned nhether simply trying to earn maximum profits for 
themselves and their stockholders could serve any longer as 
their sole or primary goal in business. Searching for nen 
identities and for nen sources of approval for their 
actions, many corporate managers began looking upon 
themselves as professional men" (1986: 295). 
During the 30* s the general public paid special attention to 
anything pertaining to business and society, as demonstrated by the type 
151 
of books which became widely read during that period (e.g. Berle and 
Means, 1932; Lynd and Lynd, 1935; Arnold, 1937), These works of social 
theory offered analyses of business and economic conditions, and usually 
expounded managerial and technological views. There was indeed interest 
in a theory of society that would improve the economic situation without 
resorting to radical ideologies ( Bottomore, 1969). 
For example, the "power without property" case indicated above 
became a public issue through Berle and Means* (1932) book. This work 
showed two important changes in the American economic system: the 
concentration of industrial production in a small number of big 
corporations; and the separation between ownership and control of 
industry. After reporting that about 6000 men controlled the entire 
American economy they argued that corporations were becoming similar to 
nations. Under this condition, they acknowledged, managers would have 
to function more like statesmen than merchants. The "managed 
capitalism" that they advocated included economic regulation by the 
state, and the development of a socially responsible business community, 
which would exert care when exercising their increased powers. 
The professionalization of management was enacted in a mystique 
of "better management education and training." It was almost a direct 
transference, through the Comtian connection, from "the divine authority 
of the king" to "the educated authority of the manager" where the 
latter* s superior knowledge would provide security to the "common 
people"-by having society*s business and economic matters well taken 
care of. They would be serving society like other professionals (e.g., 
doctors, lawyers). 
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Behind the mystique of the superior management knowledge were 
other facts. Out of 9000 business executives in 1932, 32% were college 
graduates and 45% had some college education-but only 7. 5% received 
formal business college education; and there was little correlation 
between business success and college education of any kind. More 
important, more than half of the group came from well-to-do families 
with business or professional backgrounds; and it was also clear that 
the rags-to-riches cases were only a few exceptions (Blackford and Kerr, 
1986). As already mentioned in chapter two, college education in 
America was more a consequence than a cause of economic development. 
The professional management mystique was maintained, and even 
enhanced, during the thirties (the hope that individuals possessing a 
college education would get out of economic disadvantage). But there 
was also public awareness of the complex relationship between business 
and society, and the dominance by business organizations of all spheres 
of American life. There is no doubt that in the public eye big business 
lost all redeeming qualities during this period. 
These feelings are perhaps best expressed by Lynd in the 
following commentaries: 
”... [T1he marked presence in the culture of extreme 
differences in power. . . appears in many ways: in the 
dominance of industrial areas over rural areas in such 
matters as import tariffs; in the ability of business 
pressure—blocs to prevent the passage of legislation 
manifestly in the public interest...; in the ability of 
great corporations to command able lawyers to squeeze out 
small competitors, to control patents, and otherwise to 
dominate their fields; in the helplessness of the individual 
worker in the face of the labor policies of a Republic Iron 
and Steel Company... 
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... In a culture Khich prizes "equality" as one of 
its foundation assumptions, this habitual and widespread 
tolerance of extremes of inequality in power requires the 
disguise of a formula. Two such convenient formulae are in 
wide use: 
(a) The disparities at any given moment are regarded 
either as but temporary differences in a general progress in 
which "tomorrow can be different,". . . 
( b) The second formula invoked to justify a special 
but crucial disparity in size and power, i.e., that between 
the individual and the corporation, is the convenient legal 
fiction which views a corporation as a person. . . 
And if [they] go to court over their 
transaction, they are still conveniently assumed to be 
simply two equal individuals with equal access to the law as 
represented by their respective counsels." (1939: 74-77) 
This chorus of historical commentaries, made ( with the exception 
of Lynd's) from a "vantage point" of various years past the narrated 
situations, provide the background for the readings that follow. 
These readings comprise the deconstructive critique of Barnard's 
text, worked through an intercontextualizing strategy. That is, Ihe 
Eynction_of_the_Executiye is read by establishing its relationship with 
other texts which may have been within its experience. Experience, as 
defined here, does not imply necessarily other "cited" texts. Mostly it 
is speculations about how other discourses may have "in-formed" what we 
call Barnard's. 
Three types of discourses are considered here: 
1. - Barnard's other commentaries contemporary with T^e 
Eynctignsl publication date. 
2. - A critique of the American culture written by the time The 
Eynctions was published. This cultural commentary will be laced with 
Barnard's text as a dialogue in a clearly deconstructive move: the 
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"grafting" of one text on the other. At the same time, it is mimicry in 
a very extensive sense: The text "Korks itself" over my "silence," [See, 
for example. Price (1983) and Irigaray (1974/1985) for similar 
strategies]. 
3. - Philosophical influences in the text which may be detected 
from Barnard* s discourses. 
At the end of the chapter I will reiterate the significance of 
these readings in exposing, through deconstruction, the construction of 
the organizational subject. 
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Iiit*r/T«it 1: Mhat Has Barnard Saying at This Tine? 
In the folloHing paragraphs I am reproducing a partial text by 
Barnard, published in FQrtuQg in March 1939 (three months after the 
Eynctlons was published). Barnard's comments appeared in the first of 
a series of businessmen's "round tables" the magazine sponsored in the 
late '30s and early '40s. Here Barnard, who Has a Round Table member, 
dissents, in no uncertain terns, from the other businessmen's opinions on 
issues of government spending. The "businessmen agreements" -Hhere 
Barnard is the only fully dissenting voice- is reproduced in Figure 
4-1. In reproducing Barnard's Hords, instead of paraphrasing them, I am 
pointing at Barnard's discoursive strategies, Hhere a strong social 
orientation can be read [ 41. 
Rith these readings as palimpsest (51 I propose non that 
Barnard's Functions is not a theory of organizations but a processual 
theory of society. I Hill comment more about this later, but first 
let's hear it from Barnard: 
"I dissent from the report of this Round table. . . 
Dissagreement Hith specific items could be sufficiently 
cared for by tno or three footnotes. Honever, the Round 
Table does not confine itself to the question of deficit 
financing but goes into that of profits and the control of 
economic conditions in the future. I disagree especially as 
to Hhat I believe are important implications in the 
statements concerning these matters. 
the opinion of the Round Table concerning 
profits seems to me utterly fallacious. It essentially is 
based upon the popular conception that ne live alternately 
in a profit economy (nhen it Horks nell) and a loss economy 
(Hhen it doesn’t). I think it is a profit-and-loss economy, 
and that this means not only that it must be expected that a 
very large proportion of all business Hill be conducted at a 
current operating loss or Hithout profit, but that a 
substantial proportion of savings and investment Hill also 
Figure 4.1 Fortune'a Business Hen Round Table 
I I 
i HIGHLIGHTS OF FIRST ROUND TABLE 
I 
! This report is a synthesis of the opinions of eleven active 
men concerning the vital problem of government spending, j 
j The background of this group as a whole represents a wide j 
! horizon. Here are five practical business leaders, a judge, a ; 
farmer, a distinguished laborite, an engineer, a writer on ! 
economics, and a professional economist. These men might i 
fail to agree on many specific points, but on the general 
principles set forth herewith they reached—with the excep¬ 
tions noted in the footnotes and two appendixes—an impres¬ 
sive unanimity. The highlights of their argument are; 
I. There are 10,000,000 men out of work; few new indus¬ 
tries are being created; little new capital is being in¬ 
vested. What is the cause of the trouble? 
II. One school says that government spending will revive 
the economy. Another thinks that spending is the great 
obstacle to recovery. Which is right^ 
III. The Round Table believes; 
1. That both schools make some good points but that 
neither has the answer. 
8. That government should invest its money so as to 
increase productive opportunity rather than merely 
spend to create purchasing power. 
3. That the fiscal policy of the .Administration has 
brought with it a failure in business confidence. 
4. That the spirit of enterprise languishes largely be¬ 
cause of the belief that tne Administration does not 
really care about the system of private enterprise. 
5. That these intangible concomitants of the spending 
program should be at once corrected. 
6. That, in general, the social and labor reforms so far 
established should be retained. 
7. That public spending should indeed be used to coun¬ 
terbalance the business cycle. 
8. But that this should be done within the framework 
of a periodically balanced budget and a dependable 
debt-retirement plan. 
Reproduced from Fortune, 19, March 1939; p. 60 
157 
be lost...A realistic approach to the problems of today 
seems to me to require not merely the admission of but the 
insistence upon this proposition as broadly to the general 
public advantage. Hence» I agree with the statement "Nor no 
economic system can be expected to operate indefinitely at a 
loss," but I believe it equally true that no economic system 
can be expected to operate indefinitely at a profit. . . 
Profit is a competitive reiiard of relative success Rithin 
the system; loss is a competitive penalty for relative 
failure. 
...Hhat is important is not aggregate profits or 
losses in themselves but a belief on the part of individual 
businessmen (or business) that if they exercise initiative, 
skill, and effort there is an opportunity for profit for 
them individually, if, and only if, they are successful. 
. . . Hy objection to the report as a Rhole is that it 
seems to me to reflect a philosophy of efforts to correct 
foundations merely by readjustment of the superstructure, to 
cure a disease by alleviating its symptoms. The fact that I 
do not knoR hoR to correct the foundations or to cure the 
disease does not lead me to endorse these methods as sound 
or promising. 
The question put to the Round Table and its opinions 
both assume that the difficulties of the last ten years are 
essentially economic, that they are the result of economic 
maladjustments, and that they are to be corrected by 
economic readjustments. Hy belief is that the economic 
difficulties past and present lie chiefly in the unequal 
distribution of the opportunities for productive employment, 
and that the correction of these difficulties requires 
direct attack at that fundamental point as a social rather 
than an economic process. 
The social destructiveness involved in this unequal 
distribution of adversity is much greater than can be 
conveyed in economic disaster for all classes. Hany of the 
losses of the depression are not due, in my opinion to the 
collapse of a boom, but to the incidence of a 
disproportionate share of the burdens of that collapse on a 
large section of the population. . . 
Taking this vieR, the question of deficit financing, 
and Rhether it is good or bad from an economic standpoint, 
seems to me to put the cart before the horse, the effect 
before the cause. 
...(I)t seems to me that the approach to the problem 
should not be primarily economic but social. The attempt to 
deal Rith the social problem by relief processes (Rhether 
for the unemployed, for industries, or for farmers) by 
unemployment compensation, by extravagant pension schemes, 
by the artificial creation of government projects, and by 
the artificial stimulation of certain types of industries 
Rith emphasis upon capital-goods production as essential to 
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a current prosperity, seems to me to have been, and likely 
to continue to be, either ineffective or abortive or at best 
merely palliative. These efforts attempt to cure by 
redistributing "purchasing power. " They not only create 
nothing, but by coming after production they reduce 
initiative in production where it is most important and 
hence actually destroy purchasing power. 
. . . Many of those who understand the position I take 
here seem to think the answer is some form either of 
communism or of state socialism or of state capitalism. 
Such answers seem to me and most Americans to be extremely 
undesirable. . . For this reason I believe many unconsciously 
refuse to face the sad and dangerous facts of the present 
situation fearing that they would be driven to present 
doctrines which to them are worse than present difficulties. 
I think the line of attack which is consistent with what we 
all desire is neither an artificial and compulsory equality 
nor a regulated distribution of property and income nor a 
general regimentation, but chiefly an insistence upon the 
equal distribution of opportunity for employment. . . 
Any such distribution of the opportunity to work, at 
least by any scheme 1 have been able to imagine, would meet 
the opposition of the aristocracies of labor (including most 
government employees) and of most managers of industry and 
government officials because it involves reduced weekly 
earnings for everybody when there is economic adversity 
-that is what sharing economic adversity means. However I 
should expect it to limit the adversity for all, to prevent 
this cankerous combination of both social and economic 
depression, and to increase sound prosperity... (1939: 
124-126) 
From my perspective, it is reasonable to read the above 
exposition as Barnard* s concerns for the possibility of a better theory 
of society. That theory of society would take into account multiple 
"institutional issues", and subsume them into a more holistic and 
balanced order, for the common good. Thus, it will be appropriate now 
to notice how for Barnard the terms "cooperation", "organization” and 
"organizations" are not equivalent. In my readings, ” cooperation 
through the proomss of organization" is his theory of society. 
"Organizations,” on the other hand. are specific entities of various 
kinds -including business- which may or may not enter a process of 
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organization toward cooperation. 
The issues indicated above are guiding points for reading the 
philosophical orientation which informs Barnard* s work. This 
orientation is "the Hegelian connection." It is a philosophy which has 
influenced the modern discourses of "progress" (of both right and left) 
since the eighteenth century and up to our times. In Barnard’s case, 
however, the Hegelian influence appears to be quite direct rather than 
just acquired from "the general text" of modern society. 
But before we enter any further argument, let us look at 
Barnard's response to Copeland's (1940) critique of the FuQCtiQns. In 
his discussion Barnard explicitly notes how the theory of cooperation 
would incorporate more and more units of society into a whole. And his 
examples, especially the whirlpool one, make even more clear the 
processual nature of cooperation and its adequacy as a theory of 
society. 
Barnard cites Copeland saying the following about Barnard* s 
work: 
"He seems to have been torn between a desire to 
present a conceptual scheme of a sociological pattern and an 
impulse to follow his realistic instincts. Sometimes his 
realism does not effectively come to his rescue. For 
example, he included in his concept of a "cooperative 
system" in the industrial fields not only employees and 
j^jjyg9tors but also customers. Customers, therefore, are a 
part of the "material of organizations..." (1940: 297). 
Thus, Barnard goes on to make a case for his views, 
retorting: 
"Professor Copeland then refers to this as the sort 
of confusion that has just been cited.* 
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This quotation certainly makes clarification 
necessary. . . 
Hhen the acts of tao or more individuals are 
cooperative, that is, systematically coordinated, the acts 
by my definition constitute an organization. Every such act 
is a component simultaneouly of tuo or more systems as 
determined by its functions. Thus every act of organization 
is also an act of some individual, and is his contribution 
to the organization. Hhen tao or more organizations 
cooperate, the cooperative acts are simultaneously (1) of 
individuals, and either (2) of the organization contributing 
the act and (3) of the second organization participating, or 
(4) of a nea complex organization embracing the tao original 
organizations cooperating; or of all four. This 
siiHiltaneous functioning of the cooperative act of an 
individual in tao or more organization systems provides the 
interconnection ahich results in complex organizations. . . 
This aill seem to many, no doubt, a strange, 
artificial, unrealistic kind of thing chiefly because they 
aill not realize that this is precisely the kind of thing 
they are aorking aith in their minds in a rough and ready 
aay all the time. Take, for instance, a man aho is alaays 
changing, or a corporation of ahich the principal nearly 
constant attributes are its name and by-laas; or, to get 
farther toaard the earth, take a ahirlpool. . . Hhen you use 
the name nearly everyone knoas ahat you mean, and there is 
no other name commonly covering the same thing. But if 
asked ahat it is, I think you might have to say something 
like this: 
A ahirlpool is a situation in a body of aater in 
ahich there are comparatively stable uniformities of 
relations betaeen streams of molecules of aater, moving aith 
increasing rapidity spirally toaards a center called a 
vortex, the level of ahich is depressed aith reference to 
the level of the surrounding aater. The movement of the 
stream of molecules is doanaard at the vortex. Nea 
molecules move into the situation as fast as old ones move 
out. The position of the ahirlpool also may move as is 
easily seen by the movement of the vortex. If the molecules 
stop moving in this aay, there is no ahirlpool, because all 
there is to a ahirlpool is streams of molecules of aater 
moving in certain aays. And don't ask ahat a "stream" is. 
Others aill be puzzled at the idea that a single act 
can be called part of several organizations at the same 
time, yet ae have no difficulty aith the same or similar 
idea ahen ae are used to it. . . 
To put the matter in reverse, you could not 
completely understand a specific act of a human being 
aithout knoaing all the organizations in ahich the act 
functioned as a part. If this sounds "abstract" and 
"unrealistic," let me put it this aay: you cannot deal 
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effectively nith people unless you can get their "point of 
vieK," Rhich means knoRing Rhat "influences" govern their 
behavior. . . 
In a community all acts of individuals and of 
organizations are directly or indirectly interconnected and 
interdependent. Analogously all elements of the physical 
universe are said to be interconnected and interdependent. 
For convenience obviously necessary to some degree, Re 
disregard the interconnections Rhich Re consider minor or 
trivial . . . 
Among the simplest of organization is the exchange 
of goods betReen tRO men, . .. Perhaps Re often fail to think 
of an exchange as cooperative, because emphasis is so much 
placed upon conflict of interest or bargaining in a hostile 
sense, conditions that may precede exchange; but a moment* s 
reflection is sufficient to see that an exchange is based 
upon agreement to effect a transaction, a coordination of 
acts of the tRO parties, the acts being mutually dependent 
and interconnected. Re should not be misled by the 
ephemeral character of this particular case. It is perhaps 
more short-lived than a microbe, and may be dismissed as 
unimportant. But the aggregate of the relations betReen 
Rhat is exchanged by such cooperation is the subject matter 
of economic science; and also the aggregate of such acts 
constitutes, at least in part, stable unit and complex 
organizations, and is the subject of study of cooperation. 
In the sense of ultimate analysis an organization is 
a composition of cooperative acts. It is convenient to 
deal Rith certain aggregates of such acts as named 
organizations and to classify them in various Rays. 
Professor Copeland found confusion because he could 
not reconcile the definition of organization, the 
implications of Rhich I have made more explicit above, Rith 
Rhat I said about the executive functions. . . 
Let me be definite about the matter. I meant then 
and I mean noR that in the fundamental sociology of business 
behavior the services of an employee and of a customer Rhen 
making a purchase are equivalent elements, similar 
contributions to the same organization, and that every 
statement quoted above applies unequivocally to either 
employees and their acts of purchase. 
Rhen once the cooperative relationship has been 
established, the exchange that constitutes organization is 
to be elicited. The exchange in one case (that of the 
employee) is services for money, in the other (that of the 
customer) money for services (the act of transferring goods 
or services). 
. . . Note that Re are not dealing in analogies. I do 
not say that the treatment of customers is analogous to that 
of the employees. I say that the nature of the cooperative 
acts is the same in both cases under the definition of 
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organization I am using. . . 
. . . The greatest mental difficulty is that ire are 
habituated, in economics and in business ideologies, to make 
the inducements the primary concern, Khereas in the more 
fundamental study of cooperation it is the process of 
coordination of acts ahich is primary..." (1940; 297-303). 
Thus, Hith Barnard Hords above as background for his oan aords 
in the Fugctigns, I irill enter him into a dialogue Kith Lynd* s ( 1939) 
critique of the American culture at the time. The "constructed" 
dialogue, based on the assumption that the Funstlone is e theory of 
society, makes even more explicit Barnard's preoccupation Kith his time 
and place. 
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Inter/Tezt 2: A Conversation Kith Bob and Chet 
The dialogue that folloirs has been enacted irith excerpts from 
Barnard’s Ihe_EyQctioB§_of_thg_ElgQytiye (1938) and Lynd*s lDQligdgg_£QC 
Hhs£2 (1939). Barnard's comments belong to various parts of his book 
while Lynd* s are all from his chapter III on the pattern of American 
culture. 
This section is set to accomplish two major operations within 
the dissertation. First, it demonstrate a practice of textual 
"grafting" which re-construct the meaning of a text by re-weaving it in 
a context other than that "dictated" by its "tradition. " That is, the 
operation mimes a citation of the text by placing the chosen original 
words in a context which claims a certain specific meaning for those 
words. This is not any different from what one does in traditional 
citations, except by elimination of "the traditional. " Once the 
traditional context is eliminated one may expect to find the "stark 
naked, true meaning of the text." The surprise is to discover that the 
text can only mean in context- an-other context. For example, think 
of a mime QQ.gtagg "walking a dog. " The movements the mime makes when 
"walking" the absent dog are the same as if the dog were present. But 
what makes one understand that s/he is "walking a dog" are the 
dog-walking movements embedded in a different context: the cultural 
agreement of a re-presentation that means_by_absence. 
The second operation displaces the necessity of "a traditional 
context" by providing an-other context which is also plausible. This 
operation signals to the arbitrariness and indeterminacy of meanings. 
It also subverts the possibility of returning blindly to the previous 
"traditional" context Rithout questioning further its privileged "claim 
to truth. " To follOR the example above, after observing the 
mimed/staged "Ralking of a dog" it is difficult to ignore that the 
actual Ralking of one’s dog is just another form of cultural 
representation. Hhich is more truthful? Hhich is more real?. . . 
The re-casting of Barnard's text in a context other than the 
traditional managerial interpretations -in this case, in the context 
of cultural criticism- provides one Ray to observe Rell knoRn textual 
movements (Barnard's Rords; paragraphs) in another context. It is like 
staging "Ralking a dog" Rithout the dog. The displacement of 
traditional interpretations, Rhich occurs Rhen the neR context sustains 
the possibility of these movements (the same Kords, paragraphs continue 
to be meaningful in the new context) calls into question any privilege 
toRard meaning claimed by the more conventional context of managerial 
interpretations. 
Nor, let's observe some other details in the forthcoming 
dialogue. First, it is important to notice here hoR these operations 
bring to the fore the mimetic aspects of any textual representation. In 
appearance only Barnard's and Lynd’s voices are present in the text 
Rhile my voice is absent. But, look again. Hy pretended silence sets 
the stage for a playfulness of presence (theirs) and absence (mine) that 
makes "their dialogue" possible. Again, this is not any different from 
the choices made by any "scientific" Rriter in citing others. He/she 
"moves out" of the text by "bringing in" the voices of "authority. " 
Second, as to the plausibility of the "neR context" for Barnard, 
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the sinilarity of time/place nakes Lynd and Barnard likely reflectors of 
their own culture -and makes even more strikingly dismal Barnard's 
critics disappointed by his inability to "discover" all the managerial 
knoRledge (?) that is currently possible, Rhile inhabiting "his 
authority" for their oRn purposes. The "neR context" dramatizes the 
textual violences that occur in the "scientific enactment of truth. " 
Rhere/Rhen does Barnard mean better? 
On the other hand, I do not claim that Barnard and Lynd kneR 
each other in "real life". They do not cite each other, but Barnard may 
have read Lynd and Lynd (1929 and 1937), given that they Rere Ridely 
read during the thirties. There are a feR common citations ( e. g. Hayo, 
T. N. Rhitehead, Brigdman, Bentley, Harx, and acknoRledgements to Gestalt 
psychology), but Barnard, not being an academician, often alludes to 
ideas Rithout citing the sources; his language gives him aRay (for 
example his critique of "economic man," Rhich is also a critique made by 
Lynd). 
In spite of the differences it Ras possible to enact a dialogue 
betReen these tRO very unlikely texts. My "only" additions are the 
titles and summary statements for each section ( as Rell as the design of 
the sections) and the transition comments Rritten inside the brackets 
(). The latter do not change the original contents in any other Ray 
than that of providing continuity. The texts can converse Rith each 
other because they are discourses of their ORn times. They are Ridely 
concerned Rith the conditions of their society, at a time Rhen the 
conditions of society Rere of primary concern in the Restern Rorld in 
general, and in the United States in particular. 
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Introduction 
§Un|R§r^_State(!igQt: Hhat are we now? How have we created our 
culture? 
L: [Let's converse about our present culture]. If we 
individuals in a given culture did not learn to accept 
substantially common meanings for a wide range of phenomena 
—from the physical universe to human gestures and 
institutionalized situations- we could not make sense out 
of accepting a piece of paper in repayment for a week's 
labor, or obeying the authority of a policeman, or putting 
sheets of engraved paper away in safety-deposit boxes, or 
voting, or submitting to eight or more years of compulsory 
schooling (:54). 
B: [I think that] Leadership ... is the indispensable 
social essence that gives common meaning to common purposes, 
that creates the incentive that makes other incentives 
effective, that infuses the subjective aspect of countless 
decisions with consistency in a changing environment, that 
inspires the personal conviction that produces the vital 
cohesiveness without which cooperation is impossible (:283). 
L: [Yes]. Daily living, if it is to go on, cannot stop at 
each moment to scrutinize every word, concept, symbol, or 
other institutionalized device, but must take these largely 
wholesale, in patterns and proceed to use them as given. 
These roughly common meanings for details and whole chains 
of details, thrust upon us by those about us, need conform 
to no system or logic or reason, for human beings are 
notoriously adroit in "thinking up good reasons" to explain 
what they habitually do. These meanings provide 
recognizable and dependable shorthand identifications which 
reduce complexity and enable us to live together (:55). 
B: [As a matter of fact], P.H. Bridgman (1938) notes that 
"the totality of situations with which we are confronted, 
including society in its economic, political, esthetic, and 
religious aspects, is enormously more complex that the 
situations presented by any well defined scientific activity 
such as physics or chemistry. " It seems to me quite in 
order to cease encouraging expectation that human behavior 
in' society can be anything less than the most complex study 
to which our minds may be applied (:xxxii). 
L: [But that is not how we stand today]. The deeply 
fissured surface of our American culture is padded smooth 
frith this soft amalgam of assumptions and their various 
symbolic expressions; so much so that most of us tend to 
pass over the surface most of the time unaware of the 
relative solidities and insubstantialities of the several 
areas. In time, assumptions are built in on older 
assumptions, so that ire have verbal cliches standing for 
clusters of underlying assumptions. Thus, "individual 
freedom" or "democracy" or "welfare" comes to stand for 
whole battalions of associated assumptions (:58). 
B; [Yesl,... Much of the conflict of dogmas and of stated 
interest to be observed in the political field -the 
catchwords are "individualism," "collectivism," 
"laissez-faire," "socialism," "statism," "facism," 
"liberty," "freedom," "regimentation," "discipline" - and 
some of the disorder in the industrial field, I think, 
result from inability either intuitively or by other 
processes to reconcile conceptions of the social and the 
personal positions of individuals in concrete situations 
(: 9). 
L: [Thus], As one begins to list the assumptions by which 
we Americans live, one runs at once into a large measure of 
contradictions and resulting ambivalence. This derives from 
the fact that these overlapping assumptions have developed 
in different eras and that they tend to be carried over 
uncritically into new situations or to be allowed to persist 
in long diminuendos into the changing future. . . It is 
precisely in this matter of trying to live by contrasting 
rules of the game that one of the most characteristic 
aspects of our American culture is to be seen (:59}. 
B: [And that explains the contradictions in the idea of 
"individualism"]. On first consideration, the physical 
thing endowed with life that has interacted with other 
similar organisms becomes more and more unique, separate, 
distinct, just as a point where many lines cross seems to 
the mind more definitely a point than one where only two 
line cross. But when we stop to think of the history of its 
physical components, of its long line of ancestors, and the 
extent to which it embodies the effects of actions of 
others, it becomes less and less distinct, less and less and 
individual, more and more a mere point where the crossing 
lines are more important than the place where they cross. 
The individual is then a symbol for one or more factors, 
depending on the breadth of our interest (:11-12). 
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Uneven Organization of the Several Areas of Living 
§U!D99ry_3t§t§9§nt: Hom is one an individual in such a 
society? 
L: [Then ), One may hazard the generalization that the 
functional strength of a culture may be gauged by the degree 
to Hhich it satisfies the folloaing requirement: Does it 
present to individuals a closely, explicitly, and dependably 
inter-supporting frame of behavior throughout the several 
institutionalized areas of living Mhich provides the minimum 
of strain and the maximum of active assistance in the 
discovering and following of their own creative patterns of 
rhythm, growth, and motivation in living? (:71). 
B: ( Hhat you are asking for is] The search for the 
universal of organization (which] has been obstructed, I 
suspect, by the long history of thought concerning the 
nature of the state and the church. The center of this 
thought relates to the origin and nature of authority. Its 
consequence appears to be a legalism that prevents the 
acceptance of essential facts of social organizations. No 
theory of organization that conflicts with the doctrines of 
the law can be acceptable unless it also explains these 
doctrines. The doctrine of states as sources and bases of 
formal organizations in society - the doctrine relevant in 
legal theory to all corporate organizations, such as those 
of municipalities, universities, business institutions, 
armies - is inconsistent with the theory that all states 
are based upon organizations. But the latter hypothesis 
cannot be accepted unless it is able to explain both the 
facts of states and their obvious dominance in some respects 
over the organizations from which they arise (:xxix). 
[But also, we must not forget that]...all law arises 
from the formal and especially the informal understandings 
of the people as socially organized, and that so far these 
practices and understandings are formulated in substantive 
law and promulgated by lawmaking authorities the "law" is 
merely the formulation. Its source is not rulers, 
legislatures, or courts, however constituted, but the people 
as organized in families and communities of various kinds. . . 
(:XXX). 
L: [I don't agree. For example]. Anti-trust legislation, 
while useful as a vote-catching device, dodges the central 
problem involved. "Bigness," large-scale operation and 
concentration of power, is a useful servant of modern man 
-when it is... But our system of wide differences in 
power, casually developed and casually tolerated, leaves 
unanswered the crucial questions: At what points in our 
institutional system is bigness useful? And how can such 
169 
differences in poser as are useful be made to serve rather 
than to disrupt the democratic process? (:79). 
B: This is not a difference of principle but merely one of 
the relationship of the size of the informal organization 
relative to the individual or formal group. A strong 
individual can resist the domination of opinion if it is 
confined to a small number; but rarely there is in question 
the opinion of an overshelming number, actively and 
hostilely expressed. Nos the size of any subsidiary 
organization is small compared to the informal organization 
that permeates the State; and this Kide informal 
organization Kill usually support "laK and order” regardless 
of merits if the question at issue is minor from its point 
of vieK. The pressure on the subjective attitude of 
individuals or on that of subsidiary or dependent 
organizations is strong ordinarily to induce acceptance of 
laK in an "orderly" society. 
But this informal support of objective authority of 
the State depends upon essentially the same principles as in 
the case of ordinary organizations. Inappropriatness of laa 
and of government administration, lack of understanding of 
the ultimate basis of authority, indifference to the motives 
governing individual support, untimely or impossible 
legislation, as is Kell knoKn destroy “respect for laK and 
order," that is, destroy objective political authority. In 
democracies the normal reaction is to change laK and 
administration through political action (;183}. 
The "Individual" and Cooperation 
Summary_Statement: Rhat is then "an individual" in this 
state of affairs? 
L: [ I think I knoK Khat you mean.1 Rithin the general 
frameKork of devotion to laissez-faire individualism, our 
American culture has tended to make the folloKing 
sub-assumptions regarding the process by Khich its 
structural form groKs: 
(a) It is assumed that as individuals feel the 
strain of trying to do any over-complicated thing alone, 
they Kill recognize, as free, rational persons, the need to 
join Kith their felloKS and do something about it. 
(b) It is assumed that Khen the institutional 
structure supporting one area of behavior, such as getting a 
living, becomes over-developed and begins to unbalance and 
to distort the rest of living, individuals Kill be aKare of 
this and Kill automatically redress the balance (:66). 
The lack of balance and coherence in the culture 
structure is markedly apparent Khen one compares the 
elaborate structuring of property rights in our culture Kith 
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the alnost total lack of structuring of the rights of the 
individual worker to access to and permanence in the job 
upon which all the rest of his daily living must depend 
(:67). 
B: [I think it is necessary to define what we mean by 
individual. It is my view that) The individual possesses 
certain properties which are comprehended in the word 
"person. " Usually it will be most convenient if we use the 
noun "individual" to mean "one person" and reserve the 
adjectival form "personal" to indicate the emphasis on the 
properties. These are (a) activities or behavior, arising 
from (b) psychological factors, to which are added (c) the 
limited power of choice, which results in ( d) purpose. 
...the idea of free will is inculcated in doctrines 
of personal responsibility, of moral responsibility, and of 
legal responsibility. This seems necessary to preserve a 
sense of personal integrity. ..(: 13).. . This power of 
choice, however, is limited. This is necessarily true if 
what has already been stated is true, namely, that the 
individual is a region of activities which are the combined 
effect of physical, biological, and social factors. Free 
will is limited also, it appears, because power of choice is 
paraly2ed in human beings if the number of equal 
opportunities is large. (: 14) 
[Moreover], ...every participant in an organization 
may be regarded as having a dual personality -an 
organizational personality and an individual personality. 
Strictly speaking, an organization purpose has directly no 
meaning for the individual. Rhat has meaning for him is the 
organization* s relation to him-what burdens it imposes, 
what benefits it confers. In referring to the aspects of 
purpose as cooperatively viewed, we are alluding to the 
organization personality of individuals. In many cases the 
two personalities are so clearly developed that they are 
quite apparent (:88). 
L: [But what I want to address here is the! . . . pattern of 
increasingly large population massess, held together 
principally by the tie of the individual to his job, and 
with attenuated sentiments of community in feeling and 
purpose. . . (:80). 
B; [I agree, but I see it as of lack of knowledge about the 
idea of organization]. Always, it seemed to me , the social 
scientist -from whatever side they approached - just 
reached the edge of organization as I experience it, and 
retreated. Rarely did they seem to me to sense the 
processes of coordination and decision that underlie a large 
part at least of the phenomena they described. More 
important, there was lacking much recognition of formal 
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organization as a most important characteristic of social 
life, and as being the principal structural aspect of 
society itself. Mores, folkHays, political structures, 
institutions, attitudes, motives, propensities, instincts. 
Mere discussed in eztenso; but the bridge betneen the 
generalizations of social study on the one hand and the 
actions of the masses to Mhich they related on the other Mas 
not included I thought. (:xxvii-xxix) 
[In my case] The tangible result of this experience 
and these beliefs is this book. The need for it lies in the 
confusion and uncertainty Mhich noM attends the subject, and 
the extent to Mhich especially the purposeful and 
constructive activities of men in present society are 
governed by formal organizations. It also lies in the 
relations of such organizations to society in general, and 
in the degrees to Mhich the activities of formal 
organizations, as contrasted Mith institutions and other 
abstract generalities of social life, provide the structure 
and processes of social systems (:xxxi). 
[HoMever] no construction of the theory of 
cooperative systems or of organizations, nor any significant 
interpretation of the behavior of organizations, executives, 
or others Mhose efforts are organized, can be made that is 
not based on some position as to the psychological forces of 
human behavior. 
For this reason I should add at this time that the 
exaggeration in some connections of the poMer and of the 
meaning of personal choice are vicious roots not merely of 
misunderstanding but of false and abortive effort. Often, 
as I see it, action is based on an assumption that 
individuals have a poMer of choice Mhich is not, I think, 
present. . .(:14). 
The efficiency of cooperation therefore depends upon 
Mhat it secures and produces on the one hand, and hOM it 
distributes its resources and hoM it changes motives on the 
other (:59). 
L : tl still think that)... The individual's identifying 
tag derived from his job and the property it yields him 
tends to be heavily overMorked as the fragile basis for 
social cohesion. The common focus is not on living together 
but on "the job". . . This carelessness about common sentiment 
is part of the general orientation tOMard matter-of-factness 
in a culture stressing material development, personal 
mobility, and postponement of the subtleties of living. At 
point after point our culture plays doMn extensive, acute, 
and subtle feeling. To be "business-like" is to be 
impersonal; in our moments of deep, personalized emotion Me 
tend to retreat from others into ourselves or to the trusted 
tolerance of our immediate family; a businessman Mho is 
"artistic" may be someMhat suspect; being "romantic" or 
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"idealistic” is regarded as an evidence of youth; and the 
person Kho "gets enthusiastic about things" is mildly 
disparaged as inmature and "unsound. " Human beings do not 
easily live so emotionally sterilized. . . Hickey Mouse and 
Charlie McCarthy tend to displace Uncle Sam and local 
symbols as repositories of common sentiment (:84). 
B: tMy answer to that is J: Still more do I regret the 
failure to convey the sense of organization^ the dramatic 
and aesthetic feeling that surpasses the possibilities of 
exposition, which derives chiefly from the intimate habitual 
interested experience. It is evident that many may lack an 
interest in the science of organization because they are 
oblivious to the arts of organizing, not perceiving the 
significant elements. They miss the structure of the 
symphony, the art of its composition, and the skill of its 
execution, because they cannot hear the tones (:xxxiv). 
L; [Granted], Human beings crave big, aggregating symbols 
on a culture-wide scale, but they also crave localized and 
highly personalized meanings. Human loyalties are largerly 
built of an infinite number of shared purposes in 
commonplace daily acts... He are today living through the 
end of that phase of our cultural history which was 
dominated by the quest for the conditions of individual 
liberty. Heavily laden with institutions developed to that 
end, we are reluctantly moving to a new phase in which we 
must somehow manage to rewrite our institutions in terms of 
organized community of purpose. To this end we may no 
longer conceive of the state as simply a kind of umpire over 
what Sir Henry Maine called "the beneficent private war 
which makes one man strive to climb on the shoulders of 
another and remain there through the law of the survival of 
the fittest" (:87). 
B: [But to attain that] ...we have clearly to distinguish 
between organization purpose and individual motive. It is 
frequently assumed in reasoning about organizations that 
common purpose and individual motive are or should be 
identical. Hith the exception noted below, this is never 
the case; and under modern conditions it rarely even appears 
to be the case. Individual motive is necessarily an 
internal, personal, subjective thing; common purpose is 
necessarily an external, impersonal, objective thing even 
though the individual interpretation of it is subjective. 
The one exception to this general rule, an important one, is 
that the accomplishment of an organization purpose becomes 
itself a source of personal satisfaction and a motive for 
many individuals in organizations. . . It is rare, however, if 
ever, and then I think only in connection with family, 
patriotic, and religious organizations under special 
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conditions, that organization purpose becomes or can become 
the only or even the major individual motive (:88-89). 
L: tl still don't see a solution. Our cultural pattern) ... 
is a pattern that assumes that achievement of man* s values 
Hill folloH automatically from material advancement. 
Under this theory of indirection, the rest of the 
culture tends to bent to serve the ends of business. 
Nothing escapes. Even the qualitative ends of living 
themselves are exploited in the service of money-making. 
Freedom is invoked to defeat a child-labor amendment. 
Liberty is used by a privately owned "free press" to defeat 
the effort to control misleading food and drug advertising 
in the public interest. Justice is invoked to protect the 
rights of property against the efforts of workers to 
organize. Education in the public schools is made to 
exclude consideration of economically unorthodox 
subject-matter and is used in other ways to indoctrinate 
ways of thinking useful to the status quo. Love of country 
and religion are exploited to the ends of better business. 
And "free" public opinion, a prized check on the misuse 
democratic processes, is continually bought and paid for by 
using public relations counsels whose services are for sale 
for the private ends of the highest bidder. Such things 
befuddle men's view of their values (:99-100). 
B: [I agree) ... we should not deceive ourselves by thinking 
that either a science of cooperation and organization or the 
further development of the executive arts will alone promote 
a greater integration of social forces, or even maintain the 
present status. The ethical ideal upon which cooperation 
depends requires the general diffusion of a willingness to 
subordinate immediate personal interest for both ultimate 
personal interest and the general good, together with a 
capacity of individual responsibility. The senses of what 
will be for the ultimate personal interest and of what will 
be for the general good both must come from outside the 
individual. They are social, ethical, and religious values. 
For their general diffusion they depend upon both 
intelligence and inspiration. Intelligence is necessary to 
the appreciation of the interdependence of peoples in a 
crowded world on their combined technological competence 
—an intelligence that perhaps will be derived from 
experience in cooperation rather than from anything 
suggestive of formal education. Inspiration is necessary to 
inculcate the sense of unity, and to create common ideals. 
Emotional rather than intellectual acceptance is required. 
No one who reads, or who observes the events of our times, 
but will recognize, it seems to me, the supreme importance 
of beliefs in ideals as indispensable to cooperation (:293). 
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In Conclusion 
SU!Di§ry_Sta&SQSDt: Our hope then rests on better knoKledge 
for the Mhole of society. 
L: [To summarize, then,] As one begins to list the 
assumptions by Hhich Re Americans live, one runs at once 
into a large measure of contradictions and resulting 
ambivalence. This derives from the fact that these 
overlapping assumptions have developed in different eras and 
that they tend to be carried over uncritically into nea 
situations or to be alloaed to persist in long diminuendos 
into the changing future. . . It is precisely in this matter 
of trying to live by contrasting rules of the game that one 
of the most characteristic aspects of our American culture 
is to be seen (:59). 
The folloRing suggest some of the outstanding 
assumptions in American life: 
— Individualism, "the survival of the fittest," is 
the laa of nature and the secret of America's greatness; and 
restrictions on individual freedom are un-American and kill 
initiative. 
But: No man should live for himself alone; for 
people ought to be loyal and stand together and Rork for 
common purposes. 
The family is our basic institution and the 
sacred core of our national life. 
But: Business is our most important institution, 
and, since national Relfare depends upon it, other 
institutions must conform to its needs. 
— Honesty is the best policy. 
But: Business is business, and a businessman Rould 
be a fool if he didn* t cover his hand. 
— Education is a fine thing. 
But: It is the practical men Rho get things done. 
— Poverty is deporable and should be abolished. 
But: There has never been enough to go around, and 
the Bible tells us that "The poor you have alRays Rith you" 
(:60-62). 
B: HoRever, the present questioning and discouragement do 
not come, it seems clear to me, merely from economic 
disturbances and international conflict. Much more do they 
arise from a deep conflict of beliefs concerning cooperation 
itself. There are tRO beliefs that are far apart, both 
struggling not only against each other but also against 
unrecognized limitations. One of them centers upon the 
freedom of the individual and makes him the center of the 
social universe. At the present time, on the Rhole, it is 
critical and pessimistic. It lays its emphasis upon failure 
of cooperation, upon Rars and conflicts, confusion, and 
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disorganization, Haste, hunger, disease and death, and yet 
it preaches uncritically an extreme liberty, an ideal 
individualism, a self-determination, that in their 
unrestricted dogmatism Hould prevent all formal cooperation 
beyond that imposed by the most obvious immediate 
opportunities and necessities. 
The second extreme faith is adulatory and 
optimistic. It places its emphasis upon the order, the 
predictability, the consistency, the effectiveness, of 
untold myriads of concrete acts that are cooperatively 
determined, in systems so extensively interrelated that the 
effects have been enormously to expand the Horld's 
population and to advance measurably the material and 
cultural state of many millions. Those who speak from this 
point of vies are likely to advocate uncritically a vast 
regimentation, an endless subordination, a completeness of 
coordination, that in their unrestricted dogmatism Hould 
stifle all development of individuals beyond that found 
inescapable. 
And so He find ourselves again nith the very problem 
Hith Hhich He began. . . centered upon the old question of 
free Hill and determinism, or on sentiments from Hhich this 
question takes its origin (:294-295). 
L: [Yes, and) Groning out of all the preceeding, a final 
characterization of our culture pattern runs somenhat as 
folloHs: It is a pattern of markedly uneven change, of 
unprecedented rapidity in some traits and of marshalled 
resistance to change in others, and tolerating at many 
points extreme disjunctions and contradictions. 
Human beings are, as Freud has pointed out, 
inevitably ambivalent at at many points, but a culture Hhich 
encourages unnecessary ambivalence is recklessly careless of 
the vital energies of its people. ..(: 100-1 05). 
B: [Expressed perhaps differently, but nithin the same line 
of thought is the folloHingl: Scarcely a man, I think, Hho 
has felt the annihilation of his personality in some 
organized system, has not also felt that the same system 
belonged to him because of his onn free Hill he chose to 
make it so. Many an executive, I believe, has seemed to 
himself at times to be merely the channel of imponderable 
universal forces, of all his associates the least free; and 
yet he has also believed that Hhen men do not choose, do not 
Hill, do not regard themselves as responsible and are not so 
regarded by others, the very stuff of cooperation dissolves 
(:295). 
[Thus, my book), Hithout the intent of the nriter or 
perhaps the expectation of the reader, had at its heart this 
deep paradox and conflict of feelings in the lives of men. 
Free and unfree, controlling and controlled, choosing and 
176 
being chosen, inducing and unable to resist inducement, the 
source of authority and unable to deny it, independent and 
dependent, nourishing their personalities, and yet 
depersonalized; forming purposes and being forced to change 
them, searching for limitations in order to make decisions, 
seeking the particular but concerned with the Hhole, finding 
leaders and denying leadership, hoping to dominate the earth 
and being dominated by the unseen -this is the story of 
man in society told in (its] pages (:296). 
L; [ And that brings us to] . . . the gross imbalance betireen 
shat He are able to knoH and the limited extent to which we 
have institutionalized this knowledge in the service of 
living (: 1 06). 
. . . The knowledge which the sophisticated experts 
possess in our culture is growing at a rate far more rapid 
than the rate at which it is being institutionalized in the 
habits of thought and action of the mass of our population. 
This increasing disparity arises from our heavy reliance 
upon casual adjustment, assumed to occur automatically 
wherever it is rationally relevant; from our over-exclusive 
reliance upon commercial exploitation to diffuse any new 
knowledge throughout the population; and from the freedom 
granted to interested power-blocs to supress patents, 
obstruct change, and bend new knowledge to their private 
ends (:108). 
B: (At this point I must, then, ask the following): Hould a 
thoroughly scientific approach to the problems of 
cooperative systems and organization provide a useful tool 
for the executive arts? It is my belief that it ultimately 
would, and that the development of such science is important 
in further progress in these arts and hence in cooperation 
generally. This belief is based upon reflection concerning 
the failure observed in many concrete instances to take into 
account all the elements of the situation as a whole. . . 
Neither the consideration of present experience nor 
that of the pertinent aspects of history permits escape from 
the suspicion that much sheer lack of good sense in human 
relations is to be explained by the history of the sciences. 
There is no science of organization or of cooperative 
systems. . . (:290). 
L: ( Unfortunately, and related to the above) As a culture, 
we are cumulating our disabilities and the resulting strains 
incident to daily living at a rate faster than social 
legislation, education, and all the agencies for "reform" 
are managing to harness our new knowledge in the reduction 
of these disabilities (:109). 
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B: For this reason perhaps (my book's] chief value, if 
presently it has any, will merely lie in its expression of 
one view of experience... (:292). 
I hope that the social scientist, on the other hand, 
may attempt a preliminary testing of it against the 
background of present knowledge. More concretely, I hope 
for a social anthropology, a sociology, a social psychology, 
an institutional economics, a treatise on management, etc. , 
written with the concepts of a cooperative system and an 
organization which has been presented as a part of the 
working scheme, for what this kind of thinking requires at 
present is not so much the testing of details as the 
ascertainment of whether or not there is a correspondence 
between it and general experience and social knowledge as a 
whole (:293). 
L: Every gain in knowledge and efficiency and every 
outworn symbol or causal explanation displaced by more 
realistic analysis is potentially a gain in ease and 
richness of living. But when this new knowledge is not put 
to work in the service of all the people, when it is only 
partially applied to those able to "pay for it" or bright 
enough to learn it unaided, or when it is used by those with 
power in order to exploit others, this knowledge may be 
either largely barren or, worse, it tends to become a 
disruptive factor (:113). 
B: Such a story calls finally for a declaration of faith. 
I believe in the power of the cooperation of men of free 
will to make men free to cooperate; that only as they 
choose to work together they can achieve the fullness of 
personal development; that only as each accepts a 
responsibility for choice can they enter into that communion 
of men which arise the higher purposes of individual and of 
cooperative behavior alike. I believe that the expansion of 
cooperation and the development of the individual are 
mutually dependent realities, and that a due proportion or 
balance between them is a necessary condition of human 
welfare. Because it is subjective with respect both to a 
society as a whole and to the individual, what this 
proportion is I believe science cannot say. It is a 
question for philosophy and religion (:296). 
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The readings that I have presented by enacting the preceding 
dialogue give us a vieR of Barnard very different from that of 
contemporary management texts. I believe that my readings ShOR Barnard 
as a social theorist far removed from the issues of immediate concern in 
the limited Rorld of any particular organization. 
He explains his concerns through "the executive organization" 
because that is what he knoRs best - As a good Hegelian that is his 
positive moment, Rhat he can take possession of, Rhat he can shoR 
mastery over. It is a demonstration of transcending the Lockian model 
of personhood, only conferred to the "proprietor," Rith a philosophy 
that shoRS a reversal betReen master and slave. It is a Hegelian 
conception that concedes to the servant the dominant position in the 
making of a master: the master depends on the Rork of the servant for 
his mastery. It is also a conception in line Rith Barnard* s theory of 
authority. 
In the folloRing pages I Rill shoR more explicitly the Hegelian 
in Barnard. The influence in his Rriting of this philosophical 
orientation (that also influences Lynd* s Rriting) situates Iht_FunctiQns 
in a space that aims to transcend more conventional knoRledge about 
business organizations: from benefitting any particular organization to 
the benefit of society as a Rhole. Both Lynd and Barnard identify the 
problematics of their respective positions by pointing at conceptions of 
"the individual," versus a more general vieR of society. Each in his 
ORn Ray recognizes that vieRing the individual as a separate free 
entity, determiner of his society, is certainly a convenient fiction for 
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some doninant groups, but not for the conditions of the whole (e. g. 
Barnard, 1938: 170; Lynd, 1939: 77). 
Lynd shows an awareness of Nietzsche* s "original text" critique, 
and addresses these problems through a class/historical materialism 
critique, inherited from the Hegelian/Marxist discoursive connection. 
Barnard, on the other hand, dwells into more "pure" Hegelian issues. 
His resolutions point at the possibility of ultimate synthesis, absolute 
knowledge, at the end of time. Lynd* s pessimism and Barnard* s optimism 
are reflections of these two different lines of Hegelian discourse. 
However, Barnard* s choice of considering in detail the 
problematics of individualism -for working out the contradictions of 
Social Darwinism in his notion of cooperation- served to keep his text 
as a major production in the "organizational sciences. ** As we will soon 
see, Hegel was effaced while "the individual" was enshrined. As for 
Barnard, he remained as a discoursive opening to provide for his own 
fall into the void. 
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Int«r/Tezt 3: Barnard Tba Bagalian 
Recognize these nords?: 
....responsibility, then, 
is that capacity of leaders by 
Mhich, reflecting attitudes, ideals 
hopes, derived largely from without 
themselves,they are compelled to 
bind the wills of men to the 
accomplishment of purposes beyond 
their immediate ends, beyond their 
times. Even when these purposes 
are lowly and the time is short, 
the transitory efforts of men 
become a part of the organization 
of living forces that transcends 
man unaided by man; but when these 
purposes are high and the wills of 
many men of many generations are 
bound together they live boundlessly. . . 
The abstract change which occurs 
in history has long since been 
interpreted in such a way as to 
contain a progression to the 
better, the more perfect. The 
changes in nature show only a 
cyclical movement... Only in the 
changes which occur in the field 
of the spirit does the novel 
occur. This aspect of the life 
of the spirit long ago led to 
seeing man as destined for 
something different than the 
merely natural things. ... a 
capacity for genuine change for 
the better, the more perfect, a 
drive toward perfection... 
I8l 
Cooperation and organization 
as they are observed and experienced 
are concrete synthesis of opposed facts, 
and as opposed thoughts and emotions of 
human beings. It is precisely the 
function of the executive to facilitate 
the systhesis in concrete action of 
contradictory forces, to reconcile 
conflicting forces, instincts, interests, 
conditions, positions, and ideals. 
the ethical world of social life 
is the absolute unity of 
subjective and objective good. 
In this sphere is found the 
solution of the antinomy in 
strict accordance with the 
concept of freedom. Ethics is 
not merely the subjective form 
and the self-determination of 
the Hill, but it has real 
freedom for its content. Both 
right and morality need the 
ethical for their foundation, as 
, without it neither has any 
actuality. 
For the morality that underlies 
enduring cooperation is multidimensional. 
It comes from and may expand to all the 
world; it is rooted deeply in the past, 
it faces toward the endless future. As 
it expands, it must become more complex, 
its conflicts must be more numerous and 
deeper, its call for abilities must be 
higher, its failures of ideal attainment 
must be perhaps more tragic; but the 
quality of leadership, the persistence 
of its influence, the durability of its 
related organizations, the power of 
coordination it incites, all express 
the height of moral aspirations, the 
breadth of moral foundations. So among 
those who cooperate the things that are 
seen are moved by the things unseen. 
Out of the void comes the spirit that 
shapes the ends of men. 
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The left column is Barnard's words (1938: 283-284, 21, 284, 
respectively) the right is Hegel's (Friedrich, 1954: 21, 259, 
respectively). In each case the preoccupations with the progress of 
history toward the betterment of humankind is obvious, as well as the 
need to resolve the apparent contradictions in men's life (Barnard and 
Hegel against Kantian categorical imperatives) through dialectical 
processes and ethical developments. 
In the following paragraphs I will trace some evidence of strong 
Hegelian thinking in Barnard's Functions. Doing so will serve as final 
evidence for the impossibility of "translating," "transferring," or 
"interpreting" Barnard's work into current management thinking. Any 
traditional "managerial interpretation" is/will be Just another "miming" 
and "grafting" over a text that may have meant something very different 
in his time and place. 
I should stress, again, that I am not proposing my 
interpretations as "the correct ones." One more time I should say that 
my purpose is to bring awareness of the fictive nature of all our 
interpretations when constructing theory. However, the tracing of a 
clear Hegelian influence in Barnard's text offers an interesting 
possibility for understanding the privileging of certain fictions in the 
development of the "organizational sciences." 
In this regard, one may say that as an early theoretical work in 
management Barnard's brought into the discipline discourses which helped 
construct the "organizational sciences" over a notion of progress. But 
if such is the case the resulting "disciplinary development" seems quite 
ironic. 
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Here the notion of BCQgrsSS attains a double meaning if Re 
notice hoR it is that progress (toRard the ultimate freedom through the 
Spirit) informs Hegel* s Rork, as much as Barnard* s Rork. The irony is 
that progress^ in the sense of progress of the organizational 
disciplines toRard human control for cactlQuIsr organizational purposes, 
(e. g. in the manner that Barnard has been traditionally **used*’ as a 
management text) has Rorked to_limit the idea of progress as ultimate 
freedom of man, in the Hegelian sense. 
These paradoxes and contradictions in the notion progress 
illustrate points made by Barnard and by Lynd. Barnard Rould say that 
the problem results from the inability to reconcile conceptions of the 
social and the personal positions of individuals in concrete situations. 
Lynd Rould say that they result from overlapping assumptions that tend 
to be carried uncritically from one time/place to the next. In either 
case, they result from grafting one kind of philosophical discourse over 
the remains of another. Those remains, of Rhich Re are often unaRare, 
have opened the door to still other discoursive/institutional 
disciplinary developments . They are the developments Rhich determined 
Rhat kind of subject could be *’the organizational subject. ** They are 
the discourses Rhich excluded Hegel and included **the individual. ** 
The "Hegel** in Barnard 
The folloRing is a brief summary of Hegelian ideas Rhich seems 
to be central in Barnard* s text. First, basic in Hegel is the notion 
of freedom. His Rork tries to resolve the apparent contradiction 
betneen free-Hill and determinism. His main contribution, Hhere he 
resolves these difficulties, is one where all spheres of the life of the 
individual become unified through a dialectical process. The wholeness 
and synthesis attained through dialectics, however, does not happen for 
every individual in every society. Societies, and the individuals in 
them, move into historical stages. The end of history comes when man is 
finally reali2ed beyond objective/subjective, free/determined in the 
Spirit. 
Hegel* s works are philosophical investigations in history, 
logic, aesthetics, ethics, and law, where he tries to show the 
unification that must exist on all the spheres of life if the process of 
"becoming” is to be attained. Barnard* s works show his preoccupation 
with similar issues. And his notion of cooperation comprises that 
ultimate synthesis announced by Hegel* s philosophy. 
Moreover, in Hegel’s philosophy the state of "nature" is one 
step in the road toward the Spirit, thus precluding any final resolution 
of society through pure evolutionist theories. And that is why Barnard, 
moving away from the social Darwinism that pervaded American social 
thought before the thirties, is so conscious of proposing a theory of 
l}Uman_QrgaQlga^ioQ that avoid any answer based on "the survival of the 
fittest." This is a point that Perrow obviously unaware of Barnard* s 
Hegelian "connection," notices but fails to discern (1986: 68). 
Also, within Hegel* s philosophy is a notion by which 
transcendence into ultimate freedom becomes possible only when 
individuals can translate their freedom into personality and property 
(e. g. Arthur, 1985). How to deal with this issue in the state of "power 
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Hithout property"? The executive functions are the key ansRer. By 
inculcating common purpose, that each individual can make "their oRn," 
individuals then attain "property" and "personality" (i.e. Barnard, 
1938: 87-88) by Rhich they can transcend their present imperfect state 
into the perfection of cooperation. Hor this is to happen depends on 
every particular formal organization (formal, as in form and content, a 
Hegelian issue for concreteness, for the materials of society ). Rhy 
this is to happen? So that the Rhole of cooperation, throughout society, 
could happen. 
Barnard never gets to resolve these problematics. He just 
proposes an idea that may transcend into the ultimate end of men if 
American history reaches its final state of "absolute knoRledge. ” This 
is the Hegelian vieR of science, Rhich incorporates both rationalism and 
intuitionism and transcends them Rith a higher level of consciousness 
(61. Barnard makes his proposal from the only position that he "oRns, " 
from his personality as an executive, still moving in history. 
Rhy Hegel in Barnard* a Rork? 
In the preceding sections of this chapter I have been arguing 
that Barnard Ras very preoccupied Rith the state of society during the 
thirties, and that he thought he could do something about it. His 
comments in Fortyne shoR his social orientation, his disposition to be 
very vocal Rhen disagreeing Rith current "business" thought, and his 
aRareness that his vieRS might be interpreted as Marxist Rhen they Rere 
not so. Moreover, in his in response to Copeland he is also quite 
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eaphatic about having the concept of cooperation understood in a larger 
context than that of the imaediate particular organization. The concept 
of cooperation, a systea of identity-in-differences, is dialectical in 
its parts but synthetic in its totality, like the whirlpool of his 
ezaaple. It evolves toward "the spirit that shapes the ends of man. " 
These words lead us closer to the possibility of Hegel informing 
Barnard* s work. 
As I have already discussed, the issue of Marxism was alive and 
well during the thirties, but it had also attained an intellectual 
status beyond the merely political one. Barnard is explicit about his 
awareness of Marxism in the Functions (e. g. 1938: 145n, 295). Following 
this lead, one must remember that the main influence in Marx's theories 
was Hegelian, except that Marx basically turns Hegel* s propositions 
upside down in the development of a materialistic theory of society. 
Based on this, it is my assumption that at any point Marxist thinking 
becomes an intellectual issue there is a likelihood that Hegel* s works 
will be also read and discussed. 
I have noted before that Barnard did not want to be thought of 
as related to Marxist thinking. Houldn* t it be fitting, then, that he 
would involve himself in an entreprise whereby he could go beyond Marx? 
Rhat about a theory of society which, based on Hegel, would overturn 
Marxism? The kind of work he does in Ihe.FunQtiogs can certainly be 
read as directed toward these ends. 
Could Barnard have read Hegel? The possibilities are of course 
there. Rhether Barnard read German or not I cannot claim but Hegel was 
already widely translated into English. The following editions should 
have been available: Baillie (1901), Croce (1915), McTaggart (1922), 
Stace (1924), Hegel (1931), Hook (1936). 
But I guess that a more important clue for the possibility of 
anybody re-addressing Hegel to draa a theory of American society during 
the thirties lies in Hegel* s oHn Rords. He explicitly mentioned that he 
Mould not address America in his Ehilosophy.gf.gigtory because: 
"America is therefore the land of the future in 
Mhich times to come. . . Morld history shall reveal 
itself. . . But Mhat has so far happened there is only an echo 
of the old Morld and an expression of an alien aliveness, 
and as the country of the future it does not concern us 
here. For in history our concern must be Mith what has been 
and Kith Mhat is... Concerning politics in North America the 
need of a firm cohesion is not yet present, for a real state 
and a real government only develop Mhen there is a 
difference of classes, Mhen riches and poverty become very 
large and a situation arises Mhere a great number of people 
can no longer satisfy its need in the accustumed May. But 
America does not yet approach this tension. . . For a state to 
become a state it is necessary that the citixen cannot 
continually think of emigrating, but that the class of 
cultivators, no longer able to push to the outside, presses 
upon itself and is gathered into cities and urban 
professions. Only then can a civic system develop and that 
is the condition for an organized state" (Friedrich, 1954: 
liii-liv). 
Thus the possibilities of "doing" Hegel in Barnard* s times get 
further enhanced if Hegel* s Mords are taken as a prophecy of America 
during the thirties. And the possibility that the Functions Mere based 
on Hegel becomes stronger if Me remember Berle and Means* (1932) 
arguments. They said that American society Mas that of the giant 
corporations, Mhere the managers of the future Mould have to function 
"more as princes and ministers than as promoters and merchants. ** The 
EyQQtlQ&St then, as a Hegelian theory of the American state finally 
coming into history -a state Mhere civil society had the corporate 
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form- must focus on the functions of "the princes and ministers" (the 
executives) who, as servants of that society, had the responsibility to 
move history toward the ends of man: cooperation. 
Rho is speaking? Hegel? Barnard? 
Foucault (1977) asks: "Rhat is an Author" - and answers: "To 
this day, the 'author' remains an open question. .."(: 113) to conclude: 
"Re can easily imagine a culture where discourse 
would circulate without any need for an author. Discourses, 
whatever their status, form, or value, and regardless of our 
manner of handling them, would unfold in a pervasive 
anonymity. No longer the tiresome repetitions: Rho is the 
real author? Have we proof of his authenticity and 
originality?. . . New questions will be heard: Rhat are the 
modes of existence of this discourse? Rhere does it come 
from; how is it circulated; who control it? Rhat placements 
are determined for possible subjects? Rho can fulfill these 
diverse functions of the subject? Behind all these 
questions we would hear little more than the murmur of 
indifference: Rhat matters who's speaking? " (:138). 
And so we stand. Rhat does it matter that Barnard was inspired 
by Hegel? -even if ample proof can be drawn just by doing a close 
analysis of Barnard's uses of language: his concern with "levels of 
discourse" and "the concept" (1940); the notions of intended and 
unintended results to illustrate "efficiency and effectiveness"; all of 
which can be traced back to Hegel. As a matter of fact, I can also show 
that Barnard could have been inspired by the symbolic interactionist 
approach of George Herbert Mead (first published in 1934) noting in 
passing that Goffman cites Barnard often. And I could contend against 
the "pure functionalist orientation" that Perrow sees in Barnard. But 
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Hhy Kould I do that? 
Hhat matters is that He cannot be "innocent” anymore of hoH ne 
use Barnard. Barnard, and all of us, have established a mode of 
existence for "Barnard* s" discourses. And as much as he did, every time 
that we "do Barnard” He are determining places for possible subjects. 
Hhat kind of subjects? 
The fictions I have created in my Barnard readings point at 
historical discontinuities to defer resolution of interpretation, to 
emphasize the indeterminacy of the signifier. But one step removed, 
right on the surface of my discourse, and his, and ours, is the modern 
episteme and the modern subject. It does not matter that in a detailed 
micro reading Barnard might be closer to Hegel than to March and Simon 
- Hhat matters is that Hegel, and Barnard, and March and Simon have 
all participated in creating the subject of history through the 
discourses of modernity. 
On the one hand, Barnard moved anay from conceptions of 
organization Hhich focused on micro organizational issues. He chose to 
emphasize the dialectics of a societal vien of organizations. On the 
other hand, he gave careful attention to nays by Hhich "the individual" 
could be reconciled nith his (Hegel's?) societal/holistic/processual 
viens. Ironically, this latter issue provided a rich source of "the 
individual" for those citing Barnard in discourses of very different 
philosophical orientation. These are the citations (e.g. in the books, 
articles, and critiques indicated at the beginning of this chapter) that 
effaced Hegel and enshrined "the individual. " Barnard provided a gap 
Hhere the "discourses of the modern subject" Here eventually erected in 
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his much anticipated ''organizational sciences. " 
This modern subject is explained by Foucault (1982) as one still 
submitted to pa§£QCil_poHec. From his perspective this is a form of 
poHer established in the discourses of Christianity and secularized in 
the eighteenth century. That is, at the Age of the Enlightenment the 
preeminence of the Church aas substituted by the reasonableness of Civil 
Society, but the discourses of "pastorality" simply became embedded in 
another institutional order, still concerned Rith the same subjects. 
The "pastoral poRer" in Christianity (as that exercised by the 
clergy) is concerned Rith assuring individual salvation in the next 
Rorld. It not only commands but is also prepared to sacrifice itself 
for the life and salvation of "the flock. " It looks both after the 
community and each individual in particular. And it cannot be exercised 
Rithout knoRing the inside of people's mind, Rithout exploring their 
souls and knoRing their conscience and ability to direct it. 
Hith the arrival of Civil Society the "pastoral poRer" remained, 
first exercised by the state, and eventually by more and more 
institutions in society, in the folloRing manner: 
- salvation became a matter of insuring "Rell-being" in this 
Rorld. 
- the "pastoral functions" extended from the church to all the 
institutions of society. 
- the knoRledge of souls became the knoRledge of man both in 
its globalized (population/social) and analytical 
( individual/psychological) forms. 
And so, on being modern individuals Re have become pastoral 
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subjects. Subjects in the meaning of subjection - either through 
cooperation or corporation, through executives or management, efficiency 
or effectiveness, the end of history or bounded rationality - 
throughout ire have subjected ourselves to the ideologies of 
’• well-being”, of institutions, and of ”self-knoirledge", because ire do 
not knoH hoR to be individuals irithout being subjects. 
That is, as long as ire are involved in discourses and 
disciplines whose concerns are those of man/individual/person while they 
develop a technology of the social (e. g. organizations) we are still 
involved in the discourses of pastorality. 
Thus, beyond any naive interpretation of Barnard (as discoverer 
of "organizational truths; " or by deforming his theory to make it "fit" 
current management "knowledge" ) he can be seen as one entry point of 
discourses of pastoral power in the creation of the management 
disciplinary subject. To use his own words, Barnard is a mere point 
where the crossing lines are more important than the place where they 
cross. 
And at the end, all that is left on the way "toward progress" is 
that the more things change the more they remain the same. Or, as Hegel 
would recognize in his ironic stance, absolute knowledge lies in a 
recollection carried by language, but language can never say what it 
means (Verene, 1985). Those are the modern discourses. Can we be 
anything else in Postmodernity? 
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Notes 
[ 11 
The concept simulacrum is used here in various manners. One 
understanding Hould be to identify it with image or representation. 
That is, a particular representation is brought to the reader by 
claiming that the dissertation is postmodern. Or one can reverse this 
same idea; one may be exploiting the Kriting here of the word simulacrum 
as a postmodern representational strategy -i.e. postmodern Rorks 
often use this term, so writing it here Kill associate the dissertation 
Kith postmodern writings. 
It also offers a militaristic image (simulacrum as war games) 
where one plays on the invasion of others. In this case the simulacrum 
Postmodernism plays on the invasion of modernism, and subverts its taken 
for granted categories. 
Finally, simulacrum could be interpreted as trace, an 
insubstantial form or semblance of something -thus, the effacing of 
the modern categories in the postmodern. The remains are the modern 
traces. 
[ 2] 
Discourse/discoursive practice, as used here, refers to the 
Foucauldian usage. It is also similar to Derrida* s notion of 
ecriture/writing. Both were discussed in chapter one. 
[ 31 
One caveat here: I am not proposing historical relativism but 
pointing at the differences in !D§§QiQ9£yiD§ss of discourses 
"interpreted" out of their time and place. It is to say, one more time, 
that there is no "original text." 
[ 41 
I should stress the fact that all this was published in Fortune. 
If one just considers its selling price of $2.00 in 1939 (Business Reek 
was $0.25 then) one can understand that the magazine addressed a very 
elite group in society. 
C 51 
One definition of palimpsest is a piece of writing on second 
hand vellum, parchment, or other surfaces carrying traces of previous 
writings, which were erased. The Greek usage referred to reinscribing a 
stone or slab whose previous inscription was either scraped or turned 
over. It can also be used to mimic "pali-sades, " a containment for 
loose grounds. In any event, it is used here to indicate that the 
readings to be done reinscribe "meaning" on very loose grounds ( the 
traditional claims of what the text mean). 
[ 61 
In the appendix to Ihe_Functions_of_the_Executive, "Mind Over 
Everyday Affairs," Barnard is even more explicit about this issue, using 
a very Hegelian mode of expression. For example, he says: "That the 
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increasing complexity of society and the elaboration of technique and 
organization now necessary will more and more require capacity for 
rigorous reasoning seem evident; but it is a super-structure 
necessitating a better use of the non-logical mind to support it... the 
corrective of the feeling mind that senses the end result. . . the 
interest of the all and of the spirit that perceiving the concrete parts 
encompasses also the intangibles of the whole (1938: 322 [my emphasis!). 
CHAPTER y 
FOR AN AFFLUENT SOCIETY: 
THE HUMAN SIDE OF ENTERPRISE 
In chapter four I emphasized two issues ahich are central to 
this dissertation project: the dlscourslve nature of the organizational 
disciplines, discussed at the beginning; and the Importance of defining 
a particular concept of the individual as organizational subject, 
discussed at the end. 
My readings of Barnard's Kork paid major attention to the first 
Issue. These readings, Khlch presented Barnard* s theory of cooperation 
as a theory of society, aimed at subverting the traditional "managerial" 
interpretations Imposed upon it. It Has my intention to_represent, Kith 
my readings, a theoretical barrier for conventional interpretations, by 
problematlzlng the application of Barnard's theories to any particular 
organization. That is, in my Hegelian "interpretation," this theory 
Hould Hork if, and only if both the parts (individual acts of 
organization) and the whole (society) have entered into cooperation. 
Otherwise, any one organization in society practicing cooperation, while 
others do not, would create competition through the practice of 
cooperation. From a Hegelian point of view, this latter contradiction 
can only be resolved by transcending the state where competition is 
regarded as necessary. 
My readings re-attached Barnard to a historical context in an 
attempt to mark how ahistorical interpretations (of this one or any 
other text) in the organizational disciplines can reach very different 
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conclusions CcQi.^bs.SfiiS.IQr^S- importance given to the historical 
context is, however, a reading strategy to stress the_difference_in 
sameness, the independence of any "word" from anything it may represent, 
and not a claim to the "true meaning of the text" from historical 
interpretations. The primary aim of my deconstruct!ve readings was to 
show that "the accumulation of knowledge" and "the transference of 
theory into practice, " -the traditional representation of what the 
organizational sciences are supposed to do- are difficult claims to 
sustain as they are based on the instability of signification. At the 
same time, this type of reading presented an-other manner of "doing 
organizational theory," which produces and disseminates different 
understandings of the disciplinary "tradition. " 
The second issue -the definition of individuals as 
organizational subjects- stressed the "entrance," through Barnard's 
work, of the "pastoral subject" (Foucault, 1983) in the organizational 
discourses. The "cultivation" of this subject is the major theme in the 
current chapter, and will be analyzed by reading McGregor's (1960) work. 
This view of the individual has become the "approved version" of the 
organizational subject: management/the manager -unified, whole, 
balanced, consistent, a true Cartesian cogito. As mentioned in chapter 
three, it is the representation that hides the fragmentation and 
ambiguities within the discipline by limiting the authorized 
interpretations. That is, the movement that has permitted the 
"organizational sciences" to be defined as a "true discipline" hinges on 
cultivating a particular discourse: one which accomodates or separates 
this subject from cultural or historical events. 
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Essentially, the "pastoral subject" vieR argues that a 
particular understanding of subjectivity emerged in the eighteenth 
century in Hestern civil society. It emerged out of the transformation 
of previous relationships betneen the individual and the church. As the 
modern state became more responsible for the "Hell being" of individuals 
it took upon itself traditional ecclesiastical responsibilities, Khich 
later spread about other institutions of society (e.g. schools, private 
organizations). Hegel's philosophy can be understood as a reaction to 
this situation: Rhat kind of "self" can anyone be in a society Rhich 
puts emphasis on individualization and totalization at the same time? 
Barnard inaugurated this issue in organizational texts. His 
theory of cooperation, and the role of the executive, go to 
extraordinary lengths trying to balance this problematic. His effort is 
particularly significant since it Ras done at a point in time Rhen 
American society could not refuse to exert pastoral poRer - Rho Ras 
to care for each and all the disadvantaged? Could a notion of "rugged 
individualism" and "survival of the fittest" still be sustained? Thus, 
from this perspective Barnard's theory of cooperation could be read as 
an statement in support of the pastoral poRer of the corporation, in 
lieu of the state - but a poRer Rhich could not be exercised unless 
each and all organization members in each and all possible organizations 
(including, and especially so, the executives) learned hoR to become 
pastoral subjects. 
From a deconstruct!ve perspective, the manner in Rhich Barnard 
"authorizes" his concept of "individual," -a "self" Rho Rould value 
the benefits of cooperation, instead of personal action- is 
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particularly interesting. He increasingly plays Kith the notion of 
self-identity of the subject, present_to_himself in the knoKledge from 
his OKn personal experience as an executive -a phenomenological claim. 
At the same time, he advocates the benefits of self-in-other through 
cooperation; that is, a "lacking self" Kho requires the supplement 
"other" to be Khole and self-present. Thus, "the authenticity" of 
Barnard* s experiences are really constructed not on "self-identity" but 
on his difference from those "others" on Khom he depends to make a 
truthful claim Kith his text (e.g. Derrida, 1976; 1978). 
The above commentary serves tKo purposes: first, it marks the 
phenomenological influences in a 1930s organixational text. As the 
"scientific" orientation gained popularity in the discipline the 
phenomenological orientation was deauthorixed as "true knoKledge, " and 
Barnard became interpreted as "an early and naive effort" on the road to 
"disciplinary progress. " Second, the irony is that the "scientific 
orientation" has been unable to expunge "knoKledge through 
self-experience" (i.e. phenomenological knoKledge) from later 
organizational texts. As I Kill soon point out, the phenomenological 
claim just became "hidden" differently, Khile the discourse of 
§UDPl§0§Dtacity took center stage. 
Similar to the previous chapter, my readings Kill use historical 
contextualization to indicate hoK the discontinuities in historical 
periods affect the main text read, and render impossible the alleged 
"progress" of the organizational disciplines (in this case the possible 
"progress" of "the role of the manager"). The "cooperative subject" 
made sense in Barnard's times Kith the rise of the American "Kelfare 
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state." Hhat Hould happen to this subject Kith the return of national 
prosperity during the fifties? 
Reading the Human Side of Enterprise 
In the folloKing pages I Kill establish the context for reading 
McGregor's Kork in a format similar to the Barnard's readings. HoKever, 
here the presentation of the historical context plays a different role. 
In the previous chapter "returning" Barnard's Kork to its "time and 
place" Kas a Kay of emphasizing th§ CCQdU&tlQQ of alternative 
significations out of Kell knoKn discourses. Also, it Kas a Kay of 
pointing at the fact that no interpretation can be regarded as innocent 
or value-free. 
In the present readings I use the historical context to trace a 
movement in American society aaay from the "Kelfare state" of the 
thirties and tOKard the "social responsibility of business" in the 
fifties. It is at this time that organizational discourses start 
focusing on the manager as subject; a movement aKay from "sociologizing 
organizations" and into "psychologizing organizational participants. " 
By mid-tKentieth century it Kas clear that management and 
OKnership Kould never again go hand in hand. It Kas also clear that the 
shape of American society Kas defined through its large corporations. 
And for the first time ever, it Kas clear that government Kas Korking 
more and more through these private organizations -that the nation Kas 
a system of "corporatism" (e.g. HaKley, 1978). Thus, the "ascendancy of 
the manager," as Chandler (1977) calls this situation Khen managerial 
199 
capitalism took center stage in society, required a better definition of 
the manager role. 
The historical context Hill call attention to the dominant ideas 
betneen the end of Rorld Har II and the decade of the fifties. Kith 
this analysis I Hill shOH the importance of constituting "the manager as 
subject." It Has the appropriate technology to sustain the status of 
'truth’ at that point in time. 
HiitQrigal_Con^TfxtL_G9nir§l.Issues 
Goldman (1977) describes the years after Horld Har II as those 
Hhere American liberalism triumphed as a form of conservatism. Hhat he 
meant nas that the Truman years san an increase in general support for 
government intervention to protect and advance the standard of living. 
In this sense, the liberal support for government interference in 
private affairs Has fueled by the conservative attitude of maintaining a 
status quo of economic Hell being. 
Along these lines, the American public became prime supporters 
of Horld-Hide right ning governments and the main blockage to Communism. 
These Here also the years Hhere a large majority of the population fell 
into the middle income brackets, including farm families. And they Here 
years of regained strength in the labor movements. 
These societal changes along income groups created "status 
anxiety" ( Hofstadter, 1963) in politics. The heterogeneity and search 
for secure identity of the American population gave nay to a status 
politics expressed in vindictiveness rather than proposals for positive 
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action. For others it was a matter of "status panic." Rithin this 
period C. Rright Hills (1948; 1951; and 1956) Krote three important 
works focusing on the members of three different influential groups in 
post-war society. The first one analyzed the evolution of the American 
working class and the circumstances that made trade unions aspirants for 
a place in the national elite, rather than becoming social critics. The 
second book argued that the traditional middle class ideology of 
independence, individualism, and mobility was a mystification in the 
conditions of mid-twentieth century, where most Americans were "hired 
employees. " In the last one he examined the American upper class. He 
concluded that in spite of its "classless ideology," the main power in 
the nation was concentrated in three important elites: political 
leaders, big business executives, and military chiefs. More 
importantly, he argued that the three groups coalesced in a power elite 
which made all the important decisions pertaining to the society. 
In a somewhat related theme, Riesman (1950) focused on the 
massification of society, where he saw the majority anxious to conform 
very closely to the apparent values of the groups in which they found 
themselves. In part he attributed this conformism to the declining 
importance of work and the increasing importance of consumption and 
leisure. But he also noticed that the nature of work itself had 
changed, and that now the success in an occupation became more dependent 
on being a "well-adjusted" (i. e. conforming) person. 
The changed nature of work and the relationship between work and 
leisure became important topics of discussion during this time. The 
first topic was broadly discussed by Hhyte (1956) in the contrast 
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betKeen the Protestant ethic, Rhich stressed the values of 
individualism, hard Rork, thrift, and competition and the neR "social 
ethic” Rhich stressed the importance of the group and the value of 
belonginess. This neR ethic is embodied by the business executive and 
his loyalty to the business corporation. All his life-style is defined 
by his loyalty to a situation Rhich, Hhyte suggests, resembles 
feudalism: the clearly delineated ranks of the corporation, and the 
closed-quarters contemplation of these small Rorlds. Fromm (1955), on 
the other hand, saR group conformity as an escape from the burdens of 
freedom Rhere "man regresses to a receptive and marketing orientation 
and ceases to be productive; ... he loses his sense of self, becomes 
dependent on approval, hence tends to conform and yet to feel insecure; 
he is dissatified, bored and anxious..." (op. cit.: 270). 
The change of social orientation from Rork to leisure Ras a 
topic addressed by Riesman, Rho saR it as an issue requiring some 
creative thinking on hoR to occupy the free time liberated from Rorking 
time, and also by tRo other influential thinkers of the decade: Arendt 
(1958) and Galbraith (1958). The first one presented the pessimistic 
outlook of a society of laborers Rithout labor, unable to develop of 
other meaningful activities beyond Rork itself. HoRever Galbraith, is 
fairly optimistic. He sees the affluence of the nation as the natural 
development of an economic groRth Rhich Rill continue. This affluence 
alloRs a decrease in the production of consumer goods, Rith Rhich 
society is already oversatisfied. Consequently, there could be 
increased free time, or a reduction in the number of people Rho Rork, or 
attempts to make Rork easier and more pleasant, or development of the 
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occupations that are already found enjoyable because they call for 
intelligence and skills. 
This Has the general situation of the time, where affluence, 
conformity, additional leisure time, and a new large managerial/middle 
class dominated the discourses of society. It is worth paying attention 
to the rhetoric of "wellness" at the core of most these discourses. It 
is a rhetoric which dealt with the creation of "individuality" for the 
socialized largest group in society -the "new" middle classs. 
Historical Con/Tezt: Business Issues 
To talk about "business issues" during the fifties as a separate 
historical category from other issues in society can be very misleading. 
As can be gathered from the above, general societal concerns were 
increasingly tied to business concerns (in all its double meaning) and 
economic issues. This sentiment is captured by Bottomore when he 
exclaims after analyzing Rhyte's text: 
"Is there no difference between the kinds of loyalty which 
may be expected toward different organizations; between 
loyalty to a nation, a class, a church, an academic 
community, or a business concern? Is there no difference 
between organizations in the degree of conformity which they 
expect or exact? Is not one of the major problems revealed 
by Ihe_QraoiSii^lQn_M§d simply that a particular 
organization, the business firm, which should be merely an 
instrument, has set itself up in the United States as a way 
of life and a source of ultimate values?" (1966: 84). 
To understand this situation it will be important to reiterate 
that after Rorld Rar II it became clear that the "pastoral powers" 
assumed by the government during the thirties were being transferred to 
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private interests. Economic expansion (real GNP rose by 52% between 
1945 and 1960) and price stability (consumer prices rose only 25% 
between 1950 and 1962) indicate that the strongest economy in the world 
belonged to the United States between the 1950*s and 60's. For a 
society which, as we already commented in chapter two, had economic 
development as its primary value, any "institutional order" seen as 
responsible for economic "miracles" was likely to earn a "pledge of 
allegiance. " There is no doubt that private enterprise played the main 
role in post-war economic growth. How this happened is indicated by the 
importance that the following five interrelated business/management 
activities acquired during the fifties; (1) the growth of manufacturing 
and production; (2) the increase of service industries; (3) the 
re-structuring of big businesses; (4) the emphasis on consumer 
marketing; and ( 5) the expansion of world markets ( Blackford and Kerr, 
1986). 
The return to civilian production in the manufacturing 
industries put in consumer’s hands a vast array of durable goods that 
had been scarce during the Depression and Har years. Consumer 
purchasing power was strong due to the combination of full employment 
and vast scarcity during the previous years. Cars, television sets, and 
household appliances became accesible consumer goods. Emphasis in 
manufacturing and production was accompanied by aggressive marketing 
techniques which made the desirability of fashionable products (e. g. 
annual changes in automobile models) and comfort (i.e. air conditioning) 
a expectation on the part of consumers. 
Manufacturing became the identifying tag of "big business" while 
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the groRth in service industries became often associated Kith smaller 
entrepreneurs. HoKever, the large organizations continued to grow 
larger through strategies of decentralization and diversification. This 
time they took three different routes: through internal technological 
developments into related fields; by purchasing other companies Khich 
complemented existing technologies; by purchasing other companies Khich 
had similar channels of distribution for similar markets. In each of 
these cases the diversified companies tended to maintain decentralized 
operations. 
In spite of the Cellar-Kefauver Act of 1950, Khich had placed 
limitations on the vertical and horizontal integration typical of 
diversification, "big business" Kas alive and Kell. By the end of the 
decade the "bigness syndrome" became even stronger through the 
appearance of the first conglomerates. 
Another neK type of business Khich appeared in this decade, the 
franchise, offered opportunities for small entrepreneurs. These big 
"small businesses" combined fairly lOK-investment accesibility Kith the 
umbrella of "national big names" and standardized services and products. 
Finally, as if national markets Kere not enough to sustain the 
"productive push" of the decade, the KorldKide markets Kere there for 
the taking. Multinational operations increased during these years Kith 
neK management structures. Rather than separating the international 
divisions from "home" operations, as has previously been traditional in 
companies serving international markets, the neK "cosmopolitan 
management structure" came about. In this case the top operating 
management of domestic products divisions took over the responsibility 
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for their products* international business. Another new structure, the 
multifunctional, gave equal status to the international and domestic 
divisions. In either structure it was clear that top management had 
become more involved in Horldwide operations. 
Two trends appeared in these years' political economy: The 
Office of the President became more involved in preserving American 
capitalism; and business appeared to reduce the poRer of organized 
labor. The government took the responsibility of managing the overall 
level of prosperity chartering in 1946 the Council of Economic Advisers 
together Kith the Employment and Production Act. From here on the 
professional economist became an important figure in government circles 
but the national Chamber of Commerce played an equally influential role. 
In 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act made clear that the government Ranted to 
preserve management prerogatives from labor intervention. Nonetheless, 
if the groRth of organized labor Ras not dramatic after the Rar, there 
is no doubt that groups already organized participated in the increased 
national prosperity. 
The government/business partnership in progress appeared in many 
other forms. For example, the liberalization of foreign trade after the 
Rar helped the groRth of multinational corporations as Rell as the 
disposal in foreign markets of farm surpluses; the creation of the 
military-industrial complex reshaped the relationships of technology 
developers, business corporations, and the military. The Defense 
department became an important source of funding for scientific and 
engineering research in firms and universities, Rhile over half the 
prime military contracts Rent to the fifty largest corporations in the 
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country. And public funds stimulated employment in road constructions, 
but it had the main aim of satisfying the requirements of business firms 
seeking a more efficient trucking industry. 
There is no doubt that national prosperity and government 
support Rere important influences in improving "big business' image" in 
America after 1945 to a population Hhich Has before nary and suspicious 
of its meaning for the Hell-being of society. Blackford and Kerr 
indicate another important influence in altering this image: 
"The production miracles of Horld Har II did much to 
restore public faith in the business system, but the fact 
that the executives of the large corporations Here a 
self-selected elite Hhose poners and privileges lay hidden 
from vieH accounted for the second main direction of public 
relations, to impress upon the public the notion that the 
large corporations Here socially responsible. . . Big 
business required individuals to fit into the complex maze 
of organization charts, and big businessmen Hielded poner 
through committees and other group activities. The 
large-scale organization did not seem to renard the 
individualism American traditionally admired, but public 
relations efforts helped the American public to adjust to 
the institutional realities of big business. .."( 1986: 
431-432). 
Hoh to understand nithin this context Ihe__Huroan_Side_of 
Enteprise? As in the previous chapter, ne Hill see non hoH appropriate 
is this book as exemplar discourse of its time. 
Let's remember, from chapter tno, that these Here the years of 
the "Foundation reports" (Gordon and Honell, 1959 (Ford Foundation); 
Pierson, 1959 [Carnegie Foundation)). They Here also the years nhen the 
first properly academic management journal Has founded, and the years 
Hhen the Academy of Management Has defining its separation from "the 
practitioner. " These Here the years of making the discipline rigorous 
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and the practice professional. Implicit in these explorations were 
questions about the relationship betfieen education and the nell being of 
the economy. As indicated through Bell’s (1976) discussion in chapter 
three, these Here the years Hhen to be funded one must have shonn the 
relationship betneen scientific/technological endeavors and the strength 
of the economy and society. 
In such a society the discourses of "truth and knonledge," and 
the sustenance of the systems in.poner are intimately related. Their 
articulation depends on the possibility of constituting a particular 
individual subject; one in nhom that truth and poner gets enacted. 
McGregor’s Hork is analyzed as one exemplar of constituting the subject 
Hhich sustain the ”truth/poner" of society tijrough the organizational 
disciplines. 
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Hegenionyt Truth> and The Pastoral Subject 
In the foIloKing paragraphs I discuss some ideas developed by 
Foucault (1978, 1979, 1983) and discussed by Smart (1986). My interest 
here is to delineate the relationship betseen the concept of hegemony, 
the status of truth, and the notion of the subject as proposed before. 
This discussion sill be helpful in understanding the constitution of the 
organizational subject as a technology to sustain poMer/knoHledge in the 
organizational sciences. 
My readings stress these relationships by interspersing comments 
from McGregor (1960) throughout the discussion. At certain points I 
Kill also insert commentaries from Galbraith (1958), a text contemporary 
Kith McGregor's but Khich makes almost the opposite arguments. It is 
interesting to notice that McGregor’s arguments folloKed the acceptable 
ideas of society at the time. He articulated the discourses for Khich 
there already Kere conditions of possibilities. Galbraith, on the other 
hand, Kas bringing a set of "fresh ideas" Khich Kere not folloKed. 
McGregor Kas a_voice, repeating the signs already there. Galbraith 
attempted to inscribe a neK Kriting and failed. But perhaps he kneK 
from the start Khose Kere the hegemonic discourses. He said: 
"Scholarly discourse, like bullfighting and 
classical ballet, has its OKn rules and they must be 
respected. In this arena nothing counts so heavily against 
a man as to be found attacking the values of the public at 
large and seeking to substitute his OKn. Technically his 
crime is arrogance. Actually it is ignorance of the rules. 
In any case he is automatically removed from the game. In 
the past this has been a common error of those Kho have 
speculated on the sanctity of present economic goals. . . " 
(:350). 
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Hegeaony 
Traditionally hegemony has been interpreted as the domination of one 
individual, group, class, or nation over another. In more modern terms, 
Gramsci associates the notion of hegemony (in the sense of direction or 
leadership) as one of force/consent betneen the state and other 
organizations in society and the members of that society. (Mouffe and 
Laclau, 1985) Hith Focault this notion attains still another 
definition. 
According to Smart, for Foucault hegemony resides in the various 
complex social techniques and methods fundamental to the achievement of 
a particular type of relationship in society. In this sense: 
"Hegemony contributes to or constitutes a form of 
social cohesion not through force or coercion, not 
necessarily through consent, but most effectively by nay of 
practices, techniques, and methods Hhich infiltrate minds 
and bodies, cultural practices Hhich cultivate behaviours 
and beliefs, tastes, desires, and needs as seemingly 
naturally occurring qualities and properties embodied in the 
psychic and physical reality (or 'truth') of the human 
subject" (1986: 160) 
Thus, the hegemonic orientation prevails not by overt domination 
or resigned acceptance but by naturalization. By a general recognition 
that "this is the iray things are, and they cannot be any other way. " It 
is the constitution of the relationship "truth/power. " 
And Hhat does McGregor have to say?: 
"Industry. . . is the economic organ of society, of 
all of us. Its ultimate purpose is to serve the common 
good" (:24). 
"It is natural to expect management to be committed 
to the economic objectives of the industrial organization. 
However, the history of social legislation has indicated 
that society will grant management freedom in its pursuit of 
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these objectives only to the extent that human values are 
preserved and protected. Professions like medicine, 
education, and Ian in general maintain high ethical 
standards aith respect to the influences they exert on human 
beings. In directing the human resources of the industrial 
organization, management is in a similar position. Here, as 
elseRhere in our society, the price of freedom is 
responsibility" (:13-14). 
Observe here the "naturalization” of industry as the organ of 
common good. More striking, observe how the relationship between 
management and the other technologies of the subject (medicine,... etc.) 
are established through a rhetoric of responsibility over mind and 
bodies. 
Galbraith has a counterpoint here, which the hegemonic 
orientation is likely to ignore as "merely an intellectual position: ” 
"The trend toward increased leisure is not 
reprehensible, but we resist vigorously the notion that a 
man should work less hard while on the job. Here older 
attitudes are involved. He are gravely suspicious of any 
tendency to expend less than maximum effort, for this has 
long been a prime economic virtue" (:336). 
Truth 
From the above, then, we can say that hegemony cannot be 
constituted unless "truth" is established, since the truth is what is 
Ditural. Foucault analyses what he calls "the regime of truth. " He 
studies "true discourses" which rationalize and legitimate particular 
courses of action upon the actions of self and others. Central in this 
analyses has been his recognition that in modern Hestern society there 
has been a scientific hierarchization of knowledge. That is another way 
of saying that what is true or false has become more dependent on 
whether what is said is recognized as scientific discourse or not. A 
consequence from that is the disqualification as "true discourses" of 
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loR-ranking knoMledge; that is, local and popular knowledge. 
This point is of particular importance in this project. As I 
indicated before, and demonstrated with the readings of Barnard* s work, 
discourses are extremely flexible things. If "truth" is embodied in 
"true discourses" something beyond the_words must contribute to its 
stability as "truth. " It is Foucault* s position that there is a 
political economy of truth. In other words, that what counts as truth 
depends on economic/political demand and supply. Under the aegis of 
"science," "truth" is associated with specific institutions and 
discoursive forms: produced and transmitted by the universities, the 
military, scientific journals, and media in general; diffused and 
consumed through education and information. But all this depends on 
people believing it. 
Let* s observe the construction of "true discourses" in 
McGregor* s words. Notice how these discourses play on the hegemonic 
notions already discussed -they sustain one another- and how they 
stress the hierarchization of "true knowledge: ** 
"Discussions of the idea of controlling human 
behavior raise justifiable apprehensions about possible 
manipulation and exploitation. These concerns are not new, 
but they will be intensified as the manager becomes more 
professional in his use of the social science knowledge to 
achieve the objectives of economic enterprise..." (:12). 
"Every professional is concerned with the use of 
knowledge in the achievement of objectives... The 
professional draws upon the knowledge of science and of his 
colleagues, and upon knowledge gained through personal 
experience. The degree to which he relies upon the first 
two of these rather than the third is one of the ways in 
which the professional may be distinguished from the 
layman.... It is beginning to be possible for the industrial 
manager to be a professional in this respect. He can draw 
upon a reasonable and growing body of knowledge in the 
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social sciences as an aid to achieving his managerial 
objectives. He need not rely exclusively on personal 
experience and observation. . . Progress in any profession is 
associated Rith the ability to predict and control, and this 
is true also of industrial management. One of the major 
tasks of management is to organize human effort in the 
service of economic objectives of the enterprise" (:3). 
But Galbraith also has something to say about the "true 
discourses": 
".. . one of the oldest and most effective 
obfuscations in the field of social science... is the effort 
to assert that all Rork -physical, mental, artistic, or 
managerial- is essentially the same" (:340) 
The Pastoral Subject 
Thus, Rho Rill sustain a society based on "natural hegemony" and 
"scientific truth”? The ansRer for Foucault emerged in macro-societal 
changes: Rhen states refrained from "taking life" and started to 
"foster life." That is, a change from absolute monarchical poRers to 
the emergence of industrial capitalism. In the latter case neR forms of 
poRer exercised over life -anatomo-politics of the human body and 
bio-politics of the population- became distinctive features of modern 
society. 
"These tRo forms of poRer are directed respectively 
to the cultivation of more 'useful* and 'docile* individuals 
and to the administration or management of populations, 
ultimately through measures described as social Rhich since 
the end of the nineteenth century have centred on the issues 
of industrial accidents, unemployment, sickness and old age, 
on questions of assistance and prevention, on questions of 
Rorkers* demands, of promotion and leisure." (1986: 161). 
"True knoRledge" becomes then that Rhich Rill enhance the 
psychic and physical reality of the individual; and the poRerful 
institutions become those Rhich Rill foster human Rell being. In modern 
society that is the poRer/knoRledge relationships Rhich alloR human 
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beings to recogniee themselves as subjects. 
Thus, the modern "state" is not a monolitical force nhich 
confronts the individual from above but a "matrix of individualization. " 
The apparently diverse institutions of modern society sustain similar 
discourses Hhich determines Hhat counts as "individuality. " Through 
measures directed to the health, nell-being, security, protection, and 
development of the individual, this pastoral poner over the social has 
become progressively less the function of government and more of other 
dominant institutions in society. 
McGregor's work shoRS the progressive "pastoralization" of the 
management subject. Notice hoR the discourse of management "Rellness" 
ends up being a discourse of "self-control," Rhich is an extreme 
"individualizing" strategy. The available "discourses of psychology" 
made it possible for management: 
"Under today* s conditions management has provided 
relatively Rell for the satisfaction of physiological and 
safety needs. The standard of living in our country is 
high; people do not suffer major deprivation of their 
physiological needs except during periods of severe 
unemployment. Even then, the social legislation developed 
since the thirties cushions the shock" (:41). 
"He have learned that as a society Re can have more 
of everything Re Rant by specializing individually. 
HoRever, the price of specialization is dependence on 
others. . . GroRing up and learning to live in this complex of 
interdependent relationships is not Rithout its emotional 
conflicts. Our contrary emotional needs and anxieties are 
profoundly influential" (:27). 
"The concept of integration and self-control carries 
the implication that the organization Rill be more effective 
in achieving its economic objectives if adjustments are 
made, in significant Rays, to the needs and goals of its 
members" (:50). 
"Theory T points to the possibility of lessening the 
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emphasis on external forms of control to the degree that 
commitment to organixational objectives can be achieved" 
(:56). 
Of course, the above is sustained by a hegemonic fiction: 
"The expenditure of physical and mental effort in 
Kork is as natural as play or rest" (:47). 
But not everybody believes it. In Galbraith's words: 
"Over the span of man's history, although a 
phenomenal amount of education, persuasion, indoctrination, 
and incantation have been devoted to the effort, ordinary 
people have never been quite persuaded that toil is as 
agreeable as its alternatives" (:335). 
To summarize, according to this analysis the dominant ideas in 
society are supported by that which counts as truth. In modern society 
truth has been increasingly associated with "scientific discourses. " 
The value of these discourses is enacted in a political economy 
throughout a "network" of institutions in society. However, the 
"institutional power" and "discursive truths" must be centered on 
individual and social "wellness" before it is "natural" for 
"individuals" to become subjects of these structures. As a corollary, 
it is not until a discipline has defined its subject in those terms that 
it can sustain its power/knowledge. 
Foucault's objective was to create a history of the different 
modes by which human beings in Hestern culture are made subjects. Hy 
readings of McGregor's work are the story of one of those modes: the 
objectification/subjectification of the management subject. 
In these readings I show the appearance of the management 
subject as we still know it today. McGregor's work enacts the approved 
version of the "disciplinary subject. " My readings highlight that which 
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still sustains acceptable Hork in organizational behavior. Re have 
become more "scientific and sophisticated, " but this Hork marked the 
road He could travel. The principle of integration behind Theory Y nas 
"hoH to integrate the discipline. " It created a compendium nhich soon 
thereafter became defined as "organizational sciences." 
First, it established the site of scientific knonledge in the 
discipline and the relationship betneen "scientific Hork" at the 
university and "professional Hork" in the Horkplace. More interesting, 
hoHever, is to notice certain subtleties in the text nhich further 
define the relationship betneen the inside/outside, theory/practice as 
one of interdependence. In many nays this text deconstructs itself 
around this issue. That is, even though the text creates the impression 
that it is counseling managers on Hhat to do Kith their industrial 
Horkers, the fact is that most examples used and recommendations for 
"testing the theory" focus on Khite collar, managerial personnel, nhich 
Has clearly a groning class. Thus, from this perspective Hhat the text 
is stressing is the control through "self-control" that McGregor has 
over the managers, the most likely consumers of this Hork. His text 
secures the continuation of this relationship. 
He says, for example; 
"A number of applications of Theory Y in managing 
managers and professional people are possible today. Rithin 
the managerial hierarchy, the assumptions can be tested and 
refined, the techniques can be invented and skill acquired 
in their use. as knonledge accumulates, some of the 
problems of application at the Horker level in large 
organizations may appear less baffling than they do at 
present" (:55). 
"It is not important that management accept the 
assumptions of Theory Y. These are one man's 
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interpretations of current social science knoKledge, and 
they Kill be modified. . . It is important that management 
abandon limiting assumptions like those of Theory X. . , " 
(:245). 
. . fsi_qC_us achieve that degree of emotional 
maturity Khich makes us able to accept dependence Kith 
complete objectivity. Dependent relationships are sensitive 
ones" (: 27 [my emphasis)). 
Second, hoK to understand the devaluation of experience as a 
source of knoKledge (remember Barnard?) Khile scientific and 
professional knoKledge is stressed? If Ke remember the "Foundation 
reports" it Kas clear that the "age of vocationalism" in management 
education had ended. These Kere important years for structuring the 
difference of being "an academician in administration. " For example: 
"Management is constantly becoming disillusioned 
Kith Kidely touted and expertly merchandized "neK 
approaches" to the human side of enterprise. The real 
difficulty is that these neK approaches are no more than 
different tactics -programs, procedures, gadgets- Kithin 
an unchanged strategy..." (:42). 
He must not forget that science and technology had primacy of 
funding in the universities. McGregor’s text provides a scientific 
technology of the most common subject in society at the time: the 
manager; and guarantees for himself a source of funding. He says: 
"Some years ago during a meeting of the Advisory 
Committee of MIT's School of Industrial Management, Alfred 
Sloan raised some questions related to the issue of Khether 
successful managers are born or made. I Kas aaare -as he 
Kas- that his questions Kere not easily ansKered. The 
discussion, hoKever, served to sharpen certain interests I 
had had for some time in a systematic examination of the 
many common but inconsistent assumptions of Khat make a 
manager... In 1954 the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation made a 
grant to Alex Bavelas and me to explore some of these ideas 
more fully" (: v). 
HoKever, Khat is the difference betKeen Barnard’s and McGregor’s 
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claims to knoRledge? Basically the discoursive "truth” (personal 
experience vs. science). McGregor's text still depends on "the author’s 
presence and experience," in this case his experience as a scientist 
versus "the layman." Notice his strategic scorn of "charlatans, " and 
his frequent comparison of "the social sciences" with engineering, 
medicine, and physics. McGregor provokes a sense of deja-vu. Tonne's 
(1886) and Hotchkiss’(1918) expectations nere not quite fulfilled by the 
late 1950s: 
".. . the position of the manager vis-a-vis the social 
sciences Hill one day be no different than that of the 
engineer vis-a-vis the physical sciences or the doctor 
vis-a-vis chemistry or biology. The professional need not 
be a scientist, but he must be sophisticated enough to make 
competent use of scientific knoHledge" (: 5). 
"The frequent success of the outright charlatan in 
peddling managerial patent medicine also reflects the 
consciousness of inadequacy" (:4). 
Third, this Hork is very explicit about a distressing 
consequence of abundance: the lost of authority over "the individual," 
as Hell as the lost of individualism. The understandings that came 
about to regain control over the subject Has a technology of 
"individualixing" the mass. For example, it Has comfortable to be able 
to recognize "stages of development," "hierarchy of needs," the 
possibility of management by objectives, role complexity, and testing 
individual "abilities." Thus, this text provides the hope of regaining 
prediction and control over the individual based on increasing 
differentiation of the managed: 
"Every managerial decision has behavioral 
consequences. Successful management depends -not alone, 
but significantly- upon the ability to predict and control 
human behavior" (:4). 
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"The results so far achieved in the management of 
business and industry reflects considerable ability to 
predict and control human behavior. The fact that a company 
is economically successful means, among other things, that 
management has been able to attract people into the 
organization and to organize and direct their efforts toward 
the production and sale of goods or services at a profit" 
(: 4). 
Fourth, related to the above, different from previous 
"management" texts which put more emphasis on functions and structure of 
management, or the macro aspect of organization, this work centers on 
the importance of each individual for maintaining economic well being 
-and even for preventing political revolutions. This "psychologizing" 
of society in discourses that stress the naturalness of economic 
objectives, and the sickness of those who do not contribute to such 
objectives ( Barnard also called sick those unable to cooperate) define 
the administrative discourses of "wellness:" 
"Political revolutions often grow out of thwarted 
social and ego, as well as physiological needs" (:38). 
"The man whose needs for safety, association, 
independence, or status are thwarted is sick, just as surely 
as is he who has rickets. And his sickness will have 
behavioral consequences. Re will be mistaken if we 
attribute his resultant passivity, or his hostility, or his 
refusal to accept responsibility to his inherent "human 
nature. " These forms of behavior are symptoms of illness 
- of deprivation of his social and egoistic needs" (:39) 
"...we will have to abandon the idea that individual 
and group values are necessarily opposed, that the latter 
can only be realized at the expense of the former. If we 
would look to the family, we might recognize the 
possibilities inherent in the opposite point of view" 
(:240). 
This latter quote is very relevant because it stresses the group 
and the family as "individualizing" opportunities. The definition of 
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the family as responsible for "creating and sustaining individuals," 
rather than as a societal unit per se, is a major critique of the 
discourses of modernity (e. g. Venn, 1984). 
Finally, the text also illustrate the optimism of the times in 
believing that the road to progress had not only been found forever, but 
that any societal change in the future Hould only be of a qualitative 
nature ( upnard of course). It is almost as if the announced Hegelian 
end of history had been found. Rhile the irork recognizes that the 
proposed "technologies" are required due to historical changes in the 
nature of society, it ignores the possibility of other discontinuities, 
Hhich could render a technology of the individual obsolete. This latter 
issue has almost guaranteed the "permanence of the subject" in the 
management disciplines: 
"If He don’t destroy life on this planet before ne 
discover hoH to make possible for man to utilize his 
abilities to create a Horld in Hhich he can live in peace, 
it is possible that the next half century Hill bring the 
most dramatic social changes in human history" (:244-245). 
"I believe that the industrial enterprise is a 
microcosm Hithin Hhich some of the most basic of these 
social changes Hill be invented, tested and refined. . . The 
fundamental difficulty is that ne have not yet learned 
enough about organizing and managing the human resources of 
enterprise" (:245). 
Barnard entered "pastoral poner" into management discourses, but 
it Has HcGregor Hho developed a clear technology of the subject. As the 
previous discussion illustrates, this is the story of a mode of making 
human beings into subjects, the most common human beings in Restern 
society: the organizational management subject. And Hho can resist a 
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little Barnardian discourse here?: 
"And, if Ke can learn hoH to realize the potential 
for collaboration inherent in the human resources of 
industry, we Rill provide a model for governments and 
nations Rhich mankind sorely needs" (Last three lines of Ihe 
Human_§ide_o£_Enterprisg:246). 
The next chapter shoRS the further institutionalization of the 
"organizational subject" in the face of radical changes in society. 
The hegemony of this modern subject, of such late creation, Ras not 
going to expire in the threshold of postmodernity. The road "toRard 
progress" is paved Rith the rhetoric of his "staying poRer. " 
CHAPTER VI 
RITHOUT APOLOGY: THE NATURE OF MANAGERIAL HORK 
Hhat He "traditionally" call theoretical nork in the 
organizational disciplines -nhich at this point I should reiterate 
seems like a very recent "tradition"- tends to enunciate an accepted 
idea and either extend or refute it nith "nen developments. " The Hork I 
have done so far in this dissertation has strayed from that "traditional 
path. " I have not claimed a theoretical position from nhich I Hork to 
overturn or extend previous theory because the first thing I am 
questioning is precisely the issue of "doing theory. " I am starting 
from a position that asks: Hhat are ne non? and problematizes all that 
is "natural" for us to do. 
In chapter tno I presented an account of the 
institutionalization of the organizational disciplines. My purpose Has 
to indicate hoH the birth and development of the modern practice of 
education and "knonledge creation" is co-articulated nith other 
practices of their time, Hhich contribute conditions of possibility for 
the discourses of this one, or any other, educational discipline. In 
chapter three ' discussed hoH scholars in fields other than management 
are critiquing the current institutional "production of knonledge. " 
These critiques illustrate hoH questioning Hhat has appeared as natural 
activities in the universities belongs to current discoursive formations 
that are announced as postmodernity. That is, Hhat I am doing here is 
not just a postmodern critique of our institutional production of 
221 
knoKledge. I am stating, further, that critiquing the institutional 
production of knowledge is a postmodern issue. It is from this 
position that my work can make some sense: when the normal modern 
practices get to be questioned in their "normalization." 
For that questioning to occur, however, one must stand somewhere 
else, outside those normal modern practices. The ideas of postmodernity 
discussed in chapter three provide a place to re-cast the natural in not 
so natural terms. Thus, I can understand the difficulties that may 
arise for any reader who expects to find the normal development of a 
dissertation work in management in this dissertation, since I am trying 
to stay away from it. For example, if I had said at the beginning 
"These are Foucault’s theories and methods -(and explain them)- and 
they support the theories and methods I advance here, " I would have 
been doing exactly the natural. I would have claimed "Foucault* s truth" 
as my truth to develop "a logical argument" for the "knowledge" I am 
"advancing" here. In so doing I would have fallen exactly in the place 
from where I am trying to escape: I would have done "the normal. " And 
then it would have been possible for others to do "Foucault" in a 
"normal management way;" I would have "painted" a "realist Foucault" 
that would have little to do with Foucault, and a lot with "normal 
management." Because "normal management" belongs to an order of 
discourse, to a moment of modernity, that does not and cannot include 
"Foucault." And I am re-iterating this point since some of Foucault’s 
statements could be used in support of some "normal critiques" inside 
management discourses. To "do" Foucault fQr_management one must come 
out of management. 
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That is, an important part of doiog this dissertation has been 
precisely the_doing. It is an attempt at practicing theory in a 
postmodern sense. Thus, its content is Rhat it is -questioning hOH ne 
have created our disciplinary practices, hoR Re have represented them, 
because that kind of content is a postmodern concern. But questioning 
that concern also needed to be done differently, represented in a 
different Ray, Rhich included re-casting representations of the 
organizational discourses, of our modes of doing organizational theory, 
as Re have understood them to this point. 
My attempt §t_doing Barnard in chapter four is an illustration 
of some different modes of representation. In that chapter I Ras 
questioning hOR Re came to the agreement that Barnard’s Rork provides 
theoretical developments applicable to any particular organization 
-Rhich is one Ray to understand hoR Re have created one particular 
instance of the discipline. But I Ras questioning it &y_doing_BacD§Cd 
in a "different mode." I Ras illustrating the flexibility of 
discoursive activities Rhich have permitted us to maintain "Barnard" 
in/for "the tradition of the discipline. " It Ras a demonstration of the 
Derridian notion of "iteration of the signifier" Rhich, at the same 
time, introduced the problematics of this issue into our "normal" Rork. 
Notice that on Rorking through these ideas I set my oRn Rork in a 
position Rhich cannot claim stable meanings Cqc_  cannot 
propose my interpretations as a different theory about Barnard's Rork. 
But I can propose the possibility of ® different 
mode (e.g. alternative readings over "our classics" Rhich "make present" 
QUrrSD&.CQSSli^ili^iSS in the discipline). 
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If chapter four focused on the problematics of signifiyng Kith 
discourses, of "making meaning" Kith signs -a kind of thing that can 
be created for and attached to any other thing- chapter five focused 
more intently on the conditions of possibility of discourses. That is, 
on noticing hoK discourses are involved Kith, are materials in, other 
conditions of their time and place. I Kanted to mark hoK "meaning" is 
achieved by analyzing the functioning of discourse in the production of 
the social and material "life" of "the modern individual/subject. " This 
Kas illustrated by Korking Kith McGregor* s text. In this case 
McGregor* s Kas an exemplar of "humanistic" discourses inside 
organizational texts. These Kere discourses of the social context at 
those times, and it Kas "natural" to have them as part of "a neKer, 
revitalized scientific discipline, ** Khich may not have been articulated 
Kithout them (i.e. the important psychologizing discourses of the 
fifties legitimized and provided further definition for the role of 
organizational management, inside and outside the university). 
On noticing this co-articulation of McGregor* s discourses Kith 
other practices of society at his time I Kas also calling attention to 
the struggles of "this field of knoKledge" to demarcate its legitimacy. 
From this perspective Ke can further propose that our practice of theory 
for the past tKenty-five years or so has been part of a local struggle. 
The struggle to maintain a poKerful site for our disciplinary 
discourses. 
At this point I also Kant to make explicit that the struggle 
expressed here stays aKay from totalizing discourses either from the 
right or the left. I am not implying "struggle" as if it Kere a 
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concerted activity of one group or class against another. As I Kill 
further argue in the concluding chapter, these struggles -a 
"discoursive politics"- is neither politics of discourse nor political 
discourse. 
This chapter is an illustration of that discoursive politics. I 
Kill discuss hoK the conditions of the sixties and early seventies could 
di-articulate the organizational discourses, Khich Kere then attaining 
their "scientific" stability. Mintzberg's Kork can be read as one 
instance of the struggle in the discipline to strengthen that position. 
Hhat is interesting is its complete focus on and devotion to defining 
the unified subject of the discipline: a "free standing" subject that 
depends only on his actions for his existence. The perfect intentional 
actor, predicated as rational even in his irrationality. A manager Kho, 
different from McGregor’s manager, does not depend on his relationship 
to others to be Kho he is. For example, the interdependent relationship 
management/managed Khich articulated McGregor’s discourses is 
transformed into one of the purposes for Mintzberg’s manager. The 
latter’s manager does not need the_managed to be Kho he is. He is the 
diCiOiP o€ Kho the managed can be. As I Kill discuss next, to theorize 
a condition of interdependence betKeen manager/managed could have been a 
dangerous stance to take in the late 60s. 
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Reading The Nature of Managerial Rork 
Reading Mintzberg in the context of the sixties and early 
seventies is a fascinating enterprise. Any "straight" management text 
read against the grain of the counterculture movement is likely to show 
a stark absence of sensitivity to such an "environment. " However, 
probably no other text could illustrate better than Ihe_Nature_of 
di0i9§ri§l_HQr!< organizational disciplines' trends toward separation 
from the rest of society at that point in time -nor could any other 
text illustrate better the internal disciplinary struggles that were 
then unfolding. 
He must remember first that Mintzberg was a student during the 
sixties, and that his book was developed from his doctoral dissertation, 
completed in 1968. From this, wouldn't it be possible to ask what kind 
of mark the sixties left in this text? Keren't those the years of 
student revolts? Could one have been a student in a major American 
campus at that time and not be touched by the counterculture? Could 
silence about the social issues of the sixties in a late sixties text be 
anything but an overt mechanism of exclusion, especially when the text 
deals primarily with a social image -capitalist management- which 
was widely implicated in the issues of those times? 
The '68 dissertation [what a year for a Quebecois to have 
completed this dissertation! Remember May '68 in France?] "inspired" 
the first printing of the book in 1973. The edition I am working from 
is the 1979 reprint. I want to digress for a minute here and come back 
to the significance of this second reprint. 
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The first part 
taken from Sayres et al. 
introduction the editors 
of this chapter's title (Hit6QUt_Apology) was 
(notice, 1984) Ihe_60s_HitllQUt_Apology. In the 
state: 
"The 60s is merely the name ne give to a disruption 
of late-capitalism ideological and political hegemony, to a 
disruption of the bourgeois dream of unproblematic 
production, of everyday life as the bureaucratic society of 
controlled consumption, of the end of history. . . In the 60s, 
the anti-Kork ethic Has thus introduced. . . "Free time" 
replaced the pride of the craft upon which the trade union 
and laborist tradition had been built. 
...The 60s also saw the emergence of new historical 
subjects, or at least groups that constituted themselves as 
subjects on the basis, for instance of sex and race. Having 
formed social movements, these subjects contested 
institutional spaces but also declared a sort of 
counterhegemony to the dominant social and ideological 
power. . . The women* s movement played with the language of 
domination and imposed on American society a bi-gender 
pronoun convention (his/her) to replace the ordinary 
masculine usage. . . 
Blacks, as opposed to Negroes, were of course 
another new subject, constituted on the foundation of an 
older black nationalism... A new vocabulary followed. 
Afro-American became the sign of militant identity. . . 
The 60s was also a time when new global perceptions 
permeated public discourse. It was the first time in this 
century that anti-imperialist protest came to dominate the 
overall political agenda of the nation; the global 
domination of capital was challenged from within on a more 
serious scale than ever before. . . the first time that 
discrimination based on circumstances of birth (such as 
race) became the object of political contestation at global 
level.. 
reflecting the radical displacement in those 
years of homogeneity itself, we make no claim that ours is a 
complete account. He put this work before the reader in the 
form of an intervention, and we do so without apology" 
(1984: 2-9). 
Did Mintzberg have anything to say in 1979 about his 1973 
(1968's inspired) book? His book only uses masculine pronouns to refer 
to "the manager," or any other subject of its interest for that matter. 
Homen, Blacks, the EEO are never separatedly or specifically 
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acknowledged as relevant issues in the workplace. The only more 
explicit reference to any of these, by then recent, major social changes 
is made in pages 184-185 (out of a total 198 pages in the book) by 
saying: 
"Any organizational unit exists because certain 
people ("influencers") created it and others are prepared to 
support it. To the managers falls the difficult task of 
keeping this coalition of influencers together. . . people are 
increasingly seeking greater freedom in, and control of, 
their workplaces. . . Hence, the manager will have to face a 
new set of influences, this time from below. The coalition 
will be broadened with some power given to the employees who 
work for him. . . The coalition is being attacked from the 
outside as well. Rhere once businessmen could seek to 
satisfy only shareholders, and university presidents could 
answer primarily to trustees, today they must react to a 
diverse array of influencers. Indeed, the top managers of 
large corporations are becoming more and more like political 
leaders, engaged in balancing acts among pressure groups of 
every conceivable kind. It will not help the manager to 
question the legitimacy of these demands. . . Social issues 
come to the forefront —pollution, treatment of minority 
groups, attitudes toward consumers. Rhere power is 
concentrated, as it is in the large corporation, there is a 
natural tendency for people to analyze its use and to expect 
it to be applied explicitly for the public good. 
The influence of this trend on the top manager’s job 
will be profound. He will be forced to give more attention 
to the external roles, liaison, spokeman, and figurehead, in 
order to maintain rapport with various pressure groups, and 
to the negotiator role in order to deal with their 
conflicting demands..." 
Did Mintzberg have in 1979 any apologies for his 1973 blandness, 
avoidance of profound social issues, or insensitivity to what by the end 
of the 70s were clearly permanent social changes? Here is a partial 
reproduction of his Preface to the 1979 reprint: 
"The current volume is identical to the original 
book published... in 1973, with one exception. The original 
appendices. . . have been deleted. . . Meanwhile, the shortening 
of that edition by almost 100 pages should make the book 
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more accesible to students and managers. 
As for other, more significant changes, I believe it 
is still too early to consider making them... I should also 
add that as I look through the book in 1979, I remain for 
the most part happy with what I wrote in the early 70s. 
Hhat has changed is my perspective of what I wrote 
back then. In 1973, I felt I was simply trying to replace a 
worn-out description of managerial work. But having had six 
years to see the book through the eyes of others, I now find 
in it broader meaning: essentially the putting into 
question of some conventional views about rationality and 
bureaucracy. . . 
In the space of one week after an article on this 
book appeared in Ihe_Hew_York_Times (October 29, 1976), I 
was called... to be interviewed on morning shows. In both 
cases, the callers. . . expressed pleasure that someone had 
finally 'let managers have it.' Of course this book does no 
such thing. In fact, I am amused by the fact that the only 
people who seem to appreciate its message more than program 
assistants are managers themselves. Time and time again, I 
have been told: 'You make me feel so good. All this time I 
thought I was doing something wrong..." (1979: xv-xvi). 
And that is exactly the case. Mintzberg does not have anything 
to apologize for. Every attempt at "misreadings" of the 1973 edition 
are "straightened" in the 1979 edition. On the one hand, he recognizes 
the need "to see the book through the eyes of others, " thus accepting 
the inevitability of dissemination of meaning. But he is also quick on 
curtailing the proliferation of those meanings -that is, in the 
"authorized version," authorized by the_authoE: himself, he would never 
'let the managers have it.’ He writes fQr_the_managers, to have them 
£§§i_3QQd. The book is an apology for those unsung heroes of society: 
the managers. Let's hear Mintzberg's voice again in his Preface to the 
original edition: 
"I... decided that I would endeavor to create a book 
with wide appeal, one that would have an impact on 
practicing managers and staff people as well as on academics 
and their students. I felt that there were too many 
misconceptions in the field, that managers had had enough of 
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the fact-free wisdom of the armchair, and that they were 
ready for a new look at their job, substantiated by 
systematic research" (1973: xviii). 
And so he wrote the ultimate eulogy for the managers. And made 
sure that, in the process, the managers would notice that he was not 
"sitting around" anymore. The managers' "truth" was not going to be 
fact-free; it was going to be close to reality, thanks to Mintzberg's 
systematic research. 
In the following section I present some major aspects of this 
book. Departing from the contextualizing and intertextualizing 
strategies that I have been following in the previous two chapters, here 
I show Mintzberg's text against a partial listing of important national 
and world events between 1961 and 1971. This deconstructive strategy 
dramatizes the manner by which the criticized text functions as a 
mechanism of exclusion/inclusion. As mentioned before, the text 
explicitly ignores most social issues of its time, many of which could 
have direct relevance to the managers' job. But, at the same time, that 
ignorance punctuates the author's awareness about the issues. ’ First, he 
cannot address them directly in a negative manner, since that was to 
fall in contempt of legal mandates. Second, he cannot ignore them and 
maintain the hierarchical relationship manager/managed -which is 
clearly punctuated in previous "humanistic" management discourses. To 
do so was to sustain the manager* s dependence on the managed, and the 
manager's "social responsibility. " Given the conditions of society, the 
managers would be in a difficult position if the second route was taken. 
The text is a solution to this paradox. It is constructed 
around a notion of a free-staoding manager, not dependent on anybody 
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else for his being - the manager as Being (in a Heideggerian sense). 
But Heidegger* s Being, as I discussed in chapter one, could only be 
articulated in silence - and this text is certainly not silent about 
the_manager. Thus, what is the opposition, the "other," against Rhich 
this "free standing" manager stands? Hor is he articulated? 
The manager is articulated as the boundary marker. His is the 
body that imposes limits to transgressions (Rho can be a manager? not 
Blacks, not Romen, not "others") but his mind is not his* . He is just 
given the "mantra" Rhich Re are about to read. The "mantra, "-the 
repetition of these points Rhich form almost the Rhole body of this 
text- produces the ultimate hegemonic dream: it is the Rule of the 
Father, self-present, free-standing, needed but un-needing, the creator 
of objects of desire and his controller. My commentaries in the middle 
column unites the "insider* s mantra" to its "outside." They point at 
the fictions Rhich are present in the textual absences. 
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The Managers' "Mantra”: Ten Rorking Roles 
"The manager is that person in charge of a formal 
organization or one of its subunits. He is vested with 
formal authority over his organizational unit, and this 
leads to his two basic purposes. First, the manager must 
ensure that his organization produces its specific goods or 
services efficiently. He must design and maintain the 
stability of its basic operations, and he must adapt it in a 
controlled aay to its changing environment. Second, the 
manager must ensure that his organization serves the ends of 
those persons Hho control it (the "influencers"). He must 
interpret their particular preferences and combine these to 
produce statements of organizational preference that can 
guide its decision-making. Because of his formal authority 
the manager must serve two other basic purposes as Kell. He 
must act as the key communication link betKeen his 
organization and its environment, and he must assume 
responsibility for the operation of his organization's 
status system" (1979: 166). 
1 961 
John P. Kennedy is inaugurated as 
President of the United States 
I wonder if JFK had a simple 
role as figurehead? 
Lumumba, the radical Congolese 
leader is murdered 
He may not have been a good 
As the simplest of mana¬ 
gerial roles, the manager is a symbol, 
required because of his status to carry 
out a number of social, inspirational, 
legal, and ceremonial duties 
The l&adS.C role defines the manager's 
interpersonal relationships with his 
subordinates. 
subordinate 
the Li.ai.3.2Q role focuses on the mans 
Invasion of Cuba at Bay of Pigs ger dealings with people outside his 
own organizational unit 
This role did not quite work 
Gagarin becomes first man in 
s pace 
Interstate Commerce Comisssion 
desegregates bus/train stations 
Hot in space, nor 
center** not always 
The Berlin Wall 
Seems ironic to talk about 
monitoring here. 
here. 
Through the l.S.a4fl.C and li,i.ai.aaa 
roles, the manager gains access to 
priviledged information and he 
emerges as the "nerve center" of his 
organi zat i on. 
The "nerve 
i nf ormat i on. 
As maQi.t2C the manager continually 
seeks and receives external informa¬ 
tion from <1 variety of sources to 
develop a thorough knowledge of his 
mi llieu. 
in desegregation, 
transports the 
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1 962 
Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS): The Port 
Huron Statement 
The Cuban Missile Crisis 
As li.a.a.fi.(Di.aa&.ac manager trans¬ 
mits some of his internal and external 
information to individuals outside his 
organizational unit. He acts in a 
public relations capacity. 
Disseminator or inseminator? Still, 
public relations were working quite well 
during the 50s. Not quite at this point. 
John Glenn, first American 
to orbit Earth in apace. 
As eQ^£3.s£aQS,u£ the manager is res¬ 
ponsible for the initiation and design 
of much of the controlled change in 
his organization. 
And Glenn was certainly in control 
here. Or was it Mission Control? 
1 963 
King's LtS.tt£C_Ei:2n3_A 
&LC!Dl.Q9ba!D_!lai.l, 
Massive civil rights 
March on D. C. : "I have 
a dream" 
Who was in control? How were 
allocated? 
As r:sa2UC2£_al.l.2£.at2C the manager 
oversees the allocation of all his 
organization's resources and thereby 
maintains control of its strategy¬ 
making process. 
resources 
Finally, as Qaa2ti.at2Il the manager 
Assassination of JFK takes charge when his organization 
must have important negotiations with 
I see. I wonder who was in another organization (1979: 55-99). 
charge? 
2Zh 
1 964 
Free Speech Movement 
begins at Berkeley 
Herbert Marcuse, Qua 
&LQ}aas.i.2Qai._MaQ 
Congress passes the 
Civil Rights Act 
King receives the 
Nobel Peace Prise 
Betty Friedan, XhS. 
What is with 
the manager 
that makes 
him diffe¬ 
rent? I do 
not have a 
program. 
But I am 
more than 
one dimen¬ 
sion. Free? 
Rights? Peace? 
Mystique? 
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Managers use a 
whole repertoire of general-purpose 
programs in their work. Faced with a 
particular task, the manager chooses, 
combines, and sequences a set of pro¬ 
grams to deal with it... In addition, 
the manager has some special purpose 
programs. He uses one --the schedul¬ 
ing program-- to control his activi¬ 
ties and determine the sequence of 
tasks to be executed... The current 
reality is that all these programs 
are locked in the manager's brain, 
not yet described by the management 
researchers. 
Ah, Yes! 
First regular US combat research! 
troops in Vietnam knowledge! 
some have 
The first teach-in at it and 
the University of Michigan some 
don' t. 
Large-scale bombings of who can 
North Vietnam teach in 
this simulacrum? 
There can be no science of managing 
until these programs are demarcated, 
their contents specified, the set of 
them linked into a simulation of 
managerial work, and particular ones 
subjected to systematic analysis 
and improvement. 
Napalm! who 
Anti-war march on D. C. researched 
it? who did? 
The Voting Rights Act is 
signed They were 
probably 
Malcolm X is assassinated over¬ 
burdened 
To sum up, we find that the manager, 
particularly at senior levels, is 
overburdened with work. With the 
increasing complexity of modern orga¬ 
nizations and their problems, he is 
destined to become more so... It is 
these very characteristics of the work 
that impede attempts to improve it. 
235 
1 966 
King comas out against 
the war in Vietnam There are 
those who 
The National 0rgani2ation work 
for Women (NOW) and there 
are those 
Louis Althusser's, who 
Macs think. 
You should 
1967 not do both 
but 
Black uprisings in the how 
United States, e. g. Detroit to 
provide 
Six-Day War (Israel) guidance 
1 f you 
Che Guevara is killed in don't 
Bolivia tell 
me! 
Siege of Pentagon 
Perhaps 
NOW adopts the Bill of this way 
Rights for Women it will 
be possible 
1968 to do with¬ 
out 
Student uprisings in Warsaw the 
and Mexico City unruly 
subjects 
Student uprising at 
Columbia University, 
May '68 in Franca 
King is assassinated 
Robert F. Kennedy is 
assassinatad 
Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia 
It appears 
that they 
weren' t 
teaching 
too well 
in Warsaw, 
Mexico, 
NY or 
France 
The researcher has had immense diffi¬ 
culty trying to describe work of this 
nature... The evidence from the profes¬ 
sions is that the analyst must take a 
major responsibility for bringing 
science to bear on the performance of 
work. The practitioner is busy; his 
job is to do the work, not to analyze 
it. The management scientist has so 
far effected little change in the 
job of managing. Unable to under¬ 
stand the manager's work and describe 
his programs and unable to gain 
access to his information. 
Hence, the manager continues to 
manage as he always has, receiving 
little help from the management 
scientist... Society loses, because it 
looks to its senior managers for 
solutions to its major problems. 
To take advantage of the help possible 
from management scientists, the manager 
must somehow share his information with 
them. The result could be the 
establishment of entirely new and 
more effective ways of managing. 
The management school will 
significantly influence management 
practice only when it becomes capable 
of teaching a specific set of "skills'* 
associated with the job of managing. 
Just as the medical student must learn 
diagnosis and the engineering student 
must learn design, so also must the 
student of management learn leadership, 
negotiation, disturbance handling, and 
other managerial skills. 
How could anybody be talking about 
management "skills" then? I was doing 
my MBA and truly thought I was going 
to make the world better. 
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1 969 
Woodstock and Altamont 
music festivals What 
ki nd 
League of Black Revolu- of 
tionary Workers founded a 
in Detroit revolution? 
As has been emphasized, management 
schools have so far given little 
attention to the development of basic 
managerial skills; hence they have 
really done little to train managers. . 
Skill training will probably be --and 
should be-- the next revolution in 
management education. 
Certain words do "creep in" 
US puts man on the moon 
Trial of the Chicago Bight 
Richard Nixon 
1 970 
Why 
this 
obsession 
with 
under- 
Kate Millet, SS.&U&1. standing? 
For 
Cambodian invasion; Kent whom? 
State murders 
In what 
name 
Black September in Jordan is 
anybody 
Senate holds ERA-hearings, claim- 
the first since 1956 ing 
the ability 
1971 to re¬ 
program 
Attica Prison rebellion me, 
the unruly? 
New York Radical Feminist Who 
stage Speakout Against Rape can 
talk 
Fourth World Manifesto by about 
Detroit Feminists and Indo- suc- 
chinese Women cess? 
Success for Whom? 
And for What? 
Managers use programs that are not now 
well understood. The management scien¬ 
tist must help reprogram the manager's 
work; he must specify the manager's 
programs in detail and redesign them 
with a view to better performance... 
much of the manager' a work lends 
itself to partial reprogramming, 
whereby the manager can work with the 
management scientist (or with the 
computer) in a type of man-machine 
system. The manager defines the issues 
and provides some of the input infor¬ 
mation, the scientist provides the time 
and the analytical capability. 
The success of the teacher of managers 
and of the management scientist will 
depend on the success of the researcher 
(to] provide them with better 
descriptions of the job... 
[Mlost significant, we must describe 
managerial work as a system of 
programs. Our ability to prescribe 
improvement hinges on our ability to 
describe reality precisely. We shall 
develop a science of managing only when 
efforts of this type are successful. 
(1979: 167-198). 
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Rho Authorizes This Manager? 
In commentaries about Foucault's work, Gordon (1985) notices the 
changing meaning of "truth" to be spoken about a person: from the feudal 
bond where "truth" was the authentication of the individual by reference 
to others and his ties with others, to the medieval development of the 
religious practice of the confessional, where "truth" became the 
discourse that an individual is capable of conducting about himself (see 
also Luhmann, 1986). 
Hhat is the relevance of these comments here? First, we may 
notice that they point at moments in Restern history where specific 
notions about the_person became possible out of particular institutional 
approvals. And second, these notions about the person came to represent 
ideologies that informed those institutions. Out of these discourses of 
the past we have inherited conditions of possibility for various notions 
about the person, now co-mingling in the complexities of modern society. 
On the other hand we have mostly chosen to ignore the ideologies that 
informed these discourses. But they are there, everytime we speak "the 
truth. " 
The discourses of "managerial individuation" expressed in 
Barnard* s work were very explicit in recognizing individual ties to 
others, and were also explicit in assessing the problems posed by these 
ties when personifying the executive as locus of individual action. 
Barnard* s discourses, tied to his time, also show his broad liberal 
education and his ability to understand the philosophical issues 
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involved in the position he Has taking. It is north noticing here 
Andrens’ naivete nhen he criticizes Barnard for being . . less 
interested in a living, growing person than in the abstract 
'Individual*...” (1968: xiii). 
McGregor* s work deals with the problematics of "self-and-other” 
introduced by Freudian and other psychologizing discourses which gained 
popular currency during his time. As a "social scientist" he is well 
versed in these discourses and capable of theorizing an elegant middle 
of the road "interdependent position. ** Mintzberg* s manager, however, 
had to be capable of conducting a discourse about himself. Thus, he 
first declares the manager free of interdependence: 
"Every manager faces an imposing array of pressures 
in his job. As a result, he appears to react far more than 
he acts of his own free-will. But closer examination 
discloses two important degrees of freedom -the latitude 
to develop certain long-term commitments. . . , and the right 
to turn obligations to his own advantage. In other words, 
all managerial jobs are constraining; only the strong willed 
managers control their jobs, whether they be chief 
executives or foremen. . . But it is my personal belief that 
managerial jobs are not inherently constrained or inherently 
open-ended simply because they are at a particular 
organizational level; managers at any level can exhibit a 
wide range of job control, depending on job design and their 
individual abilities to cope with the pressures. . . But we 
cannot conclude that his job allows for less personal 
control. At all levels the pressures are great; in most 
jobs, no matter what the level, it is the incumbent himself 
who determines whether he will control the job or the job 
will control him" (1979: 112-113). 
And then he makes the manager a "human universal": 
"With regard to culture, for example we have the 
finding of Stieglitz (1969) that non-US chief executives 
ranked external relations as more important and planning as 
less important than American chief executives did. He 
suggest that this may be attributable to the American 
preoccupation with management science and professionalism. 
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to an emphasis on groRth, or, perhaps, to the inability to 
plan in societies irith unstable political climates. . . Irkson 
et al. (1970) ...contrasting the work of senior managers 
in... England and... USA found that the latter appear to 
have greater belief in the principles of scientific 
management. Curiously, hoHever, the empirical studies of 
the actual work activities of managers appear to show no 
variations by country... Evidence from... Carlton (1951) in 
Sweden, Stewart (1967) in Great Britain, and Dubin and Spray 
(1964) in America suggest that the basic charasteristics of 
managerial work know no national boundaries" (1979: footnote 
pp 103-104). 
And, presto! Mintzberg had created a manager capable speaking 
the "truth" about himself, and to confess. How can we understand the 
"confessional position" of Mintzberg's manager? First, by understanding 
the changed position of the manager in the society of the sixties, and 
his need for separation from that society which he cannot "manage. " 
Second, by understanding the position of "the manager" in a discipline 
where a "new class" was emerging since the "Foundation reports" - the 
"management scientists", the new "wonder kids" of complex mathematical 
operations and computer prowess. And Mintzberg does not have to 
understand any historical and philosophical nuances to comprehend where 
he stands. It comes out loud and clear in spite of himself. 
Gordon cites Nietzsche saying that Hestern history has bred "an 
animal with the right to make promises. Man himself must first of all 
have become calculable, regular, necessary, even in his own image of 
himself, if he is to be able to stand security (sic) for his own future, 
which is what one who promises does!"(1985: 88). Thus, Mintzberg 
concocts a modern animal (the manager) with the right to make promises, 
and provides him with a technology, "the mantra," for creating an image 
of himself which provides that security. But security for whom? For 
2k0 
the managers? Or for Mintzberg? 
Notice in Mintzberg's words, reproduced in the previous section, 
his strategy for making the "management scientist" depend on the 
manager, on serving him -reducing the threat that the senior managers 
may have been facing by their inability to deal with the "whiz kids." 
Mintzberg is not too subtle when pointing at "the scientists'" ignorance 
and presumptuousness. For example, in the preface to the 1973 edition 
he comments that what made him decide to study 'what managers do' for 
his dissertation was attending a conference on the impact of the 
computer on the manager and witnessing . . the frustration of leading 
thinkers in the field who were blocked by an ignorance of the top 
manager's job" (1979: xvii). And some other "telling" comments: "The 
management scientist must learn to work in a dynamic system, he must 
develop methods which, although less elegant than those he now uses, 
will be better suited to the problems of policy-making. His methods 
must be adaptive and they must operate in 'real-time' while issues are 
current" (1979: 185-186). And another: "Management science must become 
once again the application of basic analysis -clear, systematic 
thinking with a reliance on explicit data- to the problems of 
management" (1979: 196). 
On an similar footing, teaching also depends on the manager, 
whereby management schools, as he commented above, should provide 
managerial skills training. But notice now the interesting twist in 
this hierarchization of knowledge. Both the teacher and management 
scientist exist to serve the manager, and they both depend on... who 
else but the researcher! ! ! See the end of the previous section, and 
2kl 
more explicitly, observe these words in the second to last paragraph of 
the book: "He cannot longer afford to ignore managerial work as an area 
of research. It is the researcher, feeding knowledge to the manager and 
management scientist, who will ultimately determine the ability of our 
large bureaucracies to cope with their immense problems" (1979: 198). 
. . . And so, we were all sanctified in the name of the Father 
(the manager), thanks to Mintzberg's work in extracting confessions from 
his "subject of knowledge. " Or as Foucault said quoting Servant: 
"... Hhen you have thus formed the chain of ideas in the 
heads of your citizens, you may then pride yourself in being 
the guide and master. An imbecile despot can bind his 
slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them 
more tightly with the chain of their own ideas, its end 
attached to the solid base of reason - a bond which is all 
the stronger because we are ignorant of its sustance and 
believe it to be of our own making; time and despair can 
wear down bonds of iron or steel, but can do nothing against 
the habitual union of ideas except tie them more firmly 
still; and it is on the soft fibres of the brain that the 
unshakeable base of the strongest empires is to be founded" 
(1979: 102-103). 
Hhile Mintzberg, as quoted above, said: "The current reality is 
that all these programs are locked in the managers' brain not yet 
described by the management researchers." Thus, Mintzberg (1980) won 
the struggle on his own terms, safely speaking to Bill and Barbara from 
his Quebecois refuge. Most of us (Peters and Raterman are but one 
exception -and then, it took them some time) could not understand the 
message... Its conditions of possibility were not provided in our 
institutional order. Our institutions continued to pursue the "elegant 
separation" of the management scientist - who was never able, nor 
cared to learn, how to extract any "true confessions. 
CHAPTER VII 
PAST THE IDEOLOGY OF BEING PERFECTLY CLEAR 
It seems only appropriate that in this very space I set out to- 
deconstruct the title I have just written for this chapter. I cannot 
"think" of a better activity Kith nhich to start a "summarizing 
statement" of Khat "I" did in the "previous" chapters -Notice all 
the fictions in this statement: 
Think is "think" because nhatever those thoughts may be it is 
only the nriting of think Khich conveys meaning to that Khich you are 
interpreting as my thoughts Khen reading these Kords. 
Summarizing statement is "summarizing statement" because the 
summary is another Kriting, a different text, Khich by pretending to 
restate the said it is pointing at Khat the "said" is lacking. The 
innocence of "a summarizing statement" is already implicated in a 
strategy of supplementing Khat is first presented as "Khole." 
I is "I" because there is none in this text. I exist here in the 
possibility of being repeatable on the printed page; and in the 
conventions by Khich others accept the understanding of an I Khich "I" 
can Krite here. 
Previous is "previous" because it is used to mark this chapter, 
to make it present. Thus I must refer to an absence ("the previous"). 
But on doing this I am making the_Breyigus present by implying its 
precedence to "this chapter. " 
2h2 
Noh let’s try this: 
2h3 
PAST must be "past" because this idea is given by a philosophy 
of transcendence, of progress, which I have been trying to underline as 
problematic in the previous chapters. 
IDEOLOGY must be "ideology" (especially when given as THE 
ideology) because traditionally it has meant something which prevents 
knowing, or which mystifies, the_truth. But I have stated already the 
problematic status of "truth" in the position I have taken throughout 
the project. Thus, making problematic the notion of truth makes even 
more problematic a notion of ideology resting on it. 
BEING must be "being" because it is a concept which requires 
accepting a transcendental subject, capable of being present to itself 
and/or capable of knowing itself in its sensed experience (starting with 
the Cartesian 'cogito'). My questioning of both the positivist and the 
phenomenological positions about "the self" addresses the difficult 
status of this self-present being as origin of knowledge. 
PERFECTLY must be "perfectly" because perfection can only exist 
in its difference from the imperfect, which is the "common term. " In 
the perfect/imperfect pair we privilege the first term but, how do we 
tell what is perfect? Have you ever seen a PERFECT PERFECT? 
CLEAR must be "clear" because it opposes opaque. To be opaque 
implies lying... not saying the truth. But if anything is proposed as 
truth we must be capable of lying about it (otherwise we cannot call it 
truth since we would not notice its difference from lying). But we have 
2kh 
already stated difficulties Hith proposing truth - and that also makes 
difficult proposing lying. If truth can be lying, could clear be 
opaque? The editorial policy of the Academy of Management Journal says: 
"Articles should. . .be written as concisely as possible without 
sacrificing meaningfulness or clarity of presentation" (1986, 1: 2), 
Now, let's do the title again: 
"past" "the ideology" OF "being" "perfectly" "clear" 
Oops! ! I forgot the OF - But I can discount it as a "language 
problem", my own mode of expression... I have difficulties with "the 
possessives". . . Mot very innocent those "possessives". ... To possess, to 
own. . . Rhat do I own?. . . not a nationality, I am just "naturalized" 
( normalized?) -hispanic, an entryway, a ticket, a condition of 
possibility- I better drop it 
OF/F 
V 
here 
So... and now_ THE TITLE!!!! 
"past the-being-perfectly-clear ideology" 
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At this point I feel like I may as Hell drop it all together. 
As Culler remarks, one may see deconstruction as an activity by nhich 
one: 
", . .is saning the branch on which one is sitting," 
-but then he goes on to state- "though it is unusual and 
somewhat risky, it is manifestly something one can attempt. 
One can and may continue to sit on a branch while sawing it. 
There is no physical or moral obstacle if one is willing to 
risk the consequences. The question then becomes whether 
one will succeed in sawing it clear through, and where and 
how one might land... If [it] seems foolhardy to men of 
common sense, it is not so for Nietzche, Freud, Heidegger, 
and Derrida; for they suspect that if they fall there is no 
"ground" to hit and that the most clear-sighted act may be a 
certain reckless sawing, a calculated dismemberment or 
deconstruction of the great cathedral-like trees in which 
Man has taken shelter for millenia" (1982: 149). 
Thus, one may ask, what is all this "deconstructionist" business 
about? what is the "big deal" about it? . . . and again the temptation of 
"being perfectly clear" surfaces. . . I may say it is only a discussion 
about philosophy, traditionally understood as a "foundational 
discipline" -cradle of knowledge- and how it can been seen as a form 
of writing. Philosophy-as-writing makes philosophy’s foundational 
claims quite difficult to sustain, as we may now understand. Therefore, 
one may think that Derrida -that deconstructionist par excellence- 
has his own gambit against philosophy and that he will do everything 
possible to see it "out of circulation. " Right?. . . . Hrong. It may be 
surprising to some that Derrida has been widely involved with GREPH. 
This group has been working against educational reforms that would 
reduce the role of philosophy in French schools, and reorient education 
towards . what is touted as "technological requirements of the future job 
market" (sounds familiar?). 
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Derrida's Hork in this regard indicates the importance of 
philosophy not as a "foundational discipline" but as a critical 
discourse which is explicitly concerned with the politics of knowledge. 
In other words, there is no Hestern "knowledge" that does not stand on 
some "philosophical position." Our "world views" are predicated upon 
specific concepts like "origin" and "truth" which are not devoid of "a 
position" and which live on in particular discoursive formations. The 
ignorance of the possible philosophical positions, and of the role of 
philosophy in the history and politics of Restern education, would 
permit the uncontested dominance of particular institutional 
philosophies —more dangerous when they stand on a denial of taking a 
"philosophical position." 
This is perhaps one aspect of Derrida's work sometimes 
overlooked. But, in fact, one might question whether the 
deconstructionist project will make sense without an implication in the 
institutional domain. That is, Derrida's project is about the 
assumptions and conditions of discourse, and about frameworks of 
inquiry. It cannot separate itself from the structures that govern 
"practices, competencies, and performances. " Two of his texts in 
English (1982; 1983) are good illustrations of these issues, but see 
also Olmer (1985) and Culler (1982). 
And what about Foucault? Rhat is his connection to all this? It 
is precisely through the relationship between discoursive formations and 
institutional structures that one can understand the closeness of these 
two figures in what otherwise may seem like two very distinct projects. 
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Hhat Derrida calls "the general text," of which history and 
institutional traditions are a part, is proposed as that which unbinds 
and bounds the context for interpretations. It is what makes unlikely a 
theory of "the anything goes," of total anarchy, which so many people 
fear. The "anything" that "goes" is already marked by its limits 
-i. e. that which "didn't go" because it was not within the conditions 
of possibility. Foucault's projects, which deal with unraveling "the 
history of the present" and the relationships power/knowledge/subject, 
focus precisely on the conditions of possibility for the mutual 
sustenances of discoursive formations and institutional arrangements. 
At every moment what was said, and the structures through which it could 
be said, form the chain of traces from an irrecoverable "origin" of 
meaning to the place we stand today. 
With these comments I am defining a frame around the project 
which, at least for now, I hope to finalize in this chapter. It is a 
way to re-mark the institutional connections delineated in chapter two 
with the rest of the project. It is to say, in no uncertain terms, that 
we are all implicated in the definition of our institutional order by 
the boundaries we have established around our disciplines, and by the 
way we have been able to say what we have said. My explorations of 
these issues, very tentative and not quite forceful, have only been an 
attempt to open other conditions of possibilities for the discipline; 
to investigate, like Derrida has done with philosophy, the opportunities 
for the organizational disciplines to become a critical discourse, a 
primary supplement. 
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But, as it could already be felt by the reader, this is more 
easily said than done. The amount of Hork required to elicit any 
transformation of the "discipline," and the complexities and ambiguities 
inherent in the "Khy and hoK" of it, may make such a project undesirable 
at best, and impossible at worst. As theory goes, I believe that having 
done this work attests already to its possibilities. Thus, I will 
concentrate now on creating an argument for its desirability. It is my 
position that how desirable such a project may be would largely hinge on 
how accessible it could be. Khat will be written in the following pages 
would hopefully point in that direction. 
First, I will re-iterate the relationship of poststructuralism 
and deconstruction to the periodizing notions of modernism/ 
postmodernism. Second, I will emphasize the importance of 
deconstructing specific disciplinary contexts in the transition from the 
modern to the postmodern, -and how deconstructing organizational 
discourses is of particular importance. Third, I will outline a program 
for the transition, and indicate what becoming a postmodern critical 
discourse would entail for the "organizational sciences." 
Poststructuralism and a Postmodern Discipline 
As I said in chapter one, I believe that understanding 
postructuralism is a necessary condition for anybody interested in 
working from a postmodern stance for the organizational disciplines. 
The idea of not having a "stable ground for knowledge" is the first step 
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for reconsidering Hhat Ke mean by "knoKledge," The issues He are 
dealing Kith here are as fundamental as claiming the impossibility of 
empirical knonledge on the basis of "science." It is observing hoH Hhat 
can be claimed as knonledge is implicated in a netnork of conditions 
-discoursive, institutional, social-that include/exclude Hhat can 
and cannot be "said." They are the context of science/fiction. 
Deconstructing discourses of "knonledge" becomes a step in 
unraveling the fictive character of "truth. " But this step should also 
be taken nith recognition that deconstruction is not just criticizing 
any discourse -i.e. to claim that a discourse nas lying and that our 
critique discovered the truth- since that Hould amount to doing more 
of the same. Deconstruction is first, noticing that our discourses are 
full of philosophical terms that have had their "roots" in the Hestern 
history of philosophy. Thus, Derrida* s deconstruction of issues of 
presence/absence, soul/body, meaning/form, intuition/expression, etc. 
shoH hoH certain philosophical and linguistic positions have made their 
Hay into our current thinking and saying as if they Here the only 
possible "truth. " Second, deconstruction implies that ne may undermine 
"the official versions" but that ne cannot then claim to "knoH the 
Truth. " Third, it also implies taking another step and asking: Hoh 
does one live Hhen the Truth is not possible anymore? Khat other 
questions can one ask? Hhat other voices could be heard? This 
realization is particularly frightening Hhen one* s life has been 
constructed around the fiction that Hhat one does is to "discover truth" 
and to "advance knonledge. ** 
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Similarly, Foucault’s "archeologies and genealogies" make us pay 
attention to institutional relationships, and the "objects and subjects" 
which get constructed out of these relationships. The specific 
institutionalized practices that he points at -like prisons, and 
sexual practices- are not just "any" historical practices. They are 
particular constitutions of "subjects" which have permitted certain 
institutions to live on; and certain individuals to be excluded -to 
constitute "the included." 
However, "summarizing Derrida and Foucault so that we can use it 
in management" is a work I will not, nor can I, do. That would be 
equivalent to what we have done so often: transporting and appropriating 
other disciplines' "truth" for "management purposes. " Rather, it is 
necessary for us to understand how implicated our institutions and our 
discourses are in the philosophies and epistemes Foucault and Derrida 
have discussed throughout their work. Hhat I am saying is that doing 
theory in "a different mode," be it in the organizational disciplines or 
any other "modern discipline" requires at least some awareness of 
Hestern history and philosophy, -and of the history of philosophy- 
and then to understand how that history and philosophy constituted our 
understanding of "our modern selves." That is how Foucault and Derrida 
can be of help for us. 
Once we accept that our discipline and disciplinary practices 
and discourses are just one point in the "matrix of the modern" we will 
realize ’ our need to move into other disciplines which can help 
illuminate "where we come from. " This movement out of our particular 
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disciplinary boundaries and discourses, to find our "disjointed" selves, 
is also a step toward participating in the postmodern breakage of 
"disciplinary boundaries" and in their multiple discourses. Re would 
see our "selves" in those others, and would also see the many other ways 
that "our Truth" can be reinterpreted in light of them. This is a form 
of postmodern resistance to the temptations of hegemonic discourses and 
Grand Unified Theories. And those are already a few steps into our 
constitution as a postmodern discipline. 
Organizational Science: An Exemplar Modern Discourse 
One can say that the steps mentioned above may apply to any 
modern discipline in the university. Nonetheless, there is something 
special about the "organizational sciences" which impact our current 
culture differently than other disciplines do. Derrida did not 
deconstruct just any text -but philosophical texts because they had a 
particular claim about "foundational knowledge. " Foucault worked on 
historical documents because they provided keys about discoursive and 
institutional formations which, by supporting each other, defined what 
was "normal and possible" and what was not. I may ask now: Rhat about 
us? Have we not created a very special discoursive-institutional 
relationship since the mid-1800s in America, and almost everywhere else 
since the 1940s? Are we not producers/repeaters, the articulators, of a 
particular institutional order and cultural formation? Rhat do we do at 
the university? Outside of it? Aren* t we the discourses of "the modern 
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condition?” 
I said in previous chapters that in spite of all our efforts to 
look’ for "the ultimate theory of organi2ations" it is obvious now that 
"organizational practices" have kept on doing what they do quite 
comfortably, without our theories. They work, with us and without us. 
Thus, if the organizational practices do not need us, what have we been 
doing in the universities for so many years? I may say that we have 
been creating a mode of existence for the organizational subjects. He 
have re-created and extended a discourse which sustains the hegemonic 
order of society. 
The analyses of Barnard's, McGregor* s, and Mintzberg's texts 
could help us understand three different moments of the discipline when 
those discourses were articulated. In the first one the discipline was 
new and looking for some support in society for/from "the benefits of 
the corporation. " Out of that situation, the "official Barnard 
interpretation" emerged. It made Barnard "an early contributor" in "the 
progress of knowledge," especially since he was gracious enough to 
address "the individual." Thus, his text still "lives on" in the 
making of the management subject. And the Barnard that does not "fit" 
is either discounted or ignored. In the second one, the 
military-industrial complex was then pouring funds into "new science and 
technology." It was necessary to propose a scientific technology of the 
management subject, and so it happened - with the extra help of the 
Foundation reports which legitimized that the "organizational sciences" 
could borrow the already existing "technologies of the subject" -e. g. 
253 
from psychology. In the third one, "science" was clearly taking over to 
the dismay of the managers. They could not under/stand the "whiz kids" 
any longer. Managers Here not supposed to be "scientists. " 
Thus Mintzberg returned everything to its proper perspective. 
The scientist/researchers belong to the university. From there they can 
speak the "truth" if they Kant. But in the "managers' lair" all 
"scientists" better speak the managers' language. Should it surprise us 
that In_Search_of_Excellence Kas a best seller?. . . But in the meantime 
Ke Kere "doing science. " Hoh many research projects in "organizational 
sciences" get "external funding" in hOK many universities these days?... 
He may even say that the little that gets funded at the present serves 
the main purpose, not of science, but of keeping us at the 
universities. . . extending the hegemonic discourses in our courses. 
The possibilities for the "organizational sciences" to become 
critical discourses hinge on our particular knoKledge about our OKn 
discourses, practices, and institutions. And in our capability for 
understanding ourselves as widely implicated in maintaining and fueling 
-constantly reconstructing- those discourses and institutions, which 
determine most of the values of our present society. Ours are the 
"normalizing" discourses of the modern. 
A Program for Postmodernity 
Hoh to criticize ourselves becomes then a preliminary step in 
that direction. Hoh to uncover Hhat ne do, and nhich is so normal? The 
Hork done in this dissertation is one example. A form of doing theory 
as discoursive politics, through analysis of our onn 
discoursiva-institutional productions. Because Hhat is important to 
underline here is that, different from traditional critical theory (e. g. 
of the Frankfurt tradition) ne are not dealing nith organized groups or 
classes nhich confabulate to oppress another, or nith stable ideologies 
that can be uncovered and denounced. Hhat ne are dealing nith is the 
very "normality" of the discourses of everyday life -i.e. in this 
dissertation, nith the very normal "organizational sciences" discourses. 
He are dealing nith struggles that are very local and normal, and nhich 
are articulated in many different nays, at different times, by different 
people. For example, big spending for the holidays and big debts in 
February, because it is "the spirit of the season;" or firing an 
employee because "s/he Has not increasing productivity;" or balancing 
ecological controls nith the "economic nell-being of the nation;" or 
being "careful" in defining Hhat counts as "sexual harassment. " 
Joining other disciplines in the university Hill help us analyze 
our practices nith a nider understanding of its "different faces," and 
nith more information about "nhere ne come from." Hhat are our values? 
Hhat do He stand for? Joining other disciplines, honever, Hould also 
alter the institutional order of the university. In my comments in 
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chapter three on Bove's ( 1986), Aronojri tz'( 1 981), and Said's ( 1 984) 
works I noticed their concerns with making the university participate 
more fully in the discourses of society. The separation between the 
university and the rest of society is a very specific American condition 
-which, as they noted, has reproduced in its aim for specialization 
the same de-empowerment created in other forms of work in society. To 
join the others in an intervention of "everyday life" is a manner of 
reconstructing the "organizational sciences" in postmodernity. But what 
do I mean by intervention? It is not to go out and offer the services 
of "our knowledge" because that is no different from what we are doing 
today -i.e. consulting. On what basis are we claiming to own or 
possess "the truth?" To intervene means to go out and learn from the 
voices in the margins - those that do not count as knowledge - and 
bring those discourses back into our courses. How does "organization" 
mean for them? Or can it mean at all? 
Can we teach the same? Research the same? -My position is that 
what I have outlined above is a very tentative idea based on the 
possibility that we can outdo our "realist representations. " I would 
say "the same in its difference". . . with a postscript/supplement because 
we know it is not the same. The point is not to do away with the 
organizational disciplines but to see to their transformation into 
critical discourses in postmodernity. And the critical question to 
answer first is: Hhat would count as knowledge? 
As I have argued in the previous chapters, the conditions of 
possibility of our current discipline, the closing of interpretations 
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about Khat a manager can be, depended on defining a 
controlled/controlling subject which could sustain the truth/power of 
its times. This issue has been explored in other non-organi2ational 
works beyond Foucault's (e.g. Henriquez et al. , 1984; Heller, Sosna, and 
Hellbery, 1986; Huyssen, 1984), The main point in each case has been 
the construction of an image of the individual which is balanced, 
self-centered, normal. Everything that counts as knowledge in "the 
organizational sciences" has at its core a technology to sustain this 
subject. To do away with it is to agree that we cannot tell the 
difference. That anybody can be a manager, and that coming or not to a 
school of management will not matter one way or another. But we can 
construct this situation in a different way. He can agree that we have 
not made such a good society with the millions we have "educated, " and 
we can bring the lack into the discipline- that primary supplement 
which is the critical discourse. 
How to bring "the other" into the discipline? It has been there 
all along, constituting its limits. It is, for example, the discourses 
of women and minorities, other cultures, and the relationship between 
human/artificial intelligence, all of which are acknowledged as 
"marginal" if acknowledged at all. And it is to question the 
relationship between management and the world in every act of 
"organization" -to think globally and act locally, as some may say. 
It is to explore the experience of limits and otherness. It is to have 
a disjointed self and still be an OK "individual. " 
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Rhat Are Re Going to Be In Postmodernity? 
Huyssen gives an example of a postmodern "sculpture" in 
Germany, formed by 7,000 basalt rocks in a triangular formation. The 
"social sculpture" by Beuys, near a museum, is formed by "planting 
stones." At any point people can remove a stone and plant a tree in 
its place, to give life back to an area devastated by the war. In the 
meantime people are nelcomed to touch, sit, and walk through the 
sculpture; it is everybody* s art. This example of transformation, with 
discontinous substances (rock/tree), the solid (rock) substituted by the 
fragile (new tree) which may or may not live -but which in any event 
makes the public participant in all the substances and all the 
transformations; and that makes everybody an artist in her/his own 
terms- is a very good model of what we can be. 
Is not ours the most public of discurses? -about that entity 
that everybody knows: organizations- Rould we continue to be keepers 
of the rocks while shooing the public away? 
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